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Preface
Come il fiume fra i monti
ha anfratti e golfi e seni
in cui nasconde liquidi sentieri,
anche la lingua cela in orizzonti
riposti ed alieni
amori, odî e pensieri.
To write this work took me relatively little. The process preceding the
writing of it, though, was a tough and troubled travel, which began with my
first year at the University of Pisa, when I decided that language would have
been my privileged interest, and carried on during the next eight years.
My interest in semantic holism has many roots: so many different authors
seemed to me to be endorsing some form or the other of holism, that it became
difficult for me to see that it is indeed a controversial theory at all. Since it is
my conviction that our most rooted ideas, especially when they get to lead our
thoughts and reflections, are the ones we must investigate with the greatest
care (hence my idiosyncrasy against arguments appealing to intuition, which
may become apparent in the present work), I decided to turn myself to this
topic.
I found it to be true that in philosophy a great portion of work consists in
asking the right questions, rather than finding the right answers. In fact, what
may look like a plausible answer today, tomorrow may be found to be utterly
false, and maybe again plausible the day after. This is because philosophy does
not operate in isolation, and discoveries and suggestions from other disciplines
may shed a light on our investigations. Questions, on the other hand, can be
intriguing or futile, but are never right or wrong, and are therefore less prone
to change with time. On the other hand, good questions and good answers
have this in common, in philosophy: that both can open more roads than they
close, thus bringing a whole new perspective onto an ancient matter.
I do not claim to have found such good questions, nor good answers, for
that matter. But I began this investigation still with a prejudice in favour
of holism, and my aim was to find a battery of arguments to prove it right
against its opponents. A thorough investigation of those very opponents, and
of arguments in favour of holism itself, showed me how misguided I was.
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Still, conversations with linguists and philosophers convinced me that I
was not the only one taking semantic holism for granted. Thus I found my
starting point: even if holism cannot be proved absolutely right, it may be
proved more useful than its opponents from a heuristical point of view – in
virtue, that is, of its consequences with respect to other disciplines such as
linguistics. Although even this rather weaker hypothesis would eventually
prove wrong (I found semantic atomism and molecularism to have as much
heuristic value as semantic holism), to investigate it was at least within my
possibilities.
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What you are reading is something more and something less than a work
about semantic holism. Trivially, it is more because semantic holism is not
the only semantic theory I take into consideration to prove my point. It is
more, also, because of the point I try to make in this work. I do not address
the theme of semantic theories from the exclusive point of view of their claims
concerning the way we can build a semantic theory for our languages. Rather,
my aim is to investigate semantic theories from a metaholistic point of view,
so to speak. Theories do not develop in isolation: their advocates operate
in a rich theoretical and social environment, and are open to suggestion and
motives potentially coming from any area of interest. My claim, starting
from these assumptions, is that each of the semantic theories that we may
devise have privileged interlocutors among other theories and disciplines: these
privileged interlocutors are the theories and disciplines that more than others
can profit from investigation in the direction suggested by the semantic theory
in question, and that, on the other hand, more than others can furnish it with
valuable suggestions themselves.
Thus, this work is more than merely about semantic holism in itself, be-
cause its principal focus is on the relationship between semantic holism and
other philosophical and scientific theories. The focus, as I will sometimes say
in what follows, is on the heuristic value of semantic holism, and of other kinds
of semantic theories too. For this reason, this work is also somewhat less than
a work about semantic holism. That is, it is not about semantic holism in it-
self, and it is certain that it does not cover every issue that is possible to think
of about semantic holism. And this is not only because such a task would be
impossible. Holistic theories about meaning, in one form or the other, are
around since philosophers started to reflect about language. Without going
into details, it is arguable that some kind of holistic theory of meaning can
be found in what is assumed to be the first essay of philosophy of language,
Plato’s Cratylus.
Obviously there is no room, in this as in any other work, to cover every
detail of such an enormous history. Then, of course, there is the fact that I did
not choose to deal only with semantic holism, but also with what I dubbed
its competitors – semantic atomism and semantic molecularism. Therefore,
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the number of issues I should have been dealing with would at least tripli-
cate. This reason for the incompleteness of my treatment of semantic holism,
though, is more or less contingent: that is, if this were the only reason, then
it would be possible to maintain that, were not the literature on the subject
so immense, I would have covered it. But this is not the case: since, to repeat
myself, my aim is not to deal with holism in itself, but only in its heuristic
connections, I focused specifically on those aspects of holism, of atomism, and
of molecularism that are relevant to highlight those connections. Therefore,
there is much that is left out of this work. Some, inevitably, should have
been not, for my ignorance is still great; but some of the omissions are indeed
deliberate.
∗∗∗
Some words on the structure of the present work will be adequate, now. I
decided to begin with a chapter devoted to the introduction of some terminol-
ogy. This is not because I have personal notations that the reader should be
aware of, but because the traditional terminology of philosophy of language is
itself rather ambiguously used by the scholars. Even if the terms are the same,
the notions attached to them vary widely. I do not claim that my notions are
to be preferred, but only that they are the most adequate to the arguments
I will draw in what follows. It is important that the reader notices from the
beginning that it is extremely plausible that at least some of my arguments
are biased by the use I do of the terminology. The notions I think require clar-
ification are those of utterance, sentence, and proposition (§ 1.1), that
of language itself (§ 1.2), and those of reference, meaning, and truth (§
1.3): as one can see, they are the very bricks of philosophy of language.
I devoted the first part of the work to the examination of the competitors
of semantic holism, so that the latter would be described not only by itself,
but also by the comparison with the alternative theories. The two chapters
about semantic atomism and semantic molecularism are parallel. In each I
start by describing what I call the properly semantic side of the theory, then
I move to the interpretative side of the theory of meaning (i.e., the theory of
interpretation that puts the theory of meaning into effect). Finally, I tried
to evaluate each of the theories regarding both its internal assumptions and
development, and its heuristic connections with other theories and disciplines.
The same schema has been adopted for the second part of the work, de-
voted to semantic holism. Here the three-fold structure is expanded in three
chapters. It is also reversed in its first two parts, i.e., I start with the holistic
theory of interpretation, and then I move to the holistic theory of meaning.
Then I evaluate semantic holism: again, first by itself, and then by comparing
it with its heuristic value.
It is important to state here, at the beginning of this investigation, that
the heuristic evaluation of the three semantic theories attempted here does not
arrive to claim one better than the others. Although my theoretical preference
still goes to holism, and my sympathy goes to molecularism for reasons that
2
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are not entirely supportable by theoretically sound arguments, I find that each
of the three theories has its merits and its faults, and that, considered in the






Every semantic theory deals with the meaning of sentences. We expect such a
theory to be satisfactory in characterizing sentences in a language. In order to
obtain this, we must preliminarily accomplish an equally acceptable charac-
terization of language itself. Even before that, we must explain what we mean
by ‘sentence.’ The latter task will be the topic of § 1.1, the former of § 1.2.
We would also need to clarify the differences and relationships between such
notions as ‘reference,’ ‘meaning,’ and ‘truth,’ which bear great importance for
semantics. I will do this in § 1.3.
1.1 Utterances, Sentences, Propositions
The notion of sentence does not come in isolation: it is connected to those of
utterance and proposition. This distinction is what I want to focus on now.
We can examine what we say under three points of view:
1. If we are interested in the physical instantiation of speech, then we are
dealing with the utterance. Thus, this term always refers to a single
physical entity. It is the result of a performance: it can be sound, gesture,
graphic sign (writing).
2. Every utterance is, hence, the physical instantiation of a linguistic entity:
the sentence. We can have, and typically we do have, more than one
utterance per sentence. We may say that the sentence is the type of
which individual utterances are tokens. If we deal with what has been
said inasmuch as it is a linguistic product with linguistic features, then
we are dealing with sentences.
3. The sentence is a linguistic entity: therefore, it has a meaning, it is the
sign for something. This meaning, when we consider it as a metaphys-
ical entity outside language, is what we call proposition. Since more
sentences can mean the same, more than one sentence can correspond
to the same proposition.
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Propositions and sentences are, ontologically speaking, universals. We
have said that the sentence can be seen as the type whose tokens are single
utterances. Therefore, rigorous nominalists might prefer to develop a seman-
tic theory coping with mere utterances. They would maintain that, formally
speaking, only utterances really exist, and we talk of sentences only for practi-
cal reasons. Sentences may be the mere generalization of linguistic properties
shared by utterances. This is Michael Devitt’s position:
It is often convenient to talk of the objects posited by these the-
ories as if they were types not tokens, as if they were abstract
Platonic objects, but this need be nothing more than a manner
of speaking: when the chips are down the objects are parts of the
spatio-temporal world.1
Up to this point, Devitt’s Ockhamist position is absolutely legitimate.
Devitt claims, though, that this nominalistic argument should make us deem
language as the sum of linguistic outputs, i.e., of utterances.2 Such a notion
of language, though, makes the whole talk about language redundant,3 and if
we cannot mention language, it is difficult to see how to define the linguistic
features in virtue of which we are interested in dealing with utterances and
not, say, with grunts. Devitt knows it: he adds indeed a couple of pages later
that, in order to select relevant data, a theory has to rely on a preexistent
classification, to establish what should count as linguistic data and what not.4
Nothing forbids that the preexistent classification comes from a robust
philosophical theory, rather than folk linguistics, as Devitt would prefer. Being
a nominalist with respect to utterances and sentences does not necessarily
imply that we can talk about languages only by means of utterances: if we
do not want to renounce talking of the infinite potentialities of language,5 we
have to go beyond observation and the observable, which is always finite.
∗∗∗
The notion of proposition is even more problematic than the notion of sen-
tence. Propositions are ideal entities: their existence is explicitly mentioned
only in the context of some philosophical theories (usually, semantic theories).
Therefore, their existence is not accepted by everyone. Propositions, unlike
sentences, are not linguistic entities; still they are expressible only by means of
language. The point is that every feature we would attribute to propositions
must be uncovered analysing the alleged effects of propositions on sentences.
If the only access to the properties of propositions is through sentences, and if
1Devitt (2006), pg. 26, emphasis in text.
2Cfr. ibid., pg. 25: “On my view, a language is composed of the outputs of a linguistic
competence, symbols that are governed by a system of linguistic structure rules.”
3See § 1.2.
4Devitt (2006), pg. 27: “[...] guided by folk linguistics, we start with an intuitive idea
of the domain of grammatical tokens to be studied.”
5This is what below I call the Humboldtian characteristic of language. See § 1.2.
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the only role of propositions in a theory is to explain properties of sentences,
then propositions may seem redundant with respect to sentences:
There is indeed [. . . ] the hint that corresponding to each meaning-
ful expression that is an entity, its meaning. This idea, even if not
wrong, has proven to be very little help: at best it hypostasizes
the problem.6
It is easy to see the origin of the notions of sentences and propositions
in their alleged convenience in theoretical reasoning, as it happens for all
hypostases. To see it, though, is not to take a stand on the correctness of these
notions. Such a stand can be taken only after a philosophy of language has
shown, by means of a theory of meaning, whether these notions are justified,
indispensable, and not ad hoc ones.
1.2 Language
Language, whatever our depiction of it, has the characteristic, famously ex-
pressed by Humboldt, of making “infinite use of finite means.”7 Indeed every
language can express infinite different sentences by means of a finite lexicon
and a finite number of sintactic rules. Every description of language, then,
has to deal with this characteristic, which I will dub Humboldtian charac-
teristic. I would like to show in what follows that the best way, if not the
only, to cope with it is to consider languages relative to speakers, and to treat
them as produced by rules of use mastered by speakers. Thus, to reconstruct,
starting from lexicon, all the infinite sentences which are expressible in the
language, we must assume that at least one of the rules we are considering is
recursive.
∗∗∗
The major alternative of such an approach is to consider languages as consti-
tuted by a lexicon plus a set of recursive syntactic rules plus a set of possibly
recursive semantic rules. The two proposals are, as a matter of fact, one and
the same. We must acknowledge that different speakers have different lexicons
and they may seem to have different rules:
It could even happen that every speaker from the start had his
own quite unique way of speaking. Something approaching this is
in fact the case, of course. Different speakers have different stocks
of proper names, different vocabularies, and attach somewhat dif-
ferent meanings to words.8
6Davidson (2001), pg. 126.
7Wilhelm von Humboldt, Über die Verschiedenheit des Menschlichen Sprachbaues,
Berlin 1836, pg. 122, cit. in Chomsky (2000), pg. 73.
8Cf. Davidson (2001), pgs. 276 f.
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Differences in lexicons are the most easy to detect, of course. There could
also be some slight difference between speakers as to what concerns syntax.
Although it might be claimed that the core syntax is one and the same for
every speaker, one would find ungrammatical some sentences that another
would feel perfectly correct. There are ways of explaining this: for example,
we can think, as generativists do, that there are parameters that are differently
setted, and this different settings in turn can account for what is at stake here.
Moreover, Davidson seemed to allude in the preceding quotation to the
possibility of having different semantic rules between speakers. While such
a difference would surely account for the attachment of “somewhat different
meanings to words,” we must stress that the determination of the element re-
sponsible for that difference may depend on the semantic theory we entertain.
If we do not believe in a strong relationship between semantic and conceptual
systems, for instance, we may deem the latter but not the former responsible
for such a difference.
∗∗∗
Another possibility to characterize a language is to identify it by means of
sentences. We have indeed two possibilities, both of them quite unsatisfactory:
1. We may try to identify a language by means of the set of sentences which
result expressible in it, i.e., sentences which result well-formed according
to the language. We should deal, thus, with an infinite set of sentences;
and we can manage to do it only by recursive means, i.e., by means of
recursive rules. Mathematical recursion, in fact, is the only way we can
cope with infinity.
Moreover, without a rule to determine when a sentence belongs to
this set and when not, we are not able to distinguish among different
languages. Such a rule must be a rule about the compositional features
of the language; it cannot be derived from assumptions about what a
sentence would mean or how it is used by someone who would utter it.
Our experience of what languages can do is that we cannot say looking
at what it means whether a sentence is well-formed in a language or not
– hence, whether it belongs to the set or not. Indeed, even meaningless
sentences can be well-formed in a language: take the classical example
by Chomsky, “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.” On the other hand,
there are many ungrammatical sentences that are readily interpretable,
such as: “Who did you say would take you where?”
We can only partially discriminate between allowed and forbidden
sentences with the help of the lexicon: sentences using words not in the
lexicon of the language may not be considered of that language. Or, we
can have some syntactic theory thet helps defining well-formedness in a
language. However, both a lexicon and a syntactic theory are usually
reconstructed a posteriori from linguistic behavior of speakers. What we
do, then, when we rule some sentence out of a language, is claiming that
8
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speakers of that language would never treat it as grammatical. And this
means that we relativize languages to speakers.
2. Alternatively, we may treat a language as the set of all sentences actually
ever expressed in it. This is obviously a finite set, though large, because
in a finite time only a finite number of sentences is ever expressed in a
language. Anyway, this kind of identification takes in no account (ac-
tually, it denies) the Humboldtian characteristic. Should we renounce
it, we could not attribute a single language to a speaker. In fact, given
a language – i.e., in the hypothesis under examination, a finite set of
sentences – every sentence pronounced by a speaker not in the initial set
would constitute a new language. Every speaker, thus, would speak a
number of languages equal to the number of sentences produced. Hence,
the notion of language would be redundant with respect to that of sen-
tence, or even to that of utterance, if we think that no such things as
sentences exist.9
∗∗∗
Another possibility would be to trust common sense when it identifies lan-
guages such as English, Italian, Japanese, and so on. Common sense, however,
is usually vague in distinguishing among languages and between what should
be considered a language and what a dialect or a local variety. With more
refined criteria than common sense, such as sociologic or historic criteria, we
either do not defy vagueness, or we replace it with arbitrariness.
It may anyway result useful for an intelligible discourse to draw linguistic
boundaries and to have a notion of speech community to start with. Such a
notion, although formally incorrect, may constitute a valid heuristical start
for scientific or philosophical enterprises.
For instance, nearly all linguists and some philosophers of language (e.g.,
Davidson and his followers) maintain that languages are always relative to
speakers: i.e., that, strictly speaking, only idiolects (individuals’ languages)
exist. Idiolects are identified by means of rules that are specific to every
speaker. Both disciplines, though, employ the notions of common language
and speech community because of the heuristical power of such notions.
Obviously, the employment of such a contradictory notion in a strict theo-
retic elaboration must be acknowledged. This is what Chomsky and Davidson
did, respectively for linguistics and for philosophy of language:
Of course, it is understood that speech communities in the Bloom-
fieldian sense – that is, collections of individuals with the same
speech behavior – do not exist in the real world. Each individual
has acquired a language in the course of complex social interac-




what they hear and in the internal representations that underlie
their use of language.10
Given a community of speakers with apparently the same linguis-
tic repertoire, [. . . ] the theorist will strive for a single theory of
interpretation: this will greatly narrow his practical choice of pre-
liminary theories for each individual speaker.11
Davidson and Chomsky, then, know very well that we cannot talk about
the same linguistic repertoire of different speakers. Their theories, although
somehow different, enable them to distinguish among more or less similar
repertoires, and to employ the idealized notion of speech community. This is
all they need to pursue their discourses.
Some scholars have claimed, though, that linguists’ usage of the notion of
speech community is, indeed, something more than sheer pragmatism:
[. . . ] the dismissal of concern with “a common language” like En-
glish seems overblown, at least. The members of any group that
share a meaning of one linguistic expression tend to share mean-
ings of a vast number of others and it is convenient, on the basis
of this, to follow the custom of classifying sets of these expressions
with shared meanings as English, Spanish, and so on. The clas-
sification is bound to be a bit vague but no more so than many
scientifically appropriate ones. And such classifications seem to be
useful in linguistics, for linguistics books and articles are replete
with them. Are these classifications mere manners of speaking
that can be paraphrased away when the serious linguistic work is
done? I think not: they are necessary for the linguist to identify
what she is talking about, to identify the subject matter. For, the
subject matter is the shared meanings and syntactic properties of
linguistic expressions in a certain group of people. To identify this
subject matter she has to identify the group.12
One should note that Devitt does not claim that the notion of idiolect
is dispensable: in fact, to say that linguistic research must deal with shared
meanings among idiolects13 is the same as to say that idiolects have a primitive
position, in an ontological sense, in an explanatory sense, and in a temporal
sense. On the other hand, I do not see why we cannot say that the identi-
fication of groups is a theoretical construction: it is undoubtedly useful, but
10Chomsky (1986), pg. 16.
11Davidson (2001), pg. 153.
12Devitt (2006), pgs. 183 f., emphasis in text.
13Cf. ibid. (emphasis in text): “[. . . ] my sixth major conclusion: the primary concern in




it is not independent of theory. To say that the subject matter of linguistics
is meanings and expressions shared among members of a group even before
having investigated how to identify such groups is to put the cart before the
horse.
I agree with Devitt when he says that linguistics shows efficient and co-
herent employment of the classification in linguistic groups, and that often
linguists cannot avoid mentioning such groups. On the other hand, there are
plenty of classifications that proved useful to scientific goals and that are,
nonetheless, irredeemably vague and therefore, perhaps, even false, if taken
at face value as ontological classification – e.g., the classification in species as
it is used in zoology.14 Still, in Devitt’s phrase, they are “scientifically appro-
priate.” Ontological existence and priority of entities cannot be deduced from
the existence of some science dealing with those entities. Theoretical con-
structions and scientific classifications are so debated, that every ontological
deduction based on them should be discouraged.
∗∗∗
What about artificial languages? Languages of this kind are possibly without
speakers. We can conceive them, though, as languages that a ‘speaker’ could
‘speak,’ i.e., that some kind of rational being might use for its purposes. Of
course, in certain cases, this would entail some odd kind of ‘speaker,’ but not
so odd we might not want to talk of ‘speaking’ any more, albeit in a rather
metaphorical way or, as I do, with scare quotes. In other words, I think that
we decide which artificial languages count as languages by comparing them
with natural ones.
It is certainly possible to conceive of an artificial language constituted by
such rules and lexicon, that we are able to construct only a finite number
of sentences. In this case, however, we must decide if it is still appropriate
to talk of language. If we take the Humboldtian characteristic to be part of
the definition of language, then a language with a finite number of possible
sentences is internally contradictory. This seems to be the opinion of those
who maintain recursion to be the core of the faculty of language.15
On the other hand, if we deem the Humboldtian characteristic and recur-
sion merely as sufficient but not necessary conditions to talk of language, we
must acknowledge that even a symbolic system with only one sign may count
as one language, then. The possibility of this kind of punctate languages, as
Fodor and Lepore call them16, is one of the objections that they consider to
14I am not claiming that there cannot be an ontological theory to metaphysically validate
the zoological taxonomy: what I am saying is that there is no guarantee that such a theory
is feasible, that theories supporting the opposite thesis have indeed been sustained, and,
more importantly, that there is no desire from the point of view of biologists of furnishing a
tassonomy with any ontological value, or with any more value than that which biology itself
would assign to it.
15Cf. Hauser et al. (2002).




Actually, this objection appears misled, as we do not require neither a
holistic nor an atomistic theory for punctate languages. In fact, we may
want to find a way to rule such systems out, for, if we considered them as
proper languages, then we would be forced to admit that, in principle, the
very notion of language is totally arbitrary. In fact, since we cannot extend
the criteria that allow us to talk of infinite languages to finite ones, we would
be forced to do the opposite. In this way, every sentence or utterance could
count as a language, and this is, as we already noted, definitely undesired.
We may choose to have different criteria for natural and formal languages,
but thus we would fail to understand on what ground the notion of ‘language’
applies in both cases. Or we can have different criteria for infinite and finite
languages, after all. But this is more or less equivalent to rule finite languages
out of semantic investigation, for we can stipulate that, since they respond to
different criteria, different semantics (if at all) is required too.
We are not interested, then, in finding or arguing for a semantic theory for
finite languages. What we require is a semantic theory for infinite languages,
i.e., for languages that share the Humboldtian characteristic. Therefore, I will
not indulge in much consideration of symbolic codes as human colinguistic
gesture, flag signals or semiotically equivalent codes, or animal means of com-
munication. As for the first kind of signalling, it must be noted that there is
no right at all to speak of a language, since any structure and any symbolic
relation between gesture and world is lacking. All we have is some kind of
extralinguistical emphasis added to the linguistic message. If we decide to
treat this as a linguistic message, we end up with losing the actual specificity
of language.
Something along the line can be said also about the whole lot of semiotic
conventions that human beings decide to adopt to interact one with the other
without resorting to linguistic communication. Moreover, it is easy to see
that in order for any of such conventions to be established and, thus, to work
properly, linguistic communication has to be available first.
As for animal communication, it is important to notice what is at stake
here. Even if we do not want to pay attention to the fact that animal com-
munication involves very different neurological patterns from human use of
language,18 and that there is nothing in it like the pragmatical features that
are essential to the human experience of using a language,19 we must acknowl-
edge that from an utterly formal point of view there is no point in comparing
our language to whatever animals use for their aims. Even the metaphor of
animal communication should be understood as merely such—a metaphor.
It can be claimed that the reason why acoustic or visual signals among ani-
17Cf. ibid., pg. 70.
18Rendall et al. (2009), pg. 235.
19Ibid.
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mals function in influencing the behaviour of conspecifics is not their semantic
value, but, perhaps, the physical nature of the very sounds and colours.20
I admit that our experience of interpreters can apply to these signals, so
that we might look at them as if they were produced within some kind of
language and, therefore, as if they were endowed of a semantics. I would
not object to such practice, provided that we acknowledge that it might be
nothing more than a metaphor deluding us.
The opposite might be true, though. We could be so obsessed with our
actual practice of language that we overlook what makes these kinds of sig-
nalling similar to our own. Ultimately, since language, whatever our depiction
of it, has the characteristic of bearing meanings, semantics must have a role
in defining what counts as language. Accordingly, the decision of treating a
language relatively to its speaker, or relatively to its lexicon and its rules is
only partially independent of the semantic theory we choose.
1.3 Reference, Meaning, Truth
Semantics deals with the way our language is about the world. In this respect
we must consider now three crucial notions, viz., those of ‘reference,’ ‘mean-
ing,’ and ‘truth.’ These terms concern different ways our language relates to
the world, and a semantic theory is a theory to explain these relations. The
term ‘world’ itself can indicate different things depending on which relation
we are focusing.
∗∗∗
A theory of reference is a theory to explain how our words relate to objects
in the world. Under the perspective of a theory of reference, then, we look at
the world as made up of objects.
There are semantic theories, like Richard Montague’s, that succeed in cor-
relating every word to an object or an entity of some kind.21 Traditionally,
these entities will be those described by set theory, such as sets themselves,
relations, functions, etc.
In less formal terms, we may say that words have as their references those
objects and entities they relate to. One goal of semantics, thus, is – or it
might be considered to be – explaining how words relate to their references.
To individuate words, anyway, is not so simple a task as we may imagine being
accustomed with written languages. Therefore, we might want to talk of parts
of sentences instead of words.
This move can be useful also in another way, for it exempts us to find a
reference for those parts of speech, such as articles or prepositions, which are
20Ibid., pgs. 236 f.
21It would be better, for what concerns Montague’s semantics, to talk about ‘pieces of
lexicon’ instead of ‘words,’ since this is a theory about formal languages, and the notion of
‘word’ might not be appropriate in this context.
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difficultly thought of as having one, especially in a nominalistic perspective.
The risk in doing so, on the other hand, is that we might tend to identify parts
of sentences by way of their alleged semantic counterparts, thus neglecting
their syntactic features, or their syntactic nature altogether.
∗∗∗
Another relationship we might want to investigate is that between a sentence
and some entity we call its meaning. We have already seen that meaningful
sentences may be said to have propositions as their meaning.22 However,
propositions are, as noted, highly controversial.
Some try to obviate the problem talking of propositions, hence of meanings,
as of facts or events. What a fact is, though, is disputed too. One standard
position is to look at facts as possible combinations of objects, i.e., as states
of affairs.23 Thus, we may call meaningful those sentences whose parts are
arranged so as to correspond to a possible combination of the corresponding
objects, and meaningless otherwise.
Of course this position requires that we identify references of parts of
sentences in the first place. We have already seen this can be a difficult task.
It is even impossible, according to those authors who believe that reference
is identified by way of sentence meaning. For, if we have first to identify
references of the parts of a sentence in order to identify the meaning of the
sentence itself, but we believe that references can be identified only after
having identified the sentence meaning, we are stuck in a vicious circle.
For what concerns reasons to believe that identification of meaning should
come before identification of references, Gottlob Frege wrote:
In the enquiry that follows, I have kept to three fundamental prin-
ciples:
always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical,
the subjective from the objective;
never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in
the context of a sentence;
never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and ob-
ject.
[. . . ] If the second principle is not observed, one is almost
forced to take as the reference of words mental pictures or acts of
the individual mind, and so to offend against the first principle as
well.24
22Cf. § 1.1.
23Cf. Wittgenstein (1922), § 2.
24Frege (1953b), pg. X. I changed the translation: the word translated with ‘sentence’
is ‘Satz.’ The English translation had ‘proposition,’ which I would not use for a linguistic
entity. See § 1.1 for more details.
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There are two more risks in wanting to identify facts only after having
identified references (i.e., the elements which the fact is made up of):
Seen in retrospect, the failure of correspondence theories of truth
based on the notion of fact traces back to a common source: the
desire to include in the entity to which a true sentence corresponds
not only the objects the sentence is ‘about’ (another idea full of
trouble) but also whatever it is the sentence says about them. One
well-explored consequence is that it becomes difficult to describe
the fact that verifies a sentence except by using the sentence itself.
The other consequence is that the relation of correspondence (or
‘picturing’) seems to have direct application to only the simplest
sentences (‘Dolores loves Dagmar’).25
Problems about facts and events are well known. We may try to solve
them by way of a teory of reference, but we should solve problems in that
theory first. Alternatively, we may pursue a theory of meaning by means of
a theory of truth. This was, in fact, Davidson’s task. The claim he made
in the above quotation is precisely that we cannot arrive to a good theory
of truth starting from some theory of facts that looks at facts as compounds
corresponding to sentences in every element.
∗∗∗
There have always been different views on what truth is. It is nowadays
accepted virtually by everyone that this notion concerns, rather than the world
in itself, the relationship between world and something else – perhaps our
thoughts about the world, provided our theories enable us to make such a
distinction. More specifically, when dealing with language, we are interested in
the truth of those thoughts which are expressed by our sentences. Therefore, a
theory of truth has as its goal the explanation of how our declarative sentences
relate to our world.
A discourse is true if what it means is actually the case. It is false if it is not
the case. When we consider isolated sentences, this terminology applies only
to assertions, and this is why assertions are the focus of most philosophical
research about semantics. Of course, these definitions depend on our theories
about meaning. Also, we must be careful in how we identify assertions, since
we should not distinguish them from other sentences merely by their capability
of being true or false, lest we fall in a vicious circle.
The most effectual characterization of truth has been provided by Alfred
Tarski. He defined truth for a formal language L (called ‘object language’)
with respect to another language M (called ‘metalanguage’), containing a
predicate ‘true in L’ which cannot be a predicate of L itself. LetM contain
also a name for every sentence p of L, which mirrors the structure of p (I will
indicate it with the sign 〈‘p’〉), and, for every sentence pn of L, a sentence sn
25Davidson (2001), pg. 49.
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translating it. We can now say, inM,
‘pn’ is true in L if and only if sn.
This is a very effective definition of truth in artificial languages. It avoids
reference to the notion of meaning, because, in the case of artificial languages,
we can explicitly construct a correspondence between sentences in the object
language and sentences in the metalanguage in a recursive way.26 In a way,
Tarski’s treatment of truth comes after an appreciation of meaning; while
in the case of formal languages we can surrogate meaning with an explicit
correspondence between sentences in the object language and sentences in
the metalanguage, such a correspondence cannot be thought of as given in the
case of natural languages.27 Tarski’s definition of truth, if applied in the latter
case, would involve the notion of meaning, and, therefore, cannot ground it.
Reference, meaning and truth, then, are intertwined notions. It is among
the tasks of a good semantic theory to explicit their relationship in order to
avoid vicious circles. A theory’s effectiveness in doing so is something we must
consider when evaluating it.
26For all this treatment of truth, and for more details, see Tarski (1969), chpt. VIII: “The
Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages.”








Let us now begin our survey of semantic theories with what we will call se-
mantic atomism. It is the theory according to which words or sentences (de-
pending on what we choose to be our atoms) have a significance of their own,
independently of context, i.e., of other words’ or sentences’ significance.
We will see that the choice of atoms is, unsurprisingly enough, somewhat
dependent on ontological commitment. Ontological choices on theoretical en-
tities, in their turn, might be influenced by the theory itself, i.e., by its ex-
planatory and heuristic power.1
∗∗∗
The fundamental problem of philosophy of language seems to be: How – and in
what sense – can our language be about our world? We may put the question
in another form: How can we understand other people’s language? It is worth
noticing that the two questions, though obviously related, are not the same.
Atomism answers the first question before the second: language is about
the world because it consists of a system of independent symbolic relations,
and we are able to communicate and to interpret what other people say, in
whatever language they say it, because language is about the world, which is
by definition one and the same for everyone. Holism first answers the second
question, and then the first. We will see how in the second part of the work.
For the present moment, let us concentrate on the atomistic answer.
2.1 What Words Mean
Let us begin with an examination of the question we might call the properly
semantic one, that about the relationship between language and world. We
saw in § 1.3 that this relationship is threefold, depending on which parts of
language and of world we focus on. For semantic atomism this is related to




language that bear the fundamental semantic relation to the world. We must
underline that holism and atomism both agree about, for instance, words’
having significance. The point in question is whether the semantic properties
of words in isolation (or of other atoms, should words prove unsuitable) are
fundamental or not.
Semantic holism is a theory according to which none of these relation
involving less than the entire system of language can be deemed fundamen-
tal: they all depend on the relation between the whole linguistic system and
the world. Semantic atomism is the opposite theory: there are fundamen-
tal atomic bearers of significance, which ground the relationship between the
whole linguistic system and the world (or that part of the world which we can
speak about, if such a specification has any sense).
2.1.1 Starting from References
A very classical position about what the bricks of significant language are is
to describe the sentence as a connection of terms. For a start, we can think,
together with logicians up to 19th century, that both terms and connection are
lexically instantiated, respectively by subject and predicate, and by the copula.
A semantic theory starting from lexical units, however identified, will have two
kinds of questions to answer. The first is about references themselves: what
they are and how they are identified (the second part of the question should
possibly merge with those about interpretation of language, which constitute,
as we have already seen, a different kind of semantic survey). The second kind
of semantic questions is about the connection among references operated by
connecting the terms referring them, i.e., a theory of the copula.
Words and References
Looking for the basis of language’s significance, atomists might want to start
assigning it to single portions of sentences, one by one. If the existence of
abstract and set-theoretical entities is not problematic for us, we can take the
lexical items we have found with the methods described before, and assign a
reference to each of them.2 Nouns will correspond to objects; linguistic at-
tributions will correspond to properties (perhaps set-theoretically construed);
syncategoremata will correspond to set-theoretical functions, operations and
relations; and so on. None of these cathegories contains only concrete entities,
2A word of advice may be needed, lest we think there is some kind of vicious circle
involved. Although, in sketching the present kind of semantic theory, I allude to parts of
speech such as nouns, no mention of this theoretical term is really needed. We can make the
correlation word by word, and then assign all the words referring to the same ontological
kind of entities to the same cathegory of parts of speech. Individuation of parts of speech,
then, will be deemed a semantic task, not a syntactic or a morphological one. See also the
next two notes.
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for even objects corresponding to nouns can well be abstract (like ‘whiteness,’
for instance).
∗∗∗
It is now time to notice that, although we have reasons to believe we may
individuate words in the speech flux, still we might want to keep more vaguish
about what portions of sentences to consider as semantic atoms. As said in
§ 1.3, in fact, this move would exempt us from assigning a reference to every
word in the language. For we might want to avoid resorting to such an ontology
as the abstract and set-theoretical one that I mentioned.
We may start with the same connection between words and set-theoretical
notions as above. The difference is that now we turn to set-theory just for
a methodology, not for an ontology. Once we have the connection we were
looking for, we can recursively assign concrete references to parts of sentences.
First, take all the words connected with concrete objects (these will be nouns,
according to what we said before), and assign them as their reference those
very objects. In particular, this will be an easy move to do with proper
nouns,3 since their reference is unique. Common nouns, on the other hand,
may be thought of as having as their reference some property, which is rather
a standard move.
Next, take all the words connected to functions taking concrete objects
as their arguments and giving concrete objects as a result (these will be arti-
cles, prepositions, some kinds of adjectives, and so on), and compose phrases
combining, according to the rules of the syntax, these words with themselves
and with the previous ones: the reference of each of these phrases will be the
result of the function connected to it.
There will still be problematic words. First of all, adjectives, verbs, and
adverbs (words connected with properties, events, and properties of events).4
In this respect, let us note that events can, in some way, be traced back to
properties of the objects involved in them. This is the reason why Medieval
logic was able to recognize in every sentence a subject, a predicate and a cop-
ula: even a sentence like ‘Socrates runs’ could be traced back to the allegedly
original sentence ‘Socrates is running.’ As for properties, there is no need to
look at them as separate from the objects they pertain to.
Next, indexicals, such as pronouns, demonstratives, and some adverbs
(‘now,’ ‘then,’ ‘here,’ ‘there,’ and the like). These might be conceived of as
derivative from nouns and non-deictic expressions, which they translate and
3When, in this paragraph, I speak of proper and common nouns, I do it with an eye to
a naive theory of parts of speech. I have already mentioned (in the preceding note) that we
are not at all compelled to such terminology in the kind of theory I am describing (see also
the next note).
4It is not at all true that, in our languages and in our classification of parts of speech,
nouns, adjectives and verbs differentiate because of the kind of entity they are connected to.
E.g., there are nouns connected to events (such as ‘war’), or verbs connected to properties
(such as, in one of its senses, ‘tower’). The division in parts of speech I am treating here,




Finally, words connected with abstract objects and phrases connected with
functions having abstract objects as their result form another kind of problem.
There is no easy way to trace abstract entities back to concrete ones, although
philosophers have tried to do it for a long time. Alternative ontologies can
be resorted to, and this is hardly a semantic issue – though it may have
consequences when choosing among semantic theories.5
Anything Smaller Than Words?
Before we turn on the semantics of sentences, i.e., of syntactic compositions of
words, we should ask ourselves whether any constituents smaller than words
can be individuated and exploited as semantic atoms instead of words. Indeed,
we know from linguistics that morphemes are defined as the smallest units of
speech to which we can attribute some significance. We want to know, then,
whether this means that a semantic theory should proceed from morphemes.
I think our answer should be no – or, at least, that by doing so no different
methodology from that already sketched is needed.
First, let us consider the case of those morphemes coinciding with words
(e.g., prepositions). It is plain to see that, to these, the strategy already
furnished applies.
In the case of words composed by more morphemes than one, let us as-
sign to each morpheme a corresponding set-theoretical entity, being either a
function or an argument, and provide that the final result of the function (or
functions) is the entity which was assigned to the whole word by the corre-
spondence of the previous section.
Of course, this way of proceeding has a strong flavour of ad hoc explana-
tion. However, supposing this objection is not fatal, we can appreciate that, as
anticipated, the strategy to cope with morphemes is not in principle different
from that applying to words. The decision between the two, therefore, is more
an ontological than a semantic one: if we are prepared to explain everything
in the world by resort to set-theoretical entities, then our semantic theory can
start from morphemes. This is so even if we decide, as before, that set theory
does not furnish any self-standing ontology, but just a path to the individu-
ation of references. Since resort to morphemes is redundant with respect to
words, I will not mention it in what follows.6
5See below, § 2.3.2.
6It is perhaps worth noting, though, that although to choose morphemes as semantic
atoms does not bear much significance on the semantic enterprise, there could be some
effect on the interpretation of morphological inquiry, or of the morphological features of
language. For instance, we may be led into viewing any morphological adjunction as either
a modification or a specification of the stem, affecting in some relevant way the connection
between the stem itself and its reference. Thus, morphology would be seen more like a
semantic matter than, for instance, a syntactic one.
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Semantics and Syntax
Once we assign a reference to each lexical unit (or to each of the phrases
we want to take as our semantic atoms), we need an explanation of how
language assembles words and phrases in sentences so that each sentence’s
structure results in accord with the intended arrangement of the references of
the sentence’s words or phrases. In other words, we need an explanation of
the semantic value of syntax.
Back in § 1.1 we saw that there are propositions corresponding to sen-
tences, which constitute their meanings. Although a sentence is indeed the
kind of entity we would expect to have a structure, we may not think of propo-
sitions as structured. But if propositions had no structure, then the structure
of our sentences would not help us understand what they mean, and we should
bear in mind the infinite associations between possible sentences and mean-
ings. Psychologically implausible as it may be, this scenario is not impossible.
However, this means that the connection between lexical units and references
does not bear on the connection between sentences and meanings. In other
words, the latter semantic relationship must be, in the hypothesis of unstruc-
tured propositions, a semantic primitive. This takes us away from the topic
of the present section, so I will postpone the discussion of this case to the
next one. For the present moment, then, let us assume that propositions are
indeed structured, and that we can draw a correspondence between sentential
and propositional structure (otherwise, it would be as if propositions were not
structured at all).
We have seen how every attribution or predication can be interpreted as
having a copula at its origin. If this is the theory we accept, it is easy to see
how to derive meanings of sentences. The function of the copula, in fact, is
just that of putting together subject and predicate: copulas add nothing to the
composition, except for composition itself. The mode of composition (whether
it is attribution, predication, relation, etc.) depends on the properties of the
lexical units or phrases taking part in the composition, and this contribution
can be determined in advance, at the moment of assigning references to words
and phrases in isolation.
Theories exploiting the role of copula, anyway, are highly unfavoured nowa-
days. We introduced the move of tracing every predication to an underlying
copula to assign some reference to verbs, adjectives, adverbs and the like, or
to phrases having such parts of speech at their core. Of course we may think
that this is not at all needed.
We might perhaps renounce to assign references to those elements alto-
gether, thus avoiding theories of subjacency which might prove untenable in
the face of empirical data, or even clash with other parts of the theory (e.g.,
with set theory). We must note, however, that the role of the copula, although
referenceless, is not completely void of significance. The copula represents, as
already said, the composition of the sentence itself. If all the elements of sen-
23
2. Semantic Atomism
tences have a perfectly independent reference, the only way of explaining how
they get together to build sentences is to postulate in every sentence the pres-
ence of a copula, i.e., of a referenceless element which has the task of keeping
the other elements together so that they form the sentence. To get rid of the
copula, then, we must find some other element whose reference is responsible
for composition, i.e., to keep the sentence together.
In other words, we have two options to explain composition starting from
reference. One is to postulate a copula in every sentence, which is respon-
sible for composition: in this way, we can assign to every other element of
the sentence but the copula an independent reference. Alternatively, we can
avoid appeal to the copula, by letting some elements of the sentence have not
independent references.
Frege proposed to charge the predicate itself, treating it always as a func-
tion needing an argument, which is furnished by the subject.7 Apart from
the ontological problem we may find with this proposal, we must underline
that we cannot assign a reference to predicates in isolation, since it is only
in the context of a sentence that it is showed that their reference must be
some unsaturated entity: only in the context of the sentence they show their
predicative nature.8 In this case, it is perhaps better to renounce definitely
to begin our semantic survey with a research of references, and start with
sentences’ meanings altogether.
2.1.2 Starting from Meanings
Frege’s theory of predicates as functions was utterly incompatible with a tra-
ditional theory of copula (one which deems the copula to be essential to con-
nect references into meanings, and which, therefore, assumes a copula to be
present with this role in every sentence) and with a semantic theory starting
from words’ references. In general, every theory that derives the semantic role
of some element of the sentence from its syntactic role (as Frege derived the
references of predicates from their being predicates) must take as its initial
field of inquiry at least the whole sentence. Notice this difference between the
proceeding described in § 2.1.1 and Frege’s proposal: in the former case, we
mentioned syntactic categories such as attributions or verbs with the advice
that we could avoid such mentions via the ontology of references. On the
contrary, Frege’s appeal to syntactic roles is unavoidable.
In § 1.3 we quoted a passage by Frege, where he stated his famous principle
of context:
[. . . ] never to ask for the reference of a word in isolation, but only
in the context of a sentence [. . . ].9
7Frege (1953c), pg. 31.
8Cf. ibid. and Frege (1953d).
9Frege (1953b), pg. X. About the translation, see n. 24 on ch. 1.
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Hence, we might decide to be more liberal towards the contribution of the
single portions of the sentence and look not for their reference, but only for the
meaning of the sentence. All we require now is that sentences’ meanings (i.e.,
propositions) exist and are fixed, and we may take no interest in the references
of sentences’ structural elements: the real extent of their contribution will be
recovered retrospectively.
Let us now take a deeper look into this version of semantic atomism.
Our primary interest is, of course, in the connection between sentences and
propositions. We have already mentioned that this connection has something
to do with the relationship between sentential and propositional structures.
The former kind of structure is whatever syntax or logic describe it to be.
As for the latter, though, we have already seen that there is no certainty at
all that propositions are in fact structured. Let us suppose that they are
not. Then, the syntactic or logical structures of sentences are merely devices
to help us build them, but have no necessary semantic value: that is, there
is no need that a sentence has to be structured in precisely the way it is
in order for it to signify the proposition it signifies. Taking this position to
the extreme, this means that there might be a language made up of infinite
unstructured sentences, each one of them bearing a primitive relation to the
propositional world. Although a theory along these lines is highly implausible
as a psychological theory, since it gives us no hint at all as for the actual
patterns of connection between our language and its meaning, from a formal
point of view there is no contradiction whatsoever in entertaining such a view.
There is, though, a problem of economicity. While it is perfectly coherent
for a formalistic approach to treat each sentence as isolated for what concerns
its meaning, and to consider syntactic and structural analogies and connec-
tions among sentences as irrelevant for the semantic enterprise, this is not the
shortest way to come up with a semantic theory for all the sentences in our
language. For if we consider the sentential structures also as hints to their
meanings, then we might trace the meaning of a whole lot of sentences back
to the original meaning of only a few of them (in comparison with the original
infinity), which we can deem atomic. Such a procedure, though, amounts to
consider the meanings of sentences – i.e., propositions – as structured; and,
more specifically, we must admit that sentential structure is a means to con-
strue propositional structure.
Thus, let us assume in the following discussion that there are atomic propo-
sitions, corresponding to atomic sentences, i.e., to the sentences whose struc-
ture is believed to be the simplest possible for a sentence to have. The sim-
plicity I am referring to, though, needs not be a syntactic one: rather, logical
simplicity is what we need to let semantics come into the picture. We want
atomic sentences to be the logical foundations of meaning. Thus, logically
simple sentences will be our atoms.
Our next task is to state which sentences are atomic, and which proposi-
tions are their meaning. In their criticism of Davidson’s holistic theory, Fodor
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and Lepore suggested that good candidates for being considered sentences
with an atomic meaning are what they call token-reflexive expressions:10
[. . . ] there is no argument so far that you can’t have a language all
of whose sentences are token-reflexive. [. . . ] If, however, you can
have a language that contains only token-reflexive sentences, what
argument shows that you can’t have a language that contains only
one sentence, so long as it is token-reflexive?11
I have mentioned a possible reason why we could be suspicious about such
a punctate language.12 Still, Fodor and Lepore’s claim that a language might
be constituted of token-reflexive sentences, and that the semantics of each of
such sentences is atomistic, might not be defied by that argument.
Albeit with a different goal in mind, Quine proposed something similar to
explain the first stages of language development.13 He proposed a strategy
to translate all sentences in our language into a language containing only
demonstratives as subjects and their predicates, conceived of in a Fregean
style.14
We need not share Quine’s opinion that his strategy has some psychological
value. We can just take it as a proof of the logical possibility of reducing all
sentences to token-reflexive ones. What happens in human psychology, as we
have already said, is another issue. Now, if it is correct that we can trace all
other sentences to token-reflexive ones, we can take it for proved that all we
need is some atomistic theory for the semantics of token-reflexive sentences.
It might occur to us that token-reflexive expressions were at the heart of
one of the semantic theories devised by Bertrand Russell, for whom demon-
stratives were the logical proper names.15 Moreover, this kind of sentences
reminds us also of the first ideas of logical positivism about language, which
stemmed from an interpretation (possibly a misinterpretation, actually)16 of
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-philosophicus.
10See Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 224, n. 8:
We’re constructing “token-reflexive” broadly to include, for example, tense
and any other feature that can function to relativize truth values to contexts
of utterance.
Fodor and Lepore do not say where they take the term ‘token-reflexive’ from. Quine
credited Reichenbach H., Elements of Symbolic Logic, New York 1947 (see Quine (1960),
pg. 101).
11Fodor and Lepore (1992), pgs. 69 f., emphasis in text.
12Cf. § 1.2.
13Quine (1960), chpt. III.
14Ibid., chpt. V.
15Quine shared this view, to the point that he claimed that “nouns might better have
been named propronouns” (Quine (1953), pg. 13).
16The debate about the right interpretation of Wittgenstein’s position as it emerges from
the Tractatus is endless. However, scholars more or less agree, now, in finding in it much
more than merely what positivists would. Wittgenstein himself was very skeptical about
Vienna Circle’s agenda, and about their consequent interpretation of his work. His own
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The way these philosophers explained, at least at one stage of their thoughts,
the connection between token-reflexive sentences and facts signified by those
sentences was by means of acquaintance. This was a sort of logical intuition,
a connection between world and language seen as a propriety of a mind, but
not of a psychological mind. Some transcendental logical mind was consid-
ered responsible for the operations of faculties which showed universality and
independence from contingent factors.
Of course, we are not forced to accept token-reflexive sentences as our
primitives. Any kind of sentences to which we can reduce all other kinds of
sentences will work as our atoms, and we can assume exactly the same (myste-
rious) mechanism of acquaintance to explain the semantics of the atoms. So,
e.g., it is very doubtful that Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
had in mind token-reflexive sentences as atoms. In fact, it is at least doubtful
whether he conceived his primitive objects (those which atomic sentences are
about) as relative to the context of utterance in the relevant way (which they
would have been, for instance, if they were sense of data).17
Such a position makes a strong metaphysical claim about the nature of
logic and language. Moreover, there can be some discussion about what is the
object of acquaintance. What does it bring us knowledge about? It would be
easy for us to answer: the meaning of the sentence, i.e., the proposition that
corresponds to it, the facts described by it.
The matter is complicated by the confusion arisen by the neopositivist
mention of truth conditions. For it can be demonstrated that all the previous
answers are equivalent to the following: By means of an act of acquaintance
we know how the world would be if a given sentence were true. Now, it can
be proved that, given such a definition, our theory can define only one notion
between ‘meaning’ and ‘truth.’ In fact, one is always defined in terms of the
other: the Tarskian theory of truth seen in § 1.3 presupposed the notion of
meaning of a sentence, and defined truth by putting in correlation a sentence in
one language with another sentence in another language. The kind of semantic
theory which we are presently surveying, instead, explains truth in terms of
some particular fact, described by the sentence, actually taking place. The
fact described by the sentence, though, is a logical primitive: it is precisely
opinion about it, however, might not be as definitively relevant as we would deem it. On
this regard, cf. this note by G. E. Moore quoted in Rosso (1999), n. 179:
Ramsey had visited [Wittgenstein] in Austria, at the time when he was teach-
ing in an elementary school there, in order to question him as to the meaning
of various statements in the Tractatus, which Ramsey found difficult to under-
stand. (Ramsey once told me, by the way, that in the case of many of these
statements, Wittgenstein said he had forgotten what he meant by them, and
had to think hard in order to arrive at a probable opinion as to what he might
have meant).
Cf. also Read and Crary (2000).




what we know by acquaintance.
2.1.3 Starting from Truth
Another kind of semantic theory is possible. It consists in taking truth as
a primitive notion, known by acquaintance, and to derive meaning from it.
Again, let me stress that the notion of knowledge hinted at when we say that
acquaintance is some kind of knowledge has nothing to do with an actual
psychological and statable knowledge. It is, instead, a logical assumption
we make to explain how language, seen as a logical system of sentences, is
connected with the world. Language, according to this as well as to the other
theories we have explored in this chapter, needs not be instantiated in human
mind as the theory describes it.
The semantic theory we are now surveying should give us truth conditions
for every single sentence, independently of every other one. It should be
a theory which tells us any sentence’s truth value, independently of other
sentences’ being true or false. Or perhaps we can be more charitable towards
semantic atomism: we might require from an atomistic theory of truth that,
although the truth values of some sentences are dependent on the truth values
of some other sentences, there are atoms, i.e., sentences whose truth values
stand on their own.
The derivation of dependent sentences can follow the lines of the Quinean
derivation mentioned in the last section. As for the atoms, there are two can-
didates to this role. First, the truth-conditionally self-standing sentences we
are looking for might be the analytic sentences of our language. Alternatively,
we can think that what we want are the same kind of primitive sentences
previously seen, no matter how identified, as long as we have some method to
reduce other sentences to them.
These two alternatives, it is better to stress it, are not at all mutually
exclusive. Actually, they are probably complementary. Before exploring them
with some more attention, let us notice that now we are dealing first of all with
declarative sentences, i.e., with that special category of sentences which are
susceptible of being true or false.18 Other kind of sentences (questions, escla-
mations, etc.) might be deemed derivative for what concerns their meaning.
They can in fact be thought of as having the same meaning as the assertions
they can be traced back to.
Analytic Sentences
Analytic sentences include two kinds of assertions. First of all, tautologies,
i.e., sentences which are always true because they are logically so. More in
general, all sentences whose truth depends solely on the language they are
formulated in, and not on the way the world is, are analytic.
18Cf. § 1.3.
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Tautologies, being logical truths, rest, in definitive, upon the logical axioms
and rules we accept as valid.19 What constitutes evidence for the validity of
logical rules is still disputed. According to the non-psychological perspective
we have adopted in the rest of this chapter, we must say that we are not
interested in the actual reasons why each one of us accepts or fails to accept
them.20 In agreement with the priority granted to truth by the approach we
are delineating here, we can consider the truth of logical rules as a primitive
knowledge, something known a priori by the non-psychological mind.
For what concerns the other kind of analytic sentences (i.e., those sentences
whose truth derives from the language they are formulated in), things are not
so easy. We are dealing with sentences like “No bachelor is married,” or “All
widowers have lost at least one wife.” As we can see, these sentences and the
like are founded on the definitions of the terms used in them. Thus, as the
truth of tautologies rests on the validity of logical rules, the truth of this larger
group of analytic sentences is founded upon the validity of our definitions.
Definitions, in their turn, are a special kind of sentences. In the logical per-
spective adopted, which is not interested in knowing the historical and social
processes that give a word its particular meaning, we might take the action
of originally defining as actually having occured, and consider this particular
action the cause of a word having its meaning. The truth of the sentences
constituting such original definitions is obvious: since these are indeed at the
root of the meaning of at least one term appearing in them, truth cannot
be questioned, for there is no way they might be false. As for non-original
definitions, they can be thought of as echoing the original ones, thus sharing
their truth value: in fact, they are the same sentence. The difference is not in
the sentence, but in the illocutive power of the utterance, i.e., in the different
goal that makes one utter it. Reasons, though, are not what we are interested
in, since reasons are a psychological issue.
Token-reflexive Sentences
We have seen that logical rules and definitions have truth values known by
means of what we decided to call an act of acquaintance. Analytic sentences
are obviously responsible for the truth of some of our sentences – and, though
not exclusively, of all of them. We can argue, in fact, that it is always possible
to show that the truth of our sentences agrees with the truth of logical rules
and definitions. This is possible because we can always leave inconsistencies
to a psychological inquiry, and claim that they are not a linguistic or logical
problem. Inasmuch as our sentences’ truth is consistent with logical rules and
19Given the interchangeability between logical axioms and logical rules, I will refer only
to the latter in what follows.
20It is still debated whether some human beings (as individuals or as members of some
social group) can show through their reasonings or actions that they consider different logical
rules to be valid. Cf. Quine (1960), pgs. 58 f.
29
2. Semantic Atomism
definitions, we may deem the latter responsible for the former. In fact, in all
cases of inconsistencies between our sentences and logical truths or definitions
we will call our sentences false (or appeal to some psychological explanation).
On the other hand, most of our sentences are not analytic, i.e., their truth
does not depend solely on logical rules and in the definitions of words used
therein. A comparison with the world is quite often needed to determine a
sentence’s truth value.
In § 2.1.2 we saw how such a comparison is possible, once we know (by
acquaintance, as we said there, or by some other means) the meaning of a
sentence. We then know, in fact, what to look for in the world to decide
its truth value. We also said there that one of the two notions of truth and
meaning must be considered primitive with respect to the other, because they
are always interdefined. Hence, if we decide to consider truth primitive with
respect to meaning, we should find another way to draw such a comparison
between sentences and world.
In § 2.1.2 actually there is something else that proved useful for our theory:
there we have seen how the semantics of every sentence can be traced back
to that of a (possible smaller) sub-group of (primitive) sentences, e.g., token-
reflexive sentences, or Russell’s xφy. This claim has nothing to do with the
relationship between sentences and world, dealing indeed with the relationship
among sentences themselves. Therefore, it is one and the same thing to say
that sentences can be traced back to, say, token-reflexive expressions with
regard to their meaning (as in § 2.1.2), or with regard to their truth value,
which is the issue we are presently interested in.
We can now claim that what we know by acquaintance about token-
reflexive sentences is not their meaning, but their truth value. From that
knowledge, together with knowledge of logical rules and rules of substitution
of words consistent with their definitions, we can know the truth value of every
possible sentence.
As for meaning, this is where the connection between truth and meaning
comes into play. Let us recall the Tarskian theory given in § 1.3. That theory,
as given there, was a definition of truth in a language. In fact, it defines truth
thanks to a previously known connection between sentences in a language and
sentences in another language, which were supposed to be translations of the
first, i.e., to have the same meaning. Meaning, in that theory, was therefore
a primitive notion.
We can exploit the same theory the other way round, identifying necessary
and sufficient conditions for the truth of a sentence, starting from knowledge
of the sentence’s being true or false. But atomism allows us to do this only
considering one sentence at a time, independently of other sentences’ being
true or false. Thus, we have on one side a sentence, which we know whether
is true or false, and on the other the world, which contains (in some way or
another) what makes our sentence be true or false, but we cannot identify
what precisely it is. As we cannot be any more specific, we end up with the
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quasi-Fregean doctrine according to which all true sentences are true in virtue
of the same entity, and all false sentences are false in virtue of the same entity.
And, since what makes a sentence true or false is its meaning, this is equivalent
to say that all true sentences mean the same, and all false sentences mean the
same, viz., Truth and Falsehood themselves.21
To recover the idea that sentences with the same truth value might have
different meanings, we can make the same move as Frege. He thought that
associated to every assertion was not only its meaning (“Bedeutung”, i.e., its
truth value) but also its sense (“Sinn”). This notion concerns the way each
different sentence is actually true or false. The relationship between truth
value and sense, then, is not as strict as a necessary and sufficient condition,
as in a Tarskian theory.
Sense is not, according to Frege, a psychological notion, though it is not
an entirely logical one either.22 Lacking a more specific way to deal with
this notion, we may decide to treat it as a primitive along the lines traced in
§ 2.1.2, thus nearly equating it with meaning, in our sense of the notion,23
except for the fact that it cannot be exploited in a Tarskian theory of truth.
Or we may think that, after all, it is a quasi-psychological notion; hence, we
may rule it out of our present issue, and deal with it when surveying actual
use and interpretation of language, in the next section.
2.2 What People Mean
In the preceding section we saw how semantic atomism attempts to answer
the first fundamental question of philosophy of language: How – or in what
sense – is our language about the world? We turn our attention now to the
second question: How can we understand other people’s language? This is a
question about language use and language interpretation.
We have often stressed that semantic atomism is not really concerned
with psychological issues: this kind of semantic theories borders – and often
overlaps with – logical theories. We could deem language an independent
logical entity or system, with rules and mechanisms of its own, which we can
determine by looking simply at it as a phenomenon, disregarding its origin
or purpose. Actually, everything showing the right characteristics could be
considered a language and studied consequently: such distinctions as between
natural and artificial languages do not matter to this kind of theories.
Use and interpretation of language, though, are a different matter. A sur-
vey of these issues, in fact, cannot prescind from language purposes. Anyway,
21Frege (1953e), pg. 63. I call quasi-Fregean such a theory because, although the thesis
that all true sentences mean the Truth and all false sentences mean the False is indeed
Fregean, the argument he constructed to show it had nothing to do with truth conditions
and with what a sentence is true or false in virtue of.
22Ibid., pgs. 35 f.
23See again § 1.3.
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this can mean two very different things: it might imply that we must take
into consideration the human nature of language – and either claim or jus-
tify the inseparability of language from human mind. Or we can still adopt a
more agnostic position, considering language as an instrument connected with
some purpose, though not with some deputed users (i.e., human beings). In
other words, we might think that language is not necessarily human; therefore,
we need not take actual functioning of human mind into account. This last
position goes along the lines of the semantic theories seen before.
∗∗∗
The question we are addressing here is in its turn twofold, as I briefly men-
tioned: we might think that we should distinguish between one’s linguistic
competence as a speaker and as a listener. In other words, to avoid mention
of human roles, we may distinguish between semantic production and semantic
interpretation. Semantic production, in a sense, is exactly what we explored in
the last section: it concerns, in fact, the way our language produces meaning.
We already know at least three major ways to answer this question, depending
on what we want to consider as semantic atoms and what semantic notion as
primitive.
Let us concentrate on semantic interpretation, then. First of all, let us
note that, if we have an atomistic account of semantic production, then the
two tasks must necessarily be distinguished. In fact, while production already
has the atoms it needs to build up complex expressions, interpretation must
start from the complex expression itself. The interpretative task consists in
individuating semantic atoms into the complex expression, understanding the
way atoms are connected in a significant structure and, thus, interpreting the
meaning of the complex expression.
Again, we must consider two different cases. The atomic constituents
of the complex expression, in fact, might or might not be accessible to the
interpreter.24 I will consider the former case first.
2.2.1 Interpretation by Comparison
If atoms can be used for a comparison with the complex structure to inter-
pret, the process is relatively easy to describe. Of course, to assume that
such a comparison is possible, we have to make some idealization about the
interpreter, which should be free from limitation of memory, time, and so on.
The interpreter can take advantage of different strategies, depending preva-
24By referring in what follows to an interpreter it is not my intention to impute the
process of interpretation to a human being or to a mind of certain kind. I dub ‘interpreter’
any entity, mechanism, device, or whatever able to interpret, i.e., to recover the significance
of expressions.
The process of interpretation here discussed should remain distinct from any psychological
process. Whether the mechanisms here described take place in the actual process of human
interpretation is a question to be examined afterwards, as it is utterly irrelevant to the
present discourse.
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lently on the kind of atoms involved and on the kind of semantic primitives
(references, meanings, or truth values), as said before.
∗∗∗
The easiest case is that, dealt with in § 2.1.1, where syntactic constituents are
also semantic atoms. All that the interpreter has to do, in fact, is to compare
one by one lexical units in his memory with those in the expression it has to
interpret. If syntactic phrases are our semantic atoms, but not lexical units,
the interpreter may have to construct those constituents from the lexical units
it has identified.
We can assume, now, that the interpreter knows each atom’s reference. In
fact, if atoms are lexical units, they are finite in number, and it can have in
its memory all the connections between atoms and references. If, on the other
hand, lexical units are not atoms, the interpreter has nonetheless an effective
method to recover references of the relevant phrases (i.e., those phrases which
are our atoms) from lexical units, as we pictured in § 2.1.1.
Knowing each atom’s reference, and the mode of the connection between
them (which is given ether by a theory of copula, or by any equivalent theory of
composition), it can recover the meaning and, by comparison with the world,
the truth value of every expression.
∗∗∗
Next, let us examine what happens if we take whole sentences as our atoms.
The first thing an interpreter has to do is decompose the complex expression
it has to interpret to trace it back to atomic sentences. This can be done only
thanks to linguistic means, like lexical hints or individuation of some kind of
sentential form, which inform the interpreter that a particular transformation
is taking place. The process might involve a certain amount of trial and error.
On the other hand, recognition of applications of logical rules or definitions
allegedly happens by acquaintance.
The meaning of atoms is allegedly known (by acquaintance or thanks to
some kind of Tarskian theory plus a theory of Fregean sense).25 Once decom-
position is done, and atoms are recovered, then, the meaning of the complex
expression can be built again recomposing it backwards.
Lexical Units
If our atomistic semantics takes words as its atoms, we have another problem
to solve: that of individuating the relevant lexical units in the continuity of
the discourse. Although all natural languages are passible of being written,
their written form presupposes lexical segmentation (i.e., breaking up speech
into lexical units), and cannot therefore be used to support it. The obvious
field to look at for answers regarding what should count as a word (a lexical
unit) and what should count either as part of a word or as a compound is,
nowadays, linguistics.
25See, respectively, § 2.1.2 and § 2.1.3.
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It cannot be denied that semantics has an effective role in actual identi-
fication of lexical items. This route of investigation, though, is precluded to
us, because it would require us to already have the semantic theory we are
attempting to found. Fortunately, there is a sense in which actual processes
might not be what we should be concerned with. Everyday practice of lan-
guage could in fact obliterate some true fact about language itself. For natural
languages depend on contingencies such as human biology and human history,
which could well affect our daily usage of language, but which we can deem
scarcely of any importance regarding what language really is—regarding its
essence, so to say. Provided we can find an alternative explanation, what hap-
pens in everyday interpretation of language may be labeled as a psychological
problem.26
The most useful answers about lexical segmentation come from phonol-
ogy. Instrumental measures assure us that there is no audible pause between
words in fluent speech.27 Nonetheless, there is some evidence28 that phonotac-
tics (i.e., knowledge about frequency of patterns of phonemes)29 and metrical
information (i.e., knowledge about rhythm and stress pattern), together with
data from pauses bounding utterances (which are audible), furnish some good
information to itemize speech into words.
Such information, of course, is not the only available one, when we have to
individuate words in speech. We can count also upon our preexistent knowl-
edge of what is a word. But this is not so for infants, and this is not so for
artificial computing systems. Both infants and artificial systems, though, can
get quite good at individuating word boundaries, and, at least when the task
is accomplished by artificial devices, we know that no other information rather
than phonological one is required.30 This is all we need to claim that the task
is generally speaking accomplishable.
Linguistic data are indeed holistic: to interpret them as relevant data, the
linguist has to contrast each single datum against the context of (possibly all)
other data, and only from the evaluation of all the linguistic system data show
their importance. This has been true ever since modern linguistics moved its
first steps.31 In particular, this must be the case with the kind of phonological
evidence that we are invoking here. However, this holistic nature of linguistics
26Of course, there are theories for which exactly these elements that we have just dubbed
of scarce importance (biology, history, psychology) constitute the essence of language. These
theories will have problems in addressing semantics from the point of view that is now being
described. We may call the present perspective the logicistic one. For further comments on
the strong relation between semantic atomism and a logical perspective, see § 2.3.2.
27Cairns et al. (1994), pg. 32.
28See, e.g., Mehler et al. (1981), Cutler and Norris (1988), Cutler and Butterfield (1991),
Cutler and Butterfield (1992), Rao (1993), Gow Jr. and Gordon (1995), Gow Jr. et al.
(1996), Davis (2003).
29But see Cairns et al. (1994).
30See Rao (1993).
31Cf. Morpurgo Davies (1996).
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is uncommitting for semantic atomists, since a holistic point of view about
phonological theories does not entail semantic holism.
Phonology, as all human science, is not infallible. Neither its data are
always as univocal as philosophers might want them to. However, with some
good scientific theory working on the issue, semantic atomists can well as-
sume that words can, at least in principle, be individuated without semantic
knowledge. Notice that if this were not the case, and if semantics were indeed
necessary to lexical individuation, then we could not have an atomisitc theory
of interpretation. In fact, we would need to individuate words in order to
know what they means and what the sentence they appear in means, but we
could not individuate words unless we knew what they mean.
2.2.2 Interpretation without Clue
Let us assume, now, that the interpreter cannot compare atoms available to
it with the complex structure to interpret, in order to find out which atoms
it is made up of.32 I talk of generical availability for two reasons. First, I
do not want to make any assumption about the nature of the interpreter: so
I keep vague about the mechanisms of this availability. Secondly, different
linguistic constituents can be deemed to be semantic atoms, and they are
available in different ways:33 so, it is better to keep vaguish about such a
notion of availability.
If atoms are not available, they must somehow be recovered, and this
can be done by making two distinct ways interact: one is decomposition of
the complex expression in its syntactical constituents, the other is looking at
the world. The individuation of constituents could seem a simple syntactic
matter. Indeed, some facts about word order, or movement of phrases from
one point of the sentence to another, or agreement, etc. are quite independent
from semantics. Nevertheless, although the composition of phrases starting
from lexical units can be defined a matter of pure syntax (at least according
to some syntactic theory, like the classical generative one), individuation of
such constituents (i.e., phrases) in the sentence cannot. Thus, production
and comprehension of language must be treated as two quite unrelated tasks.
For, while the individuation of words in the complex expression is (or can
be construed as) utterly independent of semantics (as seen in § 2.1.1), this is
not so for what concerns the assignment of words to different parts of speech.
In § 2.1.1 we were allowed to make arbitrarily such an assignment, because
32This can happen for a variety of reasons: for instance, the interpreter may lack lexical
memory, or the expression may be constituted of atoms that differ from those available to
the interpreter.
33In fact, while a finite number of atomic constituents might always be available to some
kind of memory, an infinite number of them should be syntactically built, thus being only




we assumed to be starting from an intuitive knowledge of references. This is
precisely what we have chosen not to assume here.
Therefore, interaction with world knowledge and world survey is needed.
The interpreter must be able to find in propositions (seen as real entities of
the world) elements corresponding to the elements of sentences – i.e., their
references. Only when it has devised a method to assign each word to a part
of speech, it can construe phrases and complex expressions. This, however, can
be done only through a trial and error procedure, and there is no guarantee
that a unique method of doing so exists. In fact, the contrary can be proved.34
Individuation of other kinds of semantic atoms (i.e., token-reflexive sen-
tences and analytic assertions) is perhaps possible. This implies that the
interpreter manages to recover such atoms in the complex sentence. Since it
cannot do it by direct comparison, an indirect one might work. A possible
way, then, is to know atoms of a language different from that in which the
expression to interpret is formulated. Then, by trial and error and some be-
havioristic survey, the interpreter might manage to build a translation theory
and to interpret the expression.
2.3 Evaluating Semantic Atomism
Up to this point we have seen how atomistic semantic theories manage to
answer questions about the relationship between language and world. It is
now time to look if those answers are in fact valuable and profitable ones, and
what is their role in the landscape of the different modern disciplines dealing
with one aspect or the other of language.
2.3.1 Internal Problems
I dub ‘internal’ those problems that arise inside a theory, before any interac-
tion between the theory itself and any other theory or any other discipline.
Contradictions, incoherences, vagueness, etc. are all instances of what I mean
with the expression, and these I will now examine.
Reference-grounded Theories
The major problem with reference-grounded theories is that the composition-
ality attributed to the language is too simple to be a good explanation of
natural semantics. Our intuition tells us that the same word assumes differ-
ent meanings and even different semantic values in different contexts, which is
Frege’s objection to any correspondentist semantics grounded on references. If
we want to follow this intuition in an atomistic theory, we end up with having




We can split different occurrences of the word among what we now are
forced to interpret as different atoms, each with its different referential rela-
tion.35 We would thus lose trace of the common ground which allowed us to
speak of a single word in the first place. Of course, there is no need that a
theory like the one we are devising should account for something that, after
all, is only in intuition and common practice. Theoretical semantics can very
well override intuititive semantics. Still, we need a principled way to know
when to stop finding different references.
The reason I think there is a problem will be apparent after the exam-
ination of the other solution I mentioned before. In a sense, it is just a
specification of the premises hidden in the previous solution. We could, that
is, assign as a reference to any intuitively ambiguous term a function which
takes as an argument the reference of the terms that enable us to solve the
ambiguity. This is, I think, the core of Frege’s proposal, which consists in
putting the context inside the reference.
I have two objections to such a methodology. First of all, I doubt that
we are still entitled to talk of atomism, here. Putting the context inside the
reference is just a roundabout way of taking the context into consideration
when assigning a reference to a word, a clumsy way not to admit that a
word’s reference is dependent on at least some portion of the context.36 And
even if we try not to explicit this role of context, and stick to the first kind of
solution proposed, there is still a role of the context that we cannot amend: for
context has at least a heuristical import on our enterprise. If we did not take
context into consideration we would never be led to consider what appeared as
the same word as, in fact, different words with different referential connections
to the world. But if this is true, then we must admit that an atomistic theory
for natural languages is only the axiomatic assessment of semantic relations
that we find through other ways. In other words, there is no insight to the
nature of natural semantics in this kind of atomistic theories.
Meaning-grounded Theories
Of course, the most problematic notion involved in the second kind of semantic
theories we have examined is that of acquaintance, which is a rather mysterious
interaction between a subject of knowledge and what it comes to know. This,
however, is not an internal problem of the theory: a metaphysical theory to
support such a notion can in fact be devised, and, as long as this possibility
exists, semanticists as such need not worry.
35For the sake of simplification, I will speak here of semantic atoms as if we already
decided that words or lexical items should count as ones. I see no easy solution coming to
the problem from the adoption of syntactic complexes as semantic atoms.
36The possibility that the relevant portion of context is the sentence, as per § 2.1.2, is
still open, of course.
37
2. Semantic Atomism
But other diffulties exist. We have seen in § 2.1.2 that it is possible to
trace every sentence of our language back to those having demonstratives as
subjects. However, the mechanism of this reduction is not always as clear and
flawless as we might desire. Idiomatic sentences are the less problematic ones,
although their reduction cannot happen in an utterly mechanic way. More
problems come from the treatment of metaphorical and, in general, figurative
speech, where sentences and phrases exploit, so it seems, their face meaning
to convey some meaning of second degree.
The greatest problems, however, come from intension. By this term we
mean the characteristic shared by all those kinds of sentences for which the
following rule does not hold: in a sentence, substitution of a phrase with
another one referring to the same as the first does not change the meaning
of the whole. For instance, given that ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ refer to the same
person, the two sentences ‘Tully wrote Pro Archia’ and ‘Cicero wrote Pro
Archia’ have the same meaning; the two sentences ‘Mark believes Cicero to
have written Pro Archia’ and ‘Mark believes Tully to have written Pro Archia,’
however, do not have the same meaning, if we take the two sentences as
expressing the content of a belief of Mark’s about some fact, and not about
a precise individual. The same happens with modal sentences: given the
identity ‘the number of planets of the Solar System = 8,’ the two sentences ’It is
necessary that 3+5 = 8’ and ‘It is necessary that 3+5 = the number of planets
of the Solar System’ have different meanings. Modalities and propositional
attitudes (i.e., attitudes towards propositions, like believing that, or thinking
that, or fearing that, etc.) always give rise to intensional contexts.
The problem with intension is that it forbids reduction of embedded sen-
tences: after all, there is a difference in meaning between ‘Mark thinks that
the ball is blue’ and ‘Mark thinks that this is a ball and this is blue,’ although
‘The ball is blue’ allegedly reduces to ‘This is a ball and this is blue.’ Reduc-
tion of intensional sentences, besides, is very difficult. To reduce intensional
sentences to extensional ones (i.e., a sentence for which the above-mentioned
rule holds), one has to swallow ontological entities such as possible worlds,
sets of propositions, etc.
There is of course no contradiction in entertaining such an ontology, al-
though one might prefer not to. But the problem with this kind of solution is,
seemingly to what we saw about reference-grounded theories, that, as we saw
in the case of ‘Mark believes Cicero to have written Pro Archia’ and ‘Mark
believes Tully to have written Pro Archia,’ there is an ambiguity that makes
some sentences express the same meaning or not, depending on the way we
interpret it. The possibility of different interpretation must be written in the
semantics of the sentences. There is more than an ontological problem, then.
If we want to account for intensional sentences in an extensional way, we must
somehow redeem natural languages from their ambiguities. The alternative
would be, thus resolving also the problem concerning idiomatic expressions
and figurative speech, to reserve this kind of semantic theory to some special
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kind of language, leaving natural languages with all their complications to
some different theory, perhaps a theory of interpretation.
Truth-grounded Theories
Subdivision of declarative sentences into analytic and non-analytic (i.e., syn-
thetic) ones might seem prima facie obvious. In fact, it is far from being
so:
The word ‘postulate’ is significant only relative to an act of inquiry;
we apply the word to a set of statements just in so far as we happen,
for the year or the moment, to be thinking of those statements in
relation to the statements which can be reached from them by
some set of transformations to which we have seen fit to direct our
attention.37
The analyticity of one sentence, then, depends on the relationship between
that sentence and other ones (or in what we consider this relationship to be).
It cannot be explained, then, by considering the analytic sentence in isolation.
I take this to mean that, just like in the cases of reference and meaning, our
only guide to establish the truth of sentences is our intuition of it and, perhaps,
formal logic, which is, anyway, a guide only for a limited class of assertions,
viz., tautologies.
We might think of solving this problem freezing language in one single
stage: although we know that there is no way to make a distinction between
analytic and synthetic sentences, we can decide to draw an arbitrary and
artificial one. After having done so, we can afford reduction. Of course, there
will be problems connected to idiomatic and intensional sentences, as we have
seen. Nonetheless, once we have put ourselves in an artificial situation, there
is no obstacle to artificially solving those problems too, in a way similar to
what we have already seen.
The major problem of such a theory, anyway, is that it is not at all clear
how to go from knowledge of the truth value of a sentence to its meaning. We
have seen that the Tarskian theory is of no help, unless we postulate some
Fregean sense of the sentence distinct from both its meaning and its truth
value, but somehow connected with both.
Besides, this kind of theories assumes that all sentences can be traced back
to assertions. While this is a relatively easy job for questions, other kinds of
sentences are more complex. Promises, or ironic sentences, and in general the
vast area of figurative speech need some more detailed explication.




Let us now focus our attention upon the group of theories we have examined
in § 2.2. Notice that these are not properly semantic theories. Let me quote a
passage from Fodor and Lepore’s book on semantic holism, to show what the
relationship between semantic theories and theories of interpretation is likely
to be:
Meaning (or semantic) holism must be distinguished from a num-
ber of related ideas with which it’s easily confused: from holism
about confirmation, for example, or about interpretation or about
the individuation of functional properties. These other kinds of
holism might be true even if meaning holism isn’t. Or at least, so
it seems; unless there are arguments to show not just that confir-
mation, interpretation, or the individuation of functional proper-
ties is holistic but also that the meaning of a symbol is somehow
determined by facts about how its applications are confirmed or
how its tokens are interpreted or the functions that it performs.38
In § 2.2, we have been forced from time to time to resort to holistic or
quasi-holistic means. Any trial and error comparison, in fact, presuppose that
the whole set of what it is to be compared and trialed is available. Therefore,
recognizing the significance of any expression is always, for any interpreter,
a partly holistic procedure. Significance itself, however, is not necessarily
holistic: for a sentence to have some meaning, or a word or phrase to have a
reference, there is no need that an entire system of meanings and references is
assumed. To interpret the same sentence or word or phrase such an assump-
tion, so it seems, must be done: therefore, theories of interpretation might be
very different from theories of meaning.
2.3.2 Interactions
We turn now to the place of semantic atomism with respect to theories of
other disciplines. This is something important in evaluating a theory, because
it gives us a relative measure of its value and defensibility. Although this is
not a universal value, we may choose to improve those theories that are closer
to certain areas of research and not others.
Semantic atomism seems to be very close to some metaphysical and logical
issue. The questions it attempts to answer are addressed also by linguistics and
psychology. Thus, we will try to delineate the relationships between semantic
atomism and these four disciplines.
∗∗∗
38Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. x.
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Very strong metaphysical and ontological commitments are needed to sustain
an atomistic position towards semantics. We have not failed to stress things
being so in the discussion above.
The ontology of reference-grounded theories, as we have seen, is a very
rich and complex one, assuming some kind of existence for abstract entities
and set-theoretical ones, such as concepts, classes, functions, and so on. We
may have various reasons for not believing in some kind of existence of these:
we may fail to assign them certain identification criteria, for instance, or we
may think that mere usefulness in a theory cannot be a proof of existence.
In fact, we have seen that there are some ways we can overcome the prob-
lem: we can consider the most problematic entities, such as set-theoretical
ones, merely for proof’s sake, and claim existence only for the unproblematic
ones. This might seem an easy move to do, but in fact it must cope with
the problem of properties. A theory excluding set-theoretical and asbstract
entities as much as possible, cannot consider properties as distinct from the
entity the property is a property of. This, however, leaves us with some meta-
physical problem of not simple solution. The way we identify what standard
metaphysics dubs substances, i.e., substrates of properties, is usually by
means of nouns, or at least some nouns, like proper nouns or nouns of natural
kinds (e.g., ‘water,’ ‘gold,’ ‘oak tree,’ and so on). However, it can be claimed
that the word ‘gold’ does not refer to a substance, but to a property, the prop-
erty of being gold; and the same for all nouns, even for proper nouns. Thus,
it seems that the only way to refer to substances is by means of indexicals
(‘this’ or ‘that’).
Two problems arise. The first is that it seems doubtful that the references
of indexicals are actually substances: for indexicals can perhaps be construed
as owing their reference to spaciotemporal properties, such as being in a cer-
tain place at a certain time. And if this is correct, we must admit that the
percipient subject is the only substance to which all properties are relative.
If this is true, then, and that is the second problem, references can only be
identified through complex phrases. Eventually, if properties are not indepen-
dent from substances, each sentence may consist in a single referring expres-
sion. There is no difference, then, from considering references or meanings as
primitives. In other words, talking of references may be merely redundant.
But reference is not the only notion that can arise ontological problems.
Even sticking to meanings, we may commit to ontologies involving rather ob-
jectionable entities (possible worlds, functions and other set-theoretical enti-
ties, propositions, abstract properties, and so on); not to count the notion of a
non-psychological mind having acquaintances and knowledge. We might need
a feasible metaphysic to deal with these notions and to give them plausibility.
∗∗∗
Under a different point of view, though, such a metaphysical theory may not
be necessary. If we consider the even stronger relationship between atomistic
theories of meaning and logic, metaphysical and ontological assumptions might
41
2. Semantic Atomism
be regarded as merely methodologic. No further commitment to them would
be meant; they would not bind us. In other words, we may assume a rich and
plentiful ontology just to support a theory which can prove of some utility in
logical matters, while we can still be more austere as for what we believe the
universe actually consists of.
The strongest relation entertained by semantic atomism, thus, is with
logic. We have seen, indeed, the strong anti-psychologistic claims moved by
the theory. This makes semantic atomism an easy prerequisite to be met for
logical theories. These, in their turn, can largely improve the semantic theory
by furnishing it with the rules of transformation and reduction it needs.
∗∗∗
The side effect of this harmonious relationship between atomistic semantics
and logic is that, as we have already noted, semantic atomism is not quite
good at describing semantics of natural languages. As a consequence, while
semantic atomism needs some portion of modern linguistic theories to get de-
veloped (such as phonology or syntax or maybe even morphology), it has very
little to offer in exchange. Modern linguistics is a deeply holistic discipline, in
every aspect and portion; therefore, an atomistic theory cannot help linguists
solving their problems, nor furnishing them with an agenda.
As for psychology, it is clear that, as long as semantic atomism carries on
with its claims that all actual processes involving language are a psychological
issue and not a semantic one, the two disciplines cannot cooperate. Never-
theless, what we have discussed in § 2.2 is a quasi-psychological side of the
matter. The mention of behavior in the last paragraph of that section is em-
blematic. Although it does not purport any assumption about the nature of
the interpreter or the producer of linguistic expressions (for mechanisms and
devices have a behavior too), still it gives to all the discussion a naturalistic
flavour, missing in the properly logical part (i.e., theories examined in § 2.1).
Besides, although this mention comes only in the last paragraph, it might
appear clear that all the section describes the process of interpretation from
a behavioristic point of view, and the very claim of not making assumption
about the nature of the interpreter is completely behavioristic in tone.
2.4 Some Brief Conclusion
Semantic atomism is a theory about language, not about human language,
nor about humans using language. Every assumption about the nature of
language that comes from language being a human feature must be neglected
by any atomistic semantics.
Atomistic theories are far from being complete or entirely convincing.
Their flaws, though, are worthy of mending, because of the strong associa-
tion between semantic atomism and modern logic.
Ontological and metaphysical weaknesses of such theories can be ignored in
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the light of the logical value of them. Nevertheless, there are clear indications
for metaphysics that some work still needs to be done, and that an answer to
metaphysical questions about universals, abstracts, and knowledge can prove
useful.
Still, semantic atomism has little to do with natural languages and, there-
fore, with linguistics. Moreover, it cannot furnish us with a gnoseology of






The second approach to semantics that I would like to sketch is the molecu-
laristic approach. While atomists claim that meaning can be accounted for by
paying no attention to the way languages constitute a system, molecularists
hold a somewhat opposite view: they think that to understand the meaning
of any atom of meaning (whatever partition of language we choose to define
as atomic) we need to consider the meaning of at least a part of the other
atoms in the language.
This point of view springs from considerations about the peculiar character
of the semantic enterprise, and about the connection between the two parts
of philosophy of language, as we previously characterized them. Again, this
point is rendered clear by a comparison with atomism. In the previous chapter
we saw that a possible semantic theory (more properly: a possible set of
theories) consists in distinguishing between a proper semantic answer to the
abstract problem of meaning and some other kind of theory, perhaps bordering
philosophy of mind and psychology, about the way we manage to attach such
an abstract meaning to our language: that is, a theory of interpretation.
We have reached the conclusion that such an approach, while not in itself
mistaken nor inconsistent, falls short of the desired goal of giving both a
theory of meaning and a theory of interpretation. The first move towards a
molecularistic semantics is to acknowledge that the two theories, though still
somewhat distinct, are so intertwined that it makes little sense to face them
one at a time:
A step in the right direction is taken by conforming to what is, I
believe, the correct observation that philosophical questions about
meaning are best interpreted as questions about understanding: a
dictum about what the meaning of an expression consists in must
be construed as a thesis about what it is to know its meaning.1
1Dummett (1976), pg. 69, emphasis in text.
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From this passage by Michael Dummett it is very clear the interdepen-
dence of the two order of phenomena we have delineated. Indeed, it seems
that Dummett says more, arriving to claim that they are the same kind of
phenomena, and that it is a misconstrual of the semantic enterprise to assign
different scopes to a theory of meaning in the narrow sense and to a theory of
interpretation. This would go against the outline I tried to give to what I per-
ceive as the core problem of meaning in the philosophy of language. But even
if Dummett says that the whole process of establishing a theory of meaning
should be construed as a foundation of a theory of interpretation, he himself
gives us a twofold theory, which accounts somewhat separately for the mean-
ing and for the use of sentences. The heuristic key to the foundation of the
properly semantic part of the theory, though, comes from a reflection on how
we recognize the meaning of sentences.
3.1 The Meaning and Sense of Sentences
From what Dummett writes, it may seem that the reason he believes his
theory to be a molecularistic one is the stress he puts upon sentences instead
of words. He thinks, that is, that the real semantic atoms of the language are
words, but that words have meaning only when used in sentences.2 This is no
surprise, given the Fregean background of Dummett’s philosophy. We might
think, though, that to start from sentences is not a sufficient reason for seeing
a theory as molecularistic. After all, sentences can be seen as bearers of a
primary semantic value, from which words’ semantic value can be construed
as merely derivative. This was the core of the approach examined in § 2.1.2.
Dummett’s theory is nonetheless molecularistic, since other features in it drive
us to attaching such a label to it.
The most important of these features is what we can call the distinction
between the meaning and the sense of a sentence, with a terminology which
is Fregean, although maybe a little stretched, since I will use the terms some-
what differently. I would say that the meaning of the sentence is the properly
semantic notion, and it is abstractly identifiable independently of the sen-
tence’s connections with other sentences. Such an identification needs not be
an effective identification; we might very well not have any idea of the meaning
of a sentence in isolation. The fact that we may still be able to consider such
a notion is enough to consign it to our inquiry.
What I call the sense of a sentence is, on the other hand, identifiable with
the way the sentence is used, with that aspect of the world and of human
practice that is related in a peculiar way to the sentence itself, and the recog-
nition of which may prove relevant for the understanding of its meaning. Such
a notion is to be distinguished, in its turn, from that of force of a sentence,
which is the most concrete of the three, for it concerns the actual usage of lan-
2Ibid., pgs. 71 f.
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guage, independently of its relevance for the attribution of the understanding
of meaning.
∗∗∗
The relation which connects the notion of sense to that of meaning is the rela-
tion of grounding. Michael Dummett takes into consideration three different
basic notions which might function as a founding ground for a molecularis-
tic semantics. These are truth, verification, and falsification. Although he
manifests some preference for the last one, he claims his discourse to be not
completely conclusive in this direction. Truth is, the other ways entail diffi-
culties that, maybe, are not faced when dealing with falsification. But let us
start with truth nonetheless, for even if we might be forced to abandon that
path, it will still prove of some utility to have walked along it for some lenght.
3.1.1 Meaning As Truth Conditions
The traditional semantic theory which Dummet considers first is the one which
starts from the identification of the meaning of a sentence with its truth con-
ditions, i.e., with the state of affairs which would render an utterance of the
sentence true. Up to this point, there is no difference with the atomistic the-
ory sketched in § 2.1.3. There, we faced the problem of defining the way such
a state of affair could be identified, and our answer appealed to some sort of
primitive acquaintance.
Dummett is unsatisfied by such an answer, and one of his points is that
the desire to ground the semantic enterprise on the concept of truth faces its
difficulties precisely in the grounding moment:
Thanks to the work of Frege, Tarski and many others, the diffi-
culties that face the construction of a theory of truth conditions
are not difficulties of detail: they are difficulties of principle, that
face us at the very outset of the enterprise. We know well enough
how to build the machine: but we have no grounds for confidence
that we can set it in operation. There are some problems of detail,
of course, concerning the adaptation to natural language of the
techniques devised by Frege and Tarski for formalized languages;
but we may reasonably feel optimistic about finding solutions to
problems of this kind.3
In the answer Dummet tentatively gives to the foundation problem lies
the molecularism of his position. In fact, he does not think that to solve the
problem of assigning a reference to the words in a sentence we only have to
consider the whole sentence in which they figure, but that we must take into
consideration also a whole possibly infinite set of sentences where those words
appear or might appear. The key to such a conclusion is in the formulation
3Ibid., p. 68, emphasis in text.
47
3. Semantic Molecularism
of the problem of meaning in terms of interpretation. What we are interested
in is not the meaning of an abstract sentence, but the construal of a specific
act of uttering it, because only the ability of uttering it can be a display of
the right knowledge of the meaning of the abstract sentence.
Someone who knows, of a given sentence, what condition must ob-
tain for it to be true does not yet know all that he needs to know
in order to grasp the significance of an utterance of that sentence.
If we suppose that he does, we are surreptitiously attributing to
him an understanding of the way in which the truth condition of
a sentence determines the conventional significance of an utter-
ance of it: but, since the theory of meaning is intended to display
explicitly all that a speaker must implicitly know in order to be
able to speak the language, the presumed connection between the
truth condition of a sentence and the character of the linguistic
act effected by uttering it must be made explicit in the theory.4
In other words, the difference between the atomistic theories we examined
in the past chapter and the theories we are taking into consideration presently
(together with those which we will be dealing with under the label of semantic
holism) is that in the former case we began by dealing with abstract meta-
physical entities deemed responsible of the semantic features of the language.
Thus, we have said how the major obstacle to entertaining an atomistic se-
mantic theory is not its inner inconsistency, but its uselessness with regard
to the interpretative task. The key to develop a theory that helps in this
respect is to begin with interpretation, or, at least, to begin not with abstract
entities but with observable phenomena. That is, sentences can still be taken
into consideration, but their semantic features must be deduced from their
displays, i.e., from utterances.
Although we still have to characterize a form of holism that appears feasi-
ble, we can already ask what is the difference between such an approach and
the molecularistic one which we are trying to sketch in this chapter. After
all, even without further details, we can anticipate that holism too sets as a
starting point for its enquiry on semantics the comparison of all the possible
uses of utterances, as a means to construe the meaning of sentences. The
core difference is that holism cannot distinguish among different sentences
before having taken all of the utterances into consideration.5 Molecularism,
on the other hand, is somehow two-headed, because from one side it iden-
tifies sentences, and from the other it interprets such sentences’ meaning by
surrounding each sentence with all the possible utterings of it.
4Ibid., pg. 73.
5We will have to see how this task is possible, since we have already showed that it is
at least disputable whether such a thing as taking all of the utterances into consideration is
possible at all.
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There is also another, more traditional, difference between the holistic and
the molecularistic views:
The difference between a molecular and a holistic view of language
is not that, on a molecular view, each sentence could, in princi-
ple, be understood in isolation, but that, on a holistic view, it is
impossible fully to understand any sentence without knowing the
entire language, whereas, on a molecular view, there is, for each
sentence, a determinate fragment of the language a knowledge of
which will suffice for a complete understanding of that sentence.
Such a conception allows for the arrangement of sentences and ex-
pressions of the language in a partial ordering, according as the
understanding of one expression is or is not dependent upon the
prior understanding of another.6
The reason why this difference is, in my opinion, only accessory and should
not constitute the core difference between a molecularistic and a holistic theory
is that it does not help distinguishing molecularism from atomism. What
Dummett writes about molecularism, in fact, can be said also about any
serious semantic atomism. Few atomists would maintain, that is, that every
single sentence is utterly independent, for what concerns meaning, from the
others. But they would claim the existence of atoms, which are, in Dummett’s
analogy, the minimal elements of the partial ordering, whose interpretation
does not call for further sentences or expression.
I do not want to suggest that Dummett was misled about his own theory:
he had the right to define molecularism by any feature he found useful. I
only want to say that, even if I refuse the definitions he furnished and I try
to provide my own, I still find his theory a molecularistic one, perhaps with
some adjustment that, by now, should be clear. For instance, I do not think
that in a molecularistic theory there is any point in speaking of partial order-
ing and, hence, of minimal elements.7 I think, though, that the traditional
difference between molecularism and holism points out an important feature
of the former, i.e., the possibility of dividing the whole language in several
sub-systems of sentences which do not call for sentences from the outside as
for determining meaning. Whether this feature is defensible or even necessary
to any semantic molecularism is a question I will face later on.
6Ibid., pg. 79.
7Here there is a problem connected not only with interpretation but also with the ac-
quisition of language. Language, in fact, is not learnt all of a sudden, but gradually; what is
more, the part of language that we have already learnt has a role in the acquisition of other
subsequent parts. In this sense, with regard to this priority of learning, we may be tempted
of finding those minimal parts I am arguing against.
I do not think that this kind of objection is unsurmountable, but to deal with it presently
would take us away from the issue of this section. Therefore, I postpone the matter until
§ 6.2.2. Although there I consider the matter from a holistic point of view, I think that it
would be easy to rebuild that argument in a molecularistic fashion.
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3.1.2 Meaning As Verification
In the previous section, we considered truth condition to be identified thanks
to a whole complex of sentences surrounding the one we are focused on in a
given moment, and we said that the construal of such a complex of sentences
depends in its turn on utterances (i.e., on the use we make of the sentences
themselves). Now it is time to mention that we can indeed doubt that what
we obtain through such an interpretive procedure are truth conditions. For
we understand truth conditions to be independent from our interpretation of
sentences expressing them; therefore, we think of them as independent from
our ability of recognizing true sentences at all.
Dummett acknowledges the problem, which arises clearly in presence of
sentences in the future tense, or with conterfactuals, or again with sentences
concerning some kind of infinity. In all such cases, the possibility of assuming
a controversial metaphysical stand for realism is certainly open:
This line of thought is related to a [. . . ] regulative principle gov-
erning the notion of truth: If a statement is true, it must be in
principle possible to know that it is true. [. . . ] [F]or, if it were
in principle impossible to know the truth of some true statement,
how could there be anything which made that statement true?8
From such a position, though, we are exposed to any objection which asked
us to point to the facts which make a given sentence true. However, we may
try to put the stress on the recognition of truth, rather than on truth itself.
Thus, we notice that the relevant notion is not that of truth condition, but that
of verification. Assuming such a notion as central for our inquiry must lead
us to abandon the pretense to apply classical logic to the semantics of natural
languages. For in the cases contemplated above, of undecidable sentences,
the principle of bivalence does not hold: in other words, there is no way to
maintain that such sentences have a determinate truth value out of two (or
more, in the case of multi-value logic).9 Realism about truth condition is a
metaphysical position which, so far, we cannot support with any proofs.
When we begin to think that the relevant notion is that of being capable of
effectively assigning a sentence a truth value, we realize that such a task cannot
be accomplished for all sentences. Since our intuitions about natural languages
are perhaps different (i.e., since we may be lead to think that every statement
we make is either true or false), Dummett concludes that the semantic theory
we are trying to found will require a revision of our linguistic practice.10 We
may draw a somewhat weaker conclusion, claiming that it is only our intuitions
about linguistic practice that need revising, or perhaps our understanding of
what is intuitive to claim about our linguistic practice.
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To illustrate what kind of semantics he has in mind, Dummett calls our
attention on intuitionistic explanation of the meaning of mathematical state-
ments:
In this case, there is no problem about the meanings of atomic
statements, namely, in this context, numerical equations, since
these are decidable: a grasp of their meaning may be taken as con-
sisting in a knowledge of the computation procedure which decides
their truth or falsity. The whole difference between the classical
or platonistic and the intuitionistic interpretation of arithmetical
statements therefore turns upon the way in which we are given the
meanings of the logical constants—the sentential operators and
the quantifiers.11
The explanation of such difference wipes the ambiguity arisen by the men-
tion of “atomic statements” out. Here Dummett is perhaps hinting at the role
of such statements in the arithmetic theory, or perhaps even in a semantic
theory given in a classical or platonistic way. Surely, there is no such thing as
atomic statement in the sense of an atomistic semantics in the kind of intu-
itionistic theory that we are now devising. This is, in fact, the way Dummett
thinks of operators (which is, as we have seen, the very point where classical
and intuitionistic interpretation differ):
The meaning of a logical operator is given by specifying what is
to count as a proof of a mathematical statement in which it is the
principal operator, where it is taken as already known what counts
as a proof of any of the constituent sentences (any of the instances,
where the operator is a quantifier). In so far as the logical operator
being explained is itself used in the explanation, the circularity is
harmless, since it is a fundamental assumption that we can effec-
tively recognize, of any mathematical construction, whether or not
it is a proof of a given statement; thus, when it is explained that a
construction is a proof of pA or Bq if and only if is either a proof
of A or a proof of B, the ‘or’ on the right-hand side stands between
two decidable statements, and is therefore unproblematic; we are
explaining the general use of ‘or’ in terms of this special use.12
The harmlessness Dummett is talking about is not due to the fact that
the foundation of our semantics lies in some atomic statements, where logical
operators would not appear. In fact, to interpret these “atoms” we still have to
refer to their effective proofs, and there we cannot do without logical operators.
Moreover, the appeal to a construction shows that, semantically speaking,




we are not dealing with atoms; we are not dealing with statements which
have their own meaning inscribed within themselves. Such a circularity is
nonetheless harmless, because it refers to human practice: in the example
given, to the peculiar system of practices that manifests the understanding of
the operator ‘or’ through the understanding of what counts as a proof of pA
or Bq.13
Once again, molecularism is torn between atomism and holism, and it
seems that it can escape Scylla only by giving itself to Charybdis. In fact,
when we generalize the intuitionistic picture to the non-mathematical case,
we see that appeals to the observation of human practice and behaviour is
inescapable. We will see in the next chapter that such an appeal constitutes
a founding moment for semantic holism.
It is at this point that Dummett’s hint to a revision of the linguistic practice
is rendered clear. It is true, in fact, that he rightly acknowledges that his
theory must take the systematic character of language into account.14 But it
is also true that his proposal to view our statements as characterized by our
practices in the world as more peripheric or more central with respect to the
system15 (following a suggestion by Quine)16 brings some kind of metric in
the system, which is, in this respect, less holistic than what we would expect,
since statements are somehow weighed according to their distance from the
core. On the other hand, if we take Quine’s suggestion to its end, we must
acknowledge that such a metric is not unique, but that different practices at,
perhaps, different times or situations may give rise to different metrics. We
will come back on this subject.
∗∗∗
About verificationist molecularism, there are two more things to be added.
The first is that, usually, to know the meaning of some statement is not only to
know when the statement is verified, but also to know when it is falsified, and
these two things are not to be confused, because the first does not necessarily
entail the other and vice versa.17
The other thing to be noted is yet another way molecularism differs from
atomism. We saw how an atomistic theory which starts from the meaning
of atomic sentences (as apparently molecularism does) is capable of tracing
the meaning of complex sentences to the meaning of constituent (atomic) sen-
tences. Still, there is no warranty that such an operation is legitimate. Since
the meaning of a complex statement is to be traced back to an acknowledgment
of what counts as verifying it, it is possible that such a verification exploits
the logical operators figuring in the complex statement (which give it its com-




16Cf. Quine (1953), pg. 42.
17Cf. Dummett (1976), pg. 112.
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a verification of the constituent statements, and, therefore, it would not give
us the meaning of the constituent statements.18
3.1.3 Meaning As Falsifying Criteria
Although promising, the solution seen in the previous section is not a definitive
one. In fact, on one side, Dummett states that it is impossible, for him, to
prove the truth condition solution wrong; on the other side, Dummett himself
seems to prefer still a third solution.
Before introducing the third notion that might prove to be central for
semantic molecularism, let us see what happened of the notion of truth. As
it turns out, such notion is still somehow central, though it is no more a
grounding notion for our enterprise. In fact, although we may have been
persuaded that we cannot figure the meaning of statements unless we know
what counts as a verification of them, nonetheless it might seem just obvious
that the notion of truth is a crucial one to understand the notion of verification
itself.
It is not mandatory to feel this way about truth, though. In fact, we may
pursue the issue a little further, and ask whence the notion of truth itself
comes from. We have already taken a route that leads us towards the analysis
of behaviour – in a wide sense, i.e., of (perhaps idealized) human practice.
Thus, we may feel comfortable carrying on this way, and figuring some kind
of practice which would open for us a window on the notion of truth. The
practice which seems more related to the notion of truth is that of making
assertions.
When we think about assertions, albeit in a rather idealized way, the
asymmetry between their correctness and their incorrectness strikes us. Even
assuming verification as the central notion for our theory of language, we must
acknowledge that recognizing a correct assertion is different from recognizing
an incorrect one. In fact, recognizing that a given assertion is correct does
entail the incorrectness of its negation, but the acknowledgment of the incor-
rectness of a given assertion does not entail the correctness of its negation.
There is, therefore, some room between the acknowledgment of the cor-
rectness or the incorrectness of a given assertion: it is the logical space where
we can say that its negation is incorrect while we are still wanting for some
proof of its own correctness or incorrectness. If we stick to the verificationist
picture given in the previous section, we should conclude that we still do not
know the meaning of the sentence expressed by such an assertion. But this
does not seem to be the case:
Suppose that we are considering some assertoric sentence which
we understand perfectly well in practice—that is, we have no un-
certainty about the content of the assertion made by means of
18Ibid., pgs. 112 f.
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it—but the application to which of the notions of truth and falsity
is intuitively obscure. How do we decide whether or not any given
state of affairs shows an assertion made by means of the sentence
to be correct? For instance, the sentence is an indicative condi-
tional, and the state of affairs is one in which the antecedent is
recognizable false.19
According to the verificationist theory, we should conclude that, since there
is no state of affairs which can count as verifying the sentence in the exam-
ple, then there is no displaying of practice which can count as knowing the
meaning of the sentence. This is not only counterintuitive, but also formally
contradictory with the premises of the thought experiment. We are therefore
forced to assume one of the following: either it is wrong to assume that we can
understand a sentence even if we do not know how to verify it, or the notion
of verification does not ground meaning.
To take the first option would mean to renounce too vast a part of our
language – even if we limit ourselves to the assertoric use of language, as we
are presently doing. The asymmetry between correctness and incorrectness of
assertions, noted before, leads us into thinking that a useful notion to definitely
ground meaning is at hand: the notion of falsification.
An assertion is not, normally, like an answer in a quiz programme;
the speaker gets no prize for being right. It is, primarily, a guide
to action on the part of the hearers (an interior judgment being a
guide to action on the part of the thinker); a guide which operates
by inducing in them certain expectations. [. . . ] The expectation
formed by someone who accepts an assertion is not, in the first
place, characterized by his supposing that one of those recognizable
states of affairs which render the assertion correct will come to
obtain; for in the general case there is no bound upon the length
of time which may elapse before the assertion is shown to have
been correct, and then such a supposition will have, by itself, no
substance. It is, rather, to be characterized by his not allowing
for the occurence of any state of affairs which would show the
assertion to have been incorrect; a negative expectation of this
kind has substance, for it can be disappointed.20
∗∗∗
I would like to underline the movement made by this progression of theories.
We began with a rather transcendental notion, that of truth; then we moved
on to some acknowledgment of the practical interconnectedness of sentences,
and hence to the doctrine that verification (i.e., the practical acknowledgment
19Ibid., pg. 123.
20Ibid., pg. 124, emphasis in text.
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of truth) is perhaps more crucial than truth itself. Finally, again by paying
more attention to the ordinary uses of language (and in particular to the rather
specific assertoric use), we ended with recognizing the fundamental notion of
our semantic theory in that of falsification. Thus, molecularism leads us from
transcendence to concreteness, although still a rather idealized concreteness,
since, after all, we are still not questioning the possibility of distinguishing
assertions from other linguistic acts.
3.2 The Force of Discourses
We have seen, so far, how a semantic theory can deal with a derivation of mean-
ing from what we could call, following the linguists, semantic competence,
i.e., the knowledge which is implicit in a speaker’s uttering a certain sentence.
The connection between these two aspects of our semantic experience – the
part of it concerning meaning and the part of it concerning knowledge – can be
viewed under two different perspectives. On one hand, we may ask what the
speaker has to know in order to express a given meaning. This was the subject
of the previous section. But we may as well ask how the speaker manifests
such knowledge.21 In other words, although our theory of meaning and our
theory of interpretation are obviously intertwined, there is still a conceptual
distinction that we may want to draw. It is with the latter perspective that
we will be dealing in the present section.
∗∗∗
We have seen that the determination of the meaning of any given sentence
may depend on molecularistic grounds, assuming one of the three notions we
analyzed as the core one. In fact, once we reduce meaning to, say, verification,
the meaning of one sentence is necessarily dependent on the meaning of some
other sentence stating the verifying condition of it, which we assume, for the
purpose, to be known. Once we question such previous statements, though,
we are of course pushed back to some other sentence, so that there is no atomic
sentence, meaning by this that there is no sentence whose meaning cannot be
given in terms of other sentences stating, say, its verifying conditions.
We face two problems, when dealing with such a theory. First of all,
we must explain how we manage to avoid a vicious circle. Second, we must
explain why we are talking of molecularism: in other words, how we can say
that we do not need the whole of the linguistic system to make the semantic
determination we need.
The second answer is easier to give: since we are still not dealing with
an actual system, but only with an idealized one (although, admittedly, less
so than that presupposed by an atomistic view), it is part of our initial as-
sumptions that we can partition the whole linguistic system in a Quinean way.
Such a partition bears great consequences on our theory of interpretation.
21Cf. ibid., pg. 128.
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The theory of interpretation may also be the key to answer the question
concerning the vicious circle. In fact, if we manage to find a starting point for
our semantic theory in the everyday practice of interpreting language, then,
even if such a starting point is only practical and not theoretical, as long as
our theory of interpretation is still molecularistic, we can see it as a support of
the theory of meaning previously given. If, on the other hand, the only way to
give a theory of interpretation is by some holistic means, we will be in more or
less the same condition of the atomists, who cannot reconcile their theories of
meaning with possible theories of interpretation exploiting the same concepts.
∗∗∗
Michael Dummett deals with the problem of interpretation, with which we
are concerned presently, when he wonders how we can derive the principles
governing what counts as evidence for the truth of a given sentence from the
meaning of that sentence. This sort of derivation is connected with interpreta-
tion inasmuch as the individuation of what counts as evidence for the truth of
a sentence can be interpreted as a (behaviouristical or conventional) hint that
what is being said is warranted by the states of affairs, by what the speaker
knows, and by the semantic theory that we are exploiting to connect these to
the actual semantic properties of the sentence. Moreover, once we manage to
draw such a connection, we can as well follow it the other way round, going
from the knowledge of the condition that allow the speaker to deem a certain
sentence true to the meaning of that very sentence, thus concluding the circle.
We will see that, in principle, nothing different happens when we deal with
the problem of interpretation in a holistic way.
The difference, though, is in method. When we deal with the conventions
governing our language and the applicability of sentences, we must acknowl-
edge that different contexts of utterance involve different requirements for the
speaker: hence, different things may count as evidence for the truth of different
utterances of the same sentence.22
This is the idea at the basis of Akeel Bilgrami’s theory of meaning and
interpretation. He expresses it through an externalist constraint:
When fixing an externally determined concept of an agent, one
must do so by looking to indexically formulated utterances of the
agent which express indexical contents containing that concept and
then picking that external determinant for the concept which is in
consonance with other contents that have been fixed for the agent.23
Incidentally, I would like to note that, while the constraint is formulated
as a principle governing some kind of theory of interpretation, it could have
been stated also to be used for a theory of meaning, thus leading to a theory
22Ibid., pg. 132.
23Bilgrami (1992), pg. 5, emphasis in text.
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not much different from the Dummett’s one, analyzed in the previous section.
To be sure, Bilgrami adds a caveat to his constraint:
[. . . ] although the constraint and the whole question of external-
ism are formulated in the context of how we “fix” an agent’s con-
cepts and contents, this does not mean that I am interested only or
even primarily in the epistemological question: how do we find out
about another’s concepts and contents. [. . . ] It is because I take
concepts to be externally constituted that I allow myself to believe
that the contents of an agent’s mind are necessarily public. And
it is because they are public items, items available to one another,
that a scrutiny of what goes into the fixing of one’s concepts and
contents by another is illuminating. [. . . ] Also, it should be obvi-
ous that when I talk of fixing concepts and attributing contents,
I do not have in mind the everyday scenario where we interpret
the sayings and doings of others by seeing them as contentful. I
do not have in mind everyday understanding of each other but,
rather, what underlies everyday understanding or what everyday
understanding consists in.24
In spite of Bilgrami’s own purpose in devising his theory, however, I will
use it as a guideline to show what a molecularistic theory of interpretation
might look like. First of all, my concern will be to distinguish the externalist
constraint given above from some similar constraint that may be found in
some sort of atomistic theory. Even atomism, in fact, may put a stress on the
role of indexicals, and then appeal to some sort of acquaintance to explain the
reference of these.25 But the notion of reference is not at stake here:
The centrality of indexical utterances and thoughts [. . . ] should
not give the impressions of any commitment to anything like direct
reference. Indexicals are central because they are essential clues to
an agent’s perceptions and responses to things and events around
him. This centrality is not lost if it is unaccompanied by doctrines
of direct reference [. . . ].26
It is not lost because the centrality of the indexical utterances has nothing
to do with direct reference. Our concern with indexicality is the same concern
that Quine and Dummett had for the individuation of the (perceptual or
behavioral or conventional) context of utterance.
24Ibid.
25Atomism has problems in explaining the interpretation of such acquaintance, of course,





It is certainly part of the conventions governing the assertoric use
of language what kind of claim we take a speaker who makes an
unqualified assertion to be advancing, i.e., what kind of ground
or warranty is required for the assertion not to be misleading.
This is something not uniformly determined by the meaning of the
sentence used to make the assertion, and may vary from one area
of discourse to another, and also from one context to another.27
The principle of externalism that we want to introduce now has to help
us distinguishing the relevant characteristics of a given context of utterance,
which enable us to construe the meaning of the utterance itself and, maybe,
also of the sentence – i.e., of that portion of meaning that is not, in fact,
dependent on the context, so that it remains the same in different contexts,
if any of the like exists at all. I use the expression “context of utterance”
in a rather broad sense: it is constituted by the perceptual reality which is
hinted at by the indexical features of utterances, the conventional principles
governing the assertability of sentences, the psycho-physical conditions which
may prompt the utterance.
When we take all this into consideration, it is quite easy to see what the
difference between our molecularistic theory of interpretation and a possibly
atomistic theory of interpretation is. It may be more difficult, though, to see
where the difference between molecularism and holism lies. We have to explain
why we need not take the whole set of possible contexts into consideration to
construe the meaning of a given utterance, and thus show that the differences
between different contexts is so substantial that it partitions the linguistic
system in different subsystems which might be considered independently from
one another for the sake of intepretation.
The point, according to Bilgrami’s externalism, is that the interpretation
of what a speaker means has a sense only when it is directed to the interpreta-
tion of the motives behind action. In other words, the attribution of content
is propedeutic for the interpretation of human actions and, therefore, for the
creation of a theory of human action and of human rationality – or, maybe,
rationality tout court. Thus, we may need to stick to the kind of determina-
tions that actually prove useful with regard to this task, and these are such
that we need not be concerned with the whole systematic nature of language.
Action-explanation always takes place at a much more local level
than the meaning-theoretic level. Here, the entire aggregate of be-
liefs that an agent associates with “water” are not all relevant. One
distils out of the aggregate of resources provided by the meaning-
theory only those beliefs that are relevant to the action-explanation
at the local level. Thus, if you and I are both drinking some
substance from the kitchen tap because we want to quench our
27Dummett (1976), pg. 132, emphasis in text.
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thirst with the cheapest available drink, we may in this locality
both be attributed the same content: “. . . that water will quench
thirst.” In this locality of explanation, your chemical beliefs are
simply not among the beliefs selected from the specifications af
the meaning-theory (for your idiolect). The specification of your
local water-concept in the attribution of content which explains
your behavior does not contain your chemical beliefs. Those be-
liefs are not needed in this locality so the specification of the local
water-concept ignores them.28
The major objection that holists may oppose to such a theory is that it
presupposes the whole semantic system as a pool from which local contents
are distilled. Bilgrami grants it, but he thinks that it is no victory for a
traditional holistic view, since that role is almost ininfluential.29 Every pool
of contents, in fact, can do the work, and any explanation for the process of
arriving to a local set of concepts is good for our purposes.
If this is correct, we may as well think that the notion of a whole pool of
meanings from which we can draw the information we need with the help of
contextual information is a derivative one, and not a primitive one. In other
words, we might start with the interpretation of individual discourses – i.e.,
groups of utterances connected to the same locality. Such a proposal calls for
an explanation of the recognition of the same content in different localities.
Of course, our answer should be that it is not appropriate to speak of exactly
the same content, but we may be nonetheless be interested in determining if
we are dealing with connected meanings of the same word or utterance, or if
we simply stumbled in an ambiguity of the language. Given the two localities
of Bilgrami’s example (drinking water from the tap, and talking of water in a
chemical lab), we want to know if the water-concepts which they individuate
are different like the bank of the river is different from the money bank, or
rather like a carnival mask is different from a gas mask.
Bilgrami would like to redimension this problem as well. He does it by
looking at a connected question, the dichotomy between change of meaning
and change of theory. Another way to look to the problem we posed in the
last paragraph, in fact, is to look at it from the perspective of a change of
opinion about what constitutes the concept of “water.” Such a change can
be motivated by very different causes, of course: mere scientific progress or
correction of a linguistical imprecision being only two extreme instances. We
want to know, in the new formulation of the problem, whether ancient Greek
scientists had the same concept of water that we have, and only a different
scientific theory built around the concept (hence, a difference in beliefs), or
our concept and theirs are altogether different.
28Bilgrami (1992), pg. 11, emphasis in text.
29Cf. ibid., pgs. 151 f.
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If my picture of things is correct, then meaning is specified by
those beliefs that are invariant between changes (or disagreement)
in belief. And that I find a very intuitive picture of what one
notion of meaning is. This notion of meaning fixes the subject
for belief-change. If there is nothing invariant then there is no
preservation of meaning, and the change must be counted as a
case of meaning-change.30
The question, then, is again about the construction and the individuation
of the relevant localities and, therefore, of the relevant overlapping beliefs.
Bilgrami thinks that, since the process of interpretation is necessarily open to
revision, we only need a rough starting point, which can as well be furnished
by some intuitive theory.31
3.3 Evaluating Semantic Molecularism
As in the previous chapter, I will devote a section to the examination of flaws
or obscure points in the semantic theory sketched in the previous two sec-
tions. Such flaws will be divided in two categories: those that arise by merely
considering the theory as it stands, and those that have their origin in the
interaction between semantic molecularism and other theories or disciplines.
3.3.1 Internal Problems
We have already examined the reasons that led Dummett shift from a theory
of meaning grounded on the notion of truth to a theory grounded on the notion
of verification, to one grounded on the notion of falsification. The faults of
the two first kinds of semantics, then, should by now be obvious enough.
In a nutshell: we may find problems in a truth-based theory of meaning
because the notion of truth requires some knowledge of it; hence, either we
consider truth and verification as interchangeable notions for our purposes,32
or we assume some sort of faculty (acquaintance) to connect us with truth,
which must be different from the verification faculty. As for verification, we
can see from rather common examples such as indicative conditionals with a
false antecedent, that we may very well understand the meaning of an asser-
tion, even without knowing what may count as a verification of such assertion.
30Ibid., pg. 128. Cf. ibid., pgs. 152 f.
31Ibid., pg. 146.
32Notice that this is not equivalent to treat the two notions as interchangeable in all cases,
because some non-linguistical theory may help us to distinguish them. Still, if we want to
save some kind of founding role for the notion of truth, we will have to prove that, in the
context of a given theory or discipline, truth is not only not interchangeable with, but also




Before dealing with falsificationism, let us face a quite obvious spot which flaws
any theory starting with some kind of access to truth conditions, viz., the fact
that the theory necessarily deals first of all with statements and assertions. I
would like to make it explicit that, by doing so, a whole section of the theory
is still missing, the part explaining how to construe the meaning of sentences
with a force other than the assertoric. That may not be a difficult task, and
we indeed have some hint of how to proceed. Some care needs still to be taken,
because the fact that in some case we find it quite easy to reconnect to the
assertoric case does not entail that this is as easy or even as possible for any
kind of sentence or utterance.
We made a similar point about atomism,33 but here the difficulty is not
as fatal, because we are allowed to consider sets of utterances or sentences
as aggregates around a practice, and this can show us a way for such an
enterprise. We should consider this as an occasion for further research, rather
than an unsurmountable flaw.
∗∗∗
When dealing with the ultimate theory of meaning devised by molecularists,
we must remember that such a theory is not distinguishable, for what concerns
its merits, from the theory of interpretation that accompanies it. The major
objections against this is that it is still not clear whether we have the right to
talk about molecularist interpretation at all. In Bilgrami’s theory (which he
does not call a molecularism) there is an important role played by the pool
of the whole aggregates of meaning that is undeniable. In spite of Bilgrami’s
attempts to belittle its contribution, it is very difficult to make the theory work
without considering the holistic meaning system original. But if we do such
a thing, then we are dealing with a holistic theory of interpretation, and all
the talk about localities merely describes the practical (though still somewhat
idealized) application of the general theory. I do not want, on my turn, to
belittle such a theoretical contribution, because it is of undoubtful importance
to show how a theory prima facie implausible – as holism is – might work in
practice. Nonetheless, if we devise a theory to handle holism and the infinity
of possibilities that holism gives us, we still end up with holism and not with
a molecularistic theory of fractionary infiniteness.34
This we would have, if we could show localities to be original, and the
holistic semantic system to be derivative. I do not think that Bilgrami had
anything the like in mind, and nothing in his book suggests it anyway. But
the proposal is clear enough to be taken into consideration.
Unfortunately, it is not as clear as to be spotless. If we have to consider lo-
calities as original, it is legitimate to ask how the beliefs which are relevant for
33Cf. § 2.3.1 above.
34More on the subject of holism, the theoretical possibilities it furnishes, and ways to
handle them, will be said in the following chapters.
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interpretation in localities are individuated. Bilgrami dismissed the question
as follows:
The protest that there is no principle for deciding what the relevant
beliefs are in the local level is [. . . ] exaggerated. All one needs
to do in order to fasten on the right explanandum and the right
explanans, at the local level, is to see what beliefs the two agents
will agree on. Imagine them communicating in this local context
of drinking water and see what they agree on and what beliefs
puzzle and throw them off. If one of them says that the substance
that they wish to drink will not poison them and the other agrees,
then that belief may be counted as relevant to this local concept
“water” which goes into the explanation of their actions. If one of
them says that the substance has the chemical composition H2O
and the other is puzzled by that, count that belief as irrelevant in
this locality. There is no serious obstacle to finding out which the
relevant and irrelevant beliefs are.35
This appeal to the intersection of belief seems to me more problematic
than Bilgrami takes it to be. It is clear that for the example to work, we can
take into consideration all the possible pairs of thirsty people who meet at a
faucet. If our test takes into consideration two chemists, then beliefs about
chemical composition of drinking water become relevant. This might imply
that we have a different locality every time a situation occurs: in other words,
there are no two equivalent situations. This begs the question regarding the
individuation of localities. I will deal with this in a moment, but I would like
to point to another problem about the intersection theory before.
Consider what our situation is: we need the theory of localities because
we want to attribute content to people in order to explain their action, and
people act in localities. Now, according to the intersection theory, we have
the problematic view that a chemist drinks tap water for different reasons
depending on the presence near the faucet of another chemist rather than
a person ignorant of chemistry. This is not only counterintuitive, but also
inconsistent with our claim that such a theory would help us explaining human
action: it seems, if anything, that things get more confuse.
Maybe we could interpret the intersection theory in some other way. For
instance, we could imagine that drinking tap water is a locality that we can
individuate, and that the relevant beliefs we are looking for are given by the
intersection of the beliefs of any two people who could participate in that
activity. Or, which would amount to the same result, we could imagine that
all the people met at the same faucet to quench their thirst. Then, the beliefs
which are relevant to explain their action will be those that any single one of
them has. But we have a problem with this generalized intersection theory:
35Bilgrami (1992), pg. 146.
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As a matter of fact, each of us knows or believes partly different
things (partly different subset of the collective encyclopedia), yet
we are all competent in the use of our language. Could lexical com-
petence be defined as the intersection of such different individual
competence? In principle, no, for we have no guarantee that the
intersection of all competences is rich enough to be considered ad-
equate as a competence (it is quite possible that the set of beliefs
we all share about, say, gold is very small, too small to constitute
an adequate competence with ‘gold’).36
A defender of the intersection theory may object that here Marconi is
dealing with something completely different, because the competence with a
lexical item is not at stake when we are trying to explain the behavior of people
acting in a certain way. For, if people did not share at least some relevant
and important belief about tap water, they would not drink it to quench their
thirst; hence, we would have no behavior to explain.
The objection is fundamentally correct, but for three gaps that need filling.
One is again the question about the individuation of localities, and I still
propose to leave it aside. The second one is that we are completely begging
the question against the existence of a core water-concept in the tap locality, if
we reason that, since people drink water from the tap to quench their thirsts,
then there must be a unique reason (and a unique concept underlying that
reason) for everyone. If these are our only argument, we still cannot bar that
any single human being could drink water from the tap for entirely different
reasons, and with entirely different concepts in mind.
The last gap is connected to the problem of lexical competence. We might
agree that the intersection theory is to be used only with some locality in the
background, but we nonetheless might ask the meaning of a word in general,
cross-locally. Here, intersection is not working any more. So we are driven to
the conclusion that the meaning attached to some lexical item may vary from
individual to individual, and even for the same individual across time.37 There
is nothing wrong with such a conclusion, as long as it is acknowledged that
it must be grounded on a theory of localities: in order to accept the variance
of meaning depending on the situation we need to know how to distinguish
when situations themselves vary.
We have seen that a possible answer is to start by appealing to our intuition
of what constitutes a locality, and then revise our theory in order to make
sense of inconsistencies. The problem with such an answer is that if we want
to consider the discourse about localities as original we must explain whence
our intuitions about them come from.
Let us assume that such knowledge may come in a molecularistic way.
What we need, then, is some more original locality (or molecule) to guide us
36Marconi (1997), pg. 52, emphasis in text.
37Cf. ibid., pg. 54.
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toward the choice of the locality which is needed to interpret a certain piece
of human behavior, e.g., an utterance. I think this can be done only by taking
into consideration the context of uttering, and our beliefs about that uttering
and its context, and so on. To choose the right molecule to interpret our
original utterance, thus, we end up with a bigger molecule. To know if this
bigger molecule leads to the right interpretation, however, we may have to
compare it with some other molecule. Eventually, we might need to consider
the whole language.
In this sense, I think that a molecularistic theory of interpretation is not
different from a holistic theory of interpretation, and there is a reason for that:
molecularism, to be implemented, needs the possibility of revision that only
a holistic picture entails. Of course, we might think that we are dealing here
with some different kind of holism than the traditional one. This is, so to say,
a potential holism, as opposed to an actual one. In the picture given here,
that is, we merely consider the possibility of drawing connections between
the various elements of the system, while more traditional holism considers
such connections as already given. This may be true: however, all we wanted
to show was that we cannot consider the whole totality of the system as
derivative, but that we need to consider it as being on the background of
every decision we make in the process of interpretation.
3.3.2 Interactions
The disciplines that look more related to the issues dealt with by semantic
molecularism seem to be linguistics, psychology and epistemology. Contrary
to semantic atomism, molecularism does not have great ontological or meta-
physical problems. The shift from the notion of truth (which is a metaphysical
notion) to the notion of access to truth – either by means of verifying condi-
tions or by means of falsifying conditions – closes the door in the face of the
metaphysical debate, only to open it to the epistemological one.
While verificationism has its flaws, as we have seen, it seems that falsi-
ficationism has a better fate. It must be clear that, in spite of its apparent
affinity with Popper’s philosophy of science (which is, as it is known, founded
on the notion of falsification), Dummett’s theory does not seem to share the
faults of Popper’s. There is, perhaps, some problem in analyzing in terms
of falsification probability statements, though – which is indeed one of the
objections that have been risen against Popper.
Also, we must note that the notion of falsification involved here is some-
what laxer than Popper’s, for the philosopher of science wanted it to function
as a demarcation criterion between science and non-science, while we want it
to be an effective means for construing the meaning of any kind of assertion,
whether scientific ones or not. I will not dilate on the subject of demarcation:
suffice it to say that it is not at all clear whether such a thing as a demarcation
criterion between scientific and non-scientific statements exists at all, let alone
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whether falsification can be such a criterion.
It should be clear, on the other hand, that applying a falsification theory
of meaning to, say, metaphysical statements involves a rather complex theory
of expectations. We would have to state, in fact, what is the warranty that we
may have to have certain expectation with respect to things or events that we
know are beyond our capacity of surveying, and in what way such expectations
affects what we are legitimate to assert concerning those things or events. In
this sense, it is obvious that epistemology should deal not only with science
(even in a broad sense of the term), but with all the many forms which human
knowledge may assume.
This task, therefore, borders psychology at least in the minimal sense that
is human knowledge and human activities that are involved. After all, as we
have said, molecularism offers itself as a theory primarily aimed at the explana-
tion of human action. Some methodological question about psychology, thus,
concerns also molecularism. The most important of these is perhaps a ques-
tion about justification: whether we are justified in assuming the existence of
certain invisible and inscrutable processes by the fact that a theory exploiting
them entails certain phenomenic consequences which we indeed make experi-
ence of. There is a large debate about this issue (which does not limit itself to
psychology or human science, but involves even hard sciences such as physics),
and several kinds of answer might be given.
Psychology, in its turn, is connected with neurosciences, and an answer to
our methodological question might come from results of the latter discipline,
depending on our opinion on what the actual relationship between the two is
or should be. This is a question concerning theoretical reduction, and again
it is not an unusual one even outside the domain of cognitive science.
Then, there is the question concerning linguistics. The stress put by molec-
ularism on human practice makes pragmatics the ideal interlocutor. After all,
some pragmaticists would be happy to have a philosophical background to
help them in the individuation of the relevant localities and contexts for the
interpretation of utterances. Fixing the flaws of the molecularistic theory
of interpretation would maybe help an advancement of pragmatics; and the
opposite kind of influence cannot be excluded, either.
3.4 Some Brief Conclusion
I will not hide my sympathy for molecularism. The stress on human activity,
the intrinsic dynamism that is attributed to the process of interpretation and
language use, the avoidance of suspicious metaphysical notions such as that
of truth are qualities that I find desirable for a theory dealing with human
language. Still, these are not universal desiderata, since it is not obvious that
our first concern should be with human language and not with something else,
perhaps language per se.
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One important difference between semantic atomism and semantic molec-
ularism is, in my opinion, that the former succeeds in giving the answers to
the kind of questions it is interested in, while the latter’s flaws may seem to
prevent it to do it. Moreover, semantic holism will be shown to deal with
the same kind of questions; therefore it will be a good thing, for us, if the
desiderata fulfilled by molecularism are not forgotten by holism. In this sense,
besides being a competitor theory (perhaps even more so than atomism),








Now we turn to the topic of semantic holism. In the previous chapters we
have said that the fundamental problems of philosophy of language are: 1)
explaining how we understand each other when we speak, and 2) how – or
in what sense – our language can be about our world. We have also seen
how the atomistic strategy of answering first to the second problem fails to
indicate a way to answer the first. Semantic holism attributes this failure to
the wrong order in which atomism answers the questions: one should reflect
first on communication between human beings, and only after that on the
connection between language and world. This is the strategy I will follow.
∗∗∗
We have seen in § 1.2 that the characterization of languages in terms of sets of
rules – which is the characterization we have chosen to adopt – has as a con-
sequence the attribution to each different speaker of a different language. The
problem of interpreting others’ speech, thus, cannot in principle be different
from the problem of translating from one language to another. Our concern,
thus, is to find a good theory to explain why given sentences in one language
correspond to certain sentences in another and not to other ones.
Semantic atomism made an assumption about interpretation we may find
rather natural and commonsensical. The distinction between semantic pro-
duction and semantic interpretation implies that all interpretation is indeed
interpretation of meaning meant by someone, who must, therefore, produce
it first. The assumption was, thence, that semantic production comes be-
fore semantic interpretation. Therefore, semantic atomism deems semantic
productivity (i.e., the ability of producing meaning) the essential feature of
language. Hence, the relative comfortableness with which it gives up to a
partly holistic strategy to explain interpretation: the latter is not the main
aim of an atomistic theory, and can be left to other theories, perhaps even to
other disciplines altogether, such as psychology.
Holistic semanticists hold a different view about language. According to
them, it may well be true that the most important feature of language is its
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semantic productivity. Still, this is certainly one of the most difficult features
to explain, and one whose mechanisms seem most hidden. Therefore, it might
seem more profitable to begin our investigation of the semantic features of lan-
guage from a phenomenon that, although it may seem a minor feature at first
sight, is nevertheless evident in every single use of language, and not less mys-
terious and requiring philosophical investigation than semantic production.
The feature I have in mind is of course interpretation.
Production, thus, will be addressed by holistic semantics only after having
coped with interpretation. The holistic mechanisms uncovered by an analysis
of this linguistic task as an original task – as opposed to a secondary one – will
furnish us with new means to find a unitary solution to both the fundamental
questions about language we are asking ourselves. Before analyzing in depth
the issue of interpretation, though, it is necessary to clarify the notion of
holism itself. This will be my starting point.
4.1 The Notion of Holism
The notion of semantic holism, as it may appear obvious, depends on what
we understand by “meaning.” It is important, for this discussion, that the
difference brought in § 1.3 is a clear one. It is different, and it makes a
difference for our discussion, if what we are concerned with is study of reference
or of meaning in the proper sense. And in both cases we have to distinguish
between semantic properties as properties of a system (or of parts or elements
of a system, since this distinction comes before any argument in favour or
against semantic holism) or as properties of people. It is different, in other
words, to be concerned with those features of language that make it possible
for words and sentences to have the semantic properties that they have, on
one side, and, on the other side, to be concerned with the way those properties
make it possible for us to communicate and interact with other people.
4.1.1 About an Eccentrical Definition of Holism
A theory can be holistic with regard to all of these different aspects of “mean-
ing,” and we must bear in mind this when evaluating holistic theories, because
we might risk to impute flaws to an argument only because we misunder-
stood the actual aim of the theory under examination. Fodor and Lepore are
amongst the strictest critics of semantic holism: they believe that no good
theory has been put forward to prove semantic holism.1 In their book, they
propose two different notions of holism. One can be found in their preface:
This is a book about holism about meaning: roughly, it’s about the
doctrine that only whole languages or whole theories or whole be-
lief systems really have meanings, so that the meanings of smaller
1Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. xii.
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units – words, sentences, hypotheses, predictions, discourses, dia-
logues, texts, thoughts, and the like – are merely derivative.2
This definition makes explicit reference to systematic wholes as being the
units where meaning is determined. What is essential in this definition is not
only that we consider meaning as a property that originally pertains to wholes,
but that these wholes are considered as structured. This can be an essential
difference, because we are accustomed to think of languages as infinite struc-
tures and our definition must therefore account for these. If the elements we
are interested in are sentences, hypotheses, predictions, discourses, dialogues,
texts, thoughts and the like, our interest resides primarily in systems which
allow an infinity of different such elements.
I am not claiming that, according to this view, only infinite systems can
be regarded as languages: what I am claiming is that only with respect to
infinite systems there is a point in talking of languages.3 If this is correct,
we must be interested in some regularity to be found in the systems we want
to study: otherwise, there is no chance that we can end up with a theory
about infinity. Thus, saying that holism about meaning is the doctrine that
only such structured systems have meanings (as Fodor and Lepore claim) is
equivalent to saying that it is the doctrine that meanings are produced only
through certain kinds of systematic rules.
Fodor and Lepore proceed to distinguish holism about meaning from sev-
eral connected issues:
Meaning (or semantic) holism must be distinguished from a num-
ber of related ideas with which is easily confused: from holism
about confirmation, for example, or about interpretation or about
the individuation of functional properties. These other kinds of
holism might be true even if meaning holism isn’t. Or at least, so
it seems; unless there are arguments to show not just that confir-
mation, interpretation, or the individuation of functional proper-
ties is holistic but also that the meaning of a symbol is somehow
2Ibid., pg. x, emphasis in text.
3A counterexample might be seen in Wittgenstein’s linguistic games, and toy-languages,
such as can be found in Wittgenstein (1953), § 2 (cf. Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 234 n. 12,
where the Wittgensteinian “primitive language” is used as a counterexample to a different,
but related, point). I think that, even if Wittgenstein thought that such languages could
be imagined as “the whole language [. . . ] of a tribe” (Wittgenstein (1953), § 6, emphasis
in text), they actually deserve the name of languages only because of a comparison with
more proper languages such as our own. Moreover, consider that Wittgenstein’s thought
experiment is, of course, set up starting with a portion of our language; maybe, then, our
impression that it is still a language is biased from the beginning because of the nature of
the thought experiment. Finally, the decision that we may make to consider those speakers
as members of the human species can play a role in our attributing them a language and,
therefore, in our considering the Wittgensteinian toy as a language. This last point will
become clearer later (see §§ 4.2.7 and 4.3.2).
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determined by facts about how its applications are confirmed or
how its tokens are interpreted or the functions that it performs.4
There is a sense in which all that counts about symbols is indeed inter-
pretation, confirmation and individuation of function. It is in this sense that
Ludwig Wittgenstein claimed that meaning is use.5 According to this view,
there is nothing more in the meaning of a symbol than the way the symbol
is used. Since this use is in turn regimented by some system of rules that
regulates all uses of all symbols in the symbolic system, each in relation to
the others, claiming that meaning is equivalent to use is a way of holding a
holistic theory about meaning.
Fodor and Lepore have problems with this view being considered as gen-
uine semantic holism. To see what the problem is, though, we have to intro-
duce the second definition they give of the term ‘holism,’ which is the one that
they assume as correct and discuss in the rest of the book. This definition, in
turn, comes together with definition of other two terms, viz., ‘atomistic’ and
the rather infelicitous ‘anatomic’ (which should be read in the meaning of ‘not
atomic’):
Many properties have the property of being, as we shall say, ana-
tomic. A property is anatomic just in case if anything has it, then
at least one other thing does. [. . . ]
If a property is not anatomic, then we shall say that it is atom-
istic or punctate. An atomistic or punctate property is one which
might, in principle, be instantiated by only one thing. [. . . ] One
way of formulating a main issue to be discussed in this book is
whether being a symbol, being a symbol belonging to language L,
having an intentional object, having intentional content, express-
ing a proposition, having a referent, being semantically evaluable,
and the like are punctate properties. The currently received philo-
sophical view is that these sorts of properties are not punctate but
anatomic. [. . . ]
Many anatomic properties have the property of being very an-
atomic, or, as we shall say, the property of being holistic. Holistic
properties are properties such that, if anything has them, then
lots of other things must have them too. The “lots of” part of
this definition could bear to be sharpened, no doubt; but, for our
purposes, this isn’t required. Our primary concerns in this book
will be with natural languages and with minds. Natural languages
and minds can be assumed to be productive in all the interesting
cases; [. . . ]. The semantic properties we’ll discuss will therefore
4Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. x.
5Wittgenstein (1953), § 41.
72
4.1.1. About an Eccentrical Definition of Holism
generally be ones which, if they are holistic, then if anything at all
has them, so too do endlessly many other things.6
From this general definition of holistic properties, Fodor and Lepore dis-
tinguish two related issues about semantic holism:
What we will call content holism is the claim that properties like
having content are holistic in the sense that no expression in a lan-
guage can have them unless many other (nonsynonymous) expres-
sions in that language have them too. In effect, it’s the doctrine
that there can be no punctate languages. What we will call trans-
lation holism is the claim that properties like meaning the same as
some formula or another of L are holistic in the sense that nothing
can translate a formula of L unless it belongs to a language con-
taining many (nonsynonymous) formulas that translate formulas
of L.7
Let us consider the difference between this definition and that given before.
If we think that semantic holism has something to do with the number of
entities having semantic properties, then it is obvious that finite languages
or punctate languages, if possible at all, cannot be holistic. On the other
hand, if what matters is only the systematicity of the whole structured set
of entities under inquiry, then the number of them is not in question, and
finite and punctate languages (again, if independently proven possible) can
count as holistic languages. A punctate language, in this respect, will be
a degenerate case, in which the entity under inquiry actually is the whole
system, and therefore it is trivially true that its meaning depends on (actually
is coincidental with) the meaning of the whole system.
Fodor and Lepore’s mistake seems to be that they consider what we are
interested in (natural languages and human minds) as the only possible sub-
ject of investigation. Thus, they cut a definition which is good enough to
characterize these subject,8 but which could need sharpening and rethink-
ing, if meant to be a general definition. On the other hand, the former and
more traditional definition was good enough to characterize every system we
could think of as endowed of semantic properties. Of course, we are interested
mostly in the study of infinite systems, such as natural languages and human
minds, but we must decide whether is in our intentions to consider also other
systems or not. In case we decide that we are interested in other systems as
well, our definitions must allow the consideration of such systems since the
beginning, so that we can use them as counterexamples only if the notion of
6Fodor and Lepore (1992), pgs. 1 f., emphasis in text.
7Ibid., pg. 5 f.
8Indeed, for such cases, it can be proved that Fodor and Lepore’s definition of holism is
equivalent to the traditional one; cf. Marconi (1997), pg. 49.
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holism, while in principle appliable, is actually proved not to apply. If, on the
other hand, we are not interested in finite systems, our definition can be cut
to leave them out, and thus we cannot take such systems as counterexamples.9
∗∗∗
Why do Fodor and Lepore give their definition instead of a more traditional
one? Two reasons can be found in what they say. The first is that the
notion of anatomisity, in their opinion, proves useful also in other philosophical
contexts. The example that they give is the argument against the possibility
of a private language.10 I do not want to enter into details here (and even
Fodor and Lepore consider the question as a rather marginal one), but I would
emphasize that to me is not at all clear how mentioning anatomisity helps “to
distinguish the part of the private language problem that’s about language
from the part that’s about privacy.”11 I feel that it was clear even without
introducing fancy anatomisity that the argument was about “the conceptual
possibility of a language with only one speaker.”12
The second reason is more compelling: Fodor and Lepore claim that there
is an argument from the anatomisity of semantic properties to semantic holism.
They add that versions of such an argument are the ground of all discussions
of holism.13 Thus, it seems that the notion of anatomisity was already be-
neath most arguments about semantic holism, and that Fodor and Lepore
only uncovered it.14 Let us then examine this argument, and what Fodor and
Lepore have to say about it.
4.1.2 The Argument A
Fodor and Lepore hold the classic argument for semantic holism – which they
call “Argument A”15 – to go along these lines:
Premise 1: Generic semantic properties like [. . . ] being-some-
or-other-belief-of-Smith’s, being a formula of language L, etc.
are anatomic. [. . . ]
Premise 2: There is no principled distinction between the propo-
sitions that Smith has to believe to believe that P and the
propositions that Smith doesn’t have to believe to believe
that P. [. . . ]
Conclusion: The property of being-some-or-other-belief-of-Smith’s
is holistic.16
9For a general perspective on the issue of finite languages, see § 1.2.
10Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 6.
11Ibid.
12Ibid.
13Ibid., pgs. 22 ff.
14Cf. ibid., pg. 26 for a list of arguments on the lines of the one they reconstruct.
15Ibid., pg. 23.
16Ibid., pgs. 23 ff., emphasis in text.
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Let us note that, as Fodor and Lepore stress, the reference to Smith is
inessential and, also, that the argument could hold even if we substitute dif-
ferent intentional properties to beliefs.17 In fact, as it stands, the argument is
supposed to prove the impossibility of a punctate mind, i.e., “a mind which
can entertain only one proposition.”18 But we can change Premise 2 so that it
reads: “There is no principled distinction between the meaningful sentences
that language L must allow in order for a given sentence s to be a meaning-
ful sentence of L” (call this Premise 2*). Through Premise 2* we can reach
Conclusion*: “The property of being a meaningful sentence of L is holistic,”
which is the same as claiming the impossibility of a punctate language. With
opportune changes to Premise 2 we can reach analogous conclusions for all
the semantic or intentional properties we might be interested in.
There are three orders of consideration to be done about Argument A. We
can question the validity of one or the other of the premises, or of the inference
from the premises to the conclusion. Fodor and Lepore’s strategy throughout
their book is showing that there is no argument for Premise 1.19
The status of Premise 1, in its turn, depends strictly on the intentional
property we are concerned with. Therefore, an evaluation of the premise can
be given only by way of a thorough holistic theory of the intentional property
of the case. So, we should postpone our analysis of Premise 1 until further
sections, and concentrate, for the present, on Premise 2 (or 2*, etc.) and on
the status of the inference.
The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
Premise 2, in all the forms it can take, is a form of rejection of a distinction
between analytic and synthetic sentences (a/s distinction).20 The reading
of the rejection of the a/s distinction involved in the premise is “The a/s
distinction isn’t principled.”21 The first source of an argument in favour of
the rejection is, of course, Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.”22 However,
Fodor and Lepore claim that Quine’s argument is incompatible with Argument
A:
When Quine says “No a/s,” he presumably means “No analytic
sentences.” On that reading of premise 2, however, argument A
would appear to be inconsistent. For premise 1 requires that there






22Quine (1953), chpt. 2.
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and it looks as though the hypothetical formed by writing one of
these sentences after “if P, then” must be analytic [. . . ].23
There are two claims that are being made in this quotation: one is a matter
of Quinean exegesis, the other is about the correct reading of Premise 1. Let
us deal with the former, first.
It is definitely true that Quine was more concerned with analyticity than
with syntheticity in his paper. After all, his problem was with this notion
and with the idea that there are truths never to be revised that can be well-
distinguished from alleged truths that may prove false in face of some evidence.
In spite of this, I cannot see the distinction that Fodor and Lepore would like
to draw between Quine’s position and the one entailed by Argument A. If
you believe that there are no analytic sentences, you also believe that the a/s
distinction is not principled and that, as a matter of fact, analyticity is not a
property that sentences have on their own, but only with relation to the place
they occupy inside a theory. In other words, since theories are developed by
human beings for their purposes, it ultimately depends on human purposes
and on human decision which sentences are to be considered analytic at a
given time:
Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between syn-
thetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and an-
alytic statements, which hold come what may. Any statement can
be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjust-
ments elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the
peryphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant experience by
pleading hallucination or by amending certain statements of the
kind called logical laws. Conversely, by the same token, no state-
ment is immune to revision. Revision even of the logical law of the
excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying quan-
tum mechanics; and what difference is there in principle between
such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or
Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?24
Quine’s point does not seem to be simply that there are not analytic sen-
tences, but rather that their individuation is not principled, since it happens
for pragmatical reasons. It could be objected that the definition of analytic
statements given in the above quotation is not the standard one. Rather, it
is a surrogate accepted by Quine after having refuted all more standard defi-
nitions. In fact, it is not so: Quine was quite explicit in stating that giving a
definition of analyticity in terms of condition of verification (viz., a statement
23Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 25.
24Quine (1953), pg. 43.
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is analytic when it is true come what may) is equivalent to standard defini-
tions of analyticity in terms of identity of meaning.25 Thus, I am claiming
that Quine did not show that there are no analytic sentences at all, but that
we cannot define analyticity, unless we give a definition which is bounded to
make the individuation of analytic statements and sentences dependent on our
pragmatical reasons. In other words, there is no principled a/s distinction.26
∗∗∗
Note, furthermore, that even if we agreed with Fodor and Lepore’s account of
Quine’s position, that would leave open the possibility of building Argument
A. Premise 1, which is allegedly incompatible with Fodor and Lepore’s reading
of Quine, is in fact perfectly consistent with it. For let us assume that there
are no analytic sentences. What Premise 1 is saying is that we can build
Fodor and Lepore’s implication “if P , then” and hold it as immune to revision
for our practical reasons. This is, allegedly, Quine’s surrogate for analyticity,
and that can be used in exactly the same way in Premise 1. What premise 1
says is, e.g., that in order to believe P there must be some Q that you also
believe. Premise 1 does not say that Q must be determined, and that it cannot
change across time. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, if we build Premise
1 around a semantic property like “being a meaningful sentence of language
L.” Thus, an evaluation of Argument A as a complex would bring more to the
interpretation of Premise 1.
The Inference from Anatomisity to Holism
Let us now deal with Argument A’s inference form, then. Fodor and Lepore
rightly note that this argument is a version of the sorites paradox.27 This,
however, should not automatically imply that the conclusion is false. All
that is implied is that the distinction here at stake – between, say, which
meaningful sentences L has to allow in order for a given sentence s to be a
meaningful sentence of L, and which it does not have to – is arbitrarily traced,
if traced at all. Before such distinction we cannot know the way sentences in
a language are connected. Moreover, even when such distinction is in fact
drawn, we know that we can always revise it. When we change the criteria to
trace the distinction between sentences related with a given one and sentences
unrelated with it, also the boundary changes. Nothing excludes that there
could be criteria which connect all sentences to the given one.
It might be objected that it does not matter whether we are capable or not
of drawing the distinction, for it may nonetheless exist. In other words, the
argument could be thought of as showing that we must be holists when col-
lecting our semantic data, but that semantic properties and semantic objects
can be arranged in a non-holistic way. I respond that we should always be
25Ibid., pg. 38.
26More on the subject of analyticity in §§ 4.2.2 and 5.2.4.
27Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 25.
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suspicious about an argument that says that, no matter what our theories are,
there is always a chance that the real world is different from how we picture
it. If this is supposed to show that all knowledge is revisable, I firmly agree.
If it is supposed to prove the existence of a real way in which things work as
opposed to the way we figured them to work, let me ask on my turn what this
real way has to do with us. If we claim that all our philosophical or scientific
theories will always be incapable of tracing such a distinction, why should we
believe in the real existence of such a distinction?
I want to stress that although the form of the argument is a sorites, it is
not the classical sorites by accumulation (like the classical example of baldness
and hairiness, for instance). Our problem resembles rather the problem of
identifying the border of a mountain. It resembles it in the sense that probably
there is no way to draw the border of the mountain so that it respects the
real border that the mountain actually has. In fact, there are reasons to think
that there is no such thing like a real border.
There is a difference between the two cases, though, because in the case
of the mountain we know we want to draw the border somewhere, because we
know that the territory for which it is meaningful to ask whether it is part
of our mountain or not does not extend infinitely. We also know that we do
not want all the territory under consideration to end up as being part of the
mountain. In the case of our semantic system, we are quite sure that it does
extend infinitely, and we have no principled bias against its entirely belonging
to one side of the border. Indeed, if we had such a bias, the whole discussion
concerning holism would be pointless. Thus, Argument A amounts to saying
that, (Premise 1) since every part of the infinite territory surrounding (so
to say) a particular semantic element e (a meaningful sentence, or a belief,
etc.) might prove relevant to the determination of e, and (Premise 2) we
have reasons to believe that we cannot determine any subterritory that is the
only relevant in all circumstances, then (Conclusion) all the system is in fact
relevant to the determination of e.
∗∗∗
Fodor and Lepore try to give strength to their point against Argument A with
another argument:
Imagine that there are disjoint sets of propositions such that (1)
believing any of these sets is sufficient to be able to believe P; (2)
you must believe at least one of these sets in order to believe P; (3)
none of these sets is such that you must believe it in order to believe
P. So someone can believe P if he believes A, or if he believes B,
and so on. [. . . ] Then, on the one hand, premise 1 would clearly be
true. And premise 2 would be true in at least the sense that there
are no analytic beliefs. Yet neither content holism nor translation
holism would follow. Content holism wouldn’t follow because it
requires that there must be many other propositions that I believe
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if I believe that P [. . . ], and the current assumptions allow that
some or all of the disjoint sets each of which is sufficient to be able
to believe P might be quite small. So, compatible with the present
account, content might be molecular rather than holistic.28
This argument seems to me to have a flaw. Let us assume that A (or B,
or whatever) is actually the set of beliefs that allows Smith to believe P . Now
we can ask why Smith believes A. Remember that Fodor and Lepore claim
that A can be a very small set. They also claim that the argument allows
a reading of the rejection of the a/s distinction according to which there are
no analytic sentences.29 So we can ask, about any of the few beliefs in A
what is sufficient, or necessary, to believe them. The question is legitimate,
unless we claim that the beliefs in A are self-sufficient. And they cannot be
self-sufficient, unless we contradict Premise 1. So, for every belief in A, we are
in the same situation as with P .
Now, P cannot be sufficient to believe any of the beliefs in A, because
otherwise A would result necessary to believe P , against hypotheses. Also,
given a belief a in A, the other beliefs in A cannot be sufficient to believe
it, otherwise they would also have been sufficient to believe P in the first
place. Suppose, then, that for each belief ai in A we can individuate the set
Bi which is responsible, being sufficient but not necessary, for Smith believing
it. For every belief in every Bi we are again in the same situation as P and
the beliefs in A: again P cannot be sufficient to believe any of the beliefs in
Bi, because the transitivity of implication gives P → bij → ai ⇒ P → ai, and
we already excluded that P could implicate the beliefs in A. For much the
same reasons, noone of the ai can be sufficient to believe any of the beliefs in
the corresponding Bi. And again, for each bij in Bi, the sufficient set cannot
be found among the other beliefs in Bi. So we have to assume the existence
of yet another set Cij for each bij in Bi. And we have the very same problem.
We must always avoid loops, because of the transitivity of the implication, so
we must always assume new sets of beliefs.
Could these sets be made up of the same elements? Well, since a finite
number of elements has only a finite number of combination, it would be
impossible to avoid loops. So it seems that there must be an infinite number of
beliefs in order to believe P and all the beliefs that make Smith in the condition
of believing P . This is bad news for Fodor and Lepore, because, according
to their definition of holism, it is only the number of beliefs that counts.
According to our definition of holism, though, this is not yet a holistic picture,
because we have not proved that all the belief system of Smith is involved
in making him believe P . Smith’s beliefs can form several different infinite
28Ibid., pgs. 27 f., emphasis in text.




networks, unrelated one to the other.30 Consider, however, that we have
already proved that there is no way to draw a univocal distinction between
beliefs in one network and beliefs in another. All we lack, then, is a proof of
how the systematicity of the whole set of Smith’s beliefs make it possible for
him to believe P .
Actually, one problem with Argument A being considered as an argument
for holism is that there is no mention of systematicity in it. This could be
the reason why Fodor and Lepore had some problems in finding explicit in-
stances of the argument in holistic authors.31 If I am correct, this is because
the argument is missing something that holistic authors might find essential:
mention of a system.
∗∗∗
Fodor and Lepore’s argument is claimed to have consequence also with regard
to translation holism:
Translation holism wouldn’t follow either, because it requires that
for two people to share any belief, they must share at least another
belief, and the present model allows that what you believe is P
and A, whereas what I believe is P and B. What everybody really
wants is that meaning should be anatomic and that translation
holism should nevertheless be false. This suggestion seems to do
the trick.32
This means, more or less: “Holists tell us a proposition P is intelligible only
with reference to its cognitive context; how do they deal with an argument
showing that the same proposition P can be understood both in the context
A and in the context B?” I think I can show there is no contradiction here.
In fact, it can be seen as mere begging the question to individuate the same
proposition P in two different contexts. How do we individuate P out of its
relation with A or B? Until we are told that, we cannot evaluate properly
the counterargument, and we have reasons to believe that holism would not
accept identification of P independently of its context.
4.2 Translation and Interpretation
What we saw discussing Fodor and Lepore objetions up to this point can be
seen as a general view on holism. Differences about aspects of meaning have
not yet proven relevant. Let us now begin our survey of interpretation, and
see how a theory about it can be holistic. As I said, there is a sense in which
every task of interpretation shares features with a translation from a language
into another. No two persons, in fact, can be assumed to speak exactly the
30I am indebted to Vincenzo De Risi for this point.
31Ibid., pg. 26.
32Ibid., pg. 28, emphasis in text.
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same language. Semantic holism (and perhaps semantic theories in general)
cannot ignore differences between idiolects, because it cannot be decided in
advance that there are irrelevant differences.
Translation has been a big issue for philosophers: to explain how languages
with very different means are able to convey the same meanings – or whether
they are – would indeed constitute a big step towards an explanation of what
meaning is. To understand the terms of the question, we need to introduce
some terminology, which I take from Donald Davidson:
In the general case, a theory of translation involves three lan-
guages: the object language, the subject language, and the meta-
language (the languages from and into which translation proceeds,
and the language of the theory, which says what expressions of
the subject language translate which expressions of the object lan-
guage). And in this general case, we can know which sentences of
the subject language translate which sentences of the object lan-
guage without knowing what any of the the sentence of either lan-
guage mean (in any sense, anyway, that would let someone who un-
derstood the theory interpret sentences of the object language).33
The problem assumes its biggest proportions in the case of radical trans-
lation, i.e., in situations where object language and subject language are rad-
ically separate, in the sense that they are not akin, nor there are speakers
someway competent in both languages:
Translation between kindred languages, e.g., Frisian and English,
is aided by resemblance of cognate word forms. Translation be-
tween unrelated languages, e.g., Hungarian and English, may be
aided by traditional equations that have evolved in step with a
shared culture. What is relevant rather to our purposes is radi-
cal translation, i.e., translation of the language of a hitherto un-
touched people. The task is one that is not in practice undertaken
in its extreme form, since a chain of interpreters of a sort can be
recruited of marginal persons across the darkest archipelago. But
the problem is the more nearly approximated the poorer the hints
available from interpreters [. . . ]. I shall imagine that all help of
interpreters is excluded.34
We will come to the conclusion that all interpretive tasks, even those which
looks the simplest, are just as difficult to explain. This will be proved by means
of an analysis of the radical task, and a few considerations about it.
33Davidson (2001), pg. 129
34Quine (1960), pg. 28, emphasis in text.
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4.2.1 Some Issues about Behavioristical Theories of
Interpretation
When Quine inquired the problem of radical translation, he wanted to survey,
as if with a magnifying glass, an extreme case of a more general question –
that of interpretation – so to prove the following general conclusion:
[. . . ] the infinite totality of sentences of any given speaker’s lan-
guage can be so permuted, or mapped onto itself, that (a) the
totality of the speaker’s dispositions to verbal behavior remains
invariant, and yet (b) the mapping is no mere correlation of sen-
tences with equivalent sentences, in any plausible sense of equiva-
lence however loose.35
It is plain to see that this is a behavioristic conclusion. The point, accord-
ing to Quine, is that we can identify the meaning of a sentence only through
the behaviour of speakers, because we have no elements to treat meaning as
an independent entity.36 The meaning of a sentence, therefore, depends on the
conditions which solicit uttering by the speaker. Yet, we have no guarantee
that, for a given utterance, we can identify these conditions with certainty.
Moreover, the same stimuli can solicit uttering of different non-equivalent
sentences. That such a behavioristic theory about interpretation is a holistic
theory of language is proved by what follows.
If meaning is to be recovered by means of behavioral survey, but behavior
is always ambiguous, we have two possibilities. We may decide to attribute
to the speaker a different meaning any single time he utters something. In
other words, we may decide to interpret each utterance as if it were part of
some new and until now unknown language – a language that will coincide in
practice with the utterance itself, hence with the sentence which the utterance
instantiates. The implication of this perspective is that language is neither
unitary nor systematic. We could have been able to recover such features if
we chose to investigate language from its semantic productivity, as atomistic
semantics does; we decided, though, to go the other way round, and now we
lack the evidence to assume systematicity and unity. As we will see soon, we
are not at all forced to renounce them, but we cannot have atomism on one
side and systematicity and unity on the other, if our approach starts from
interpretation.
The other possibility is, hence, to renounce atomism to stick to a system-
atic and unitary picture of language. If we regard each utterance as carrying
a meaning that we can recover only taking into consideration other utterances
35Ibid., pg. 27, emphasis in text.
36As a theory of interpretation, this goes along the lines of what we have seen in § 2.2,
with the severe restriction that a luxurious ontology is definitely unwanted. I recall that in
§ 2.3.1 we reached the conclusion that all interpretive processes are at least partly holistic,
and that a minimal account of interpretation takes the form of behaviorism.
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(possibly every other utterance produced by the speaker), then the speaker
will obviously appear to be speaking a systematic and unitary language.
It is perhaps possible to claim that not every other utterance is needed:
maybe only some of them – possibly only a few – would do. This would entail
that a single language is divided in several sets of utterances. If we want
language to be unitary and systematic, either we think that each of these sets
of sentences is, in fact, a language, or we find some other way of dealing with
this molecularized language.
For what concerns the latter position, i.e., what we called semantic molec-
ularism, recall that, before we can confine our survey to just the some utter-
ances needed to interpret the given one, we need a methodology to distinguish
relevant utterances from irrelevant ones. It is undisputable that behavioral
analysis, without further assumptions, cannot trace such a distinction.
For what concerns the former option, we should notice that here we would
have the result that one single speaker speaks several languages, which is fine,
as long as we are allowed to explore the semantics of each of these languages
independently from the others. In what follows, therefore, I will keep consid-
ering each speaker as if speaking one single language.
Let us assume, thus, that to understand the meaning carried by an utter-
ance, we must take all other utterances by the same speaker into consideration.
Anyway, this procedure does not give us quite a good picture of language. As
we have seen in § 1.2, the identification of a language with some set of ut-
terances allegedly produced in that language clashes with the Humboldtian
characteristic, i.e., with the apparent possibility of each language to produce
infinite different sentences. Hence, we decided to talk of a language as a set of
rules and a lexicon, which is a rather systematic and unitary view of language
indeed. We must attribute it to a speaker as a whole, not piece by piece.
Behaviour-based tests are, thus, tests to the whole linguistic system, not to
parts of it.
The first thing we must do to interpret a sentence, according to the be-
havioristic theory seen so far, is to individuate the stimulus that prompts an
utterance of it. This is equivalent, according to Quine, to individuate what
makes the speaker deem the sentence true. It is clear that such a behavioristic
theory has to make assumptions about truth and meaning much before having
settled the rule system of the language. This is apparently a problem, but,
in fact, we have seen in § 2.3.1 that every trial and error procedure involves
holism, and all we need to survey the linguistic system is precisely a trial and
error procedure. Holism is needed for such a methodology, because it is the
only assumption that gives us freedom to look for relevant utterances through-




4.2.2 Again on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
The conclusion that we reached in the previous section is acceptable only if
we cannot assume that we can recover the meaning of sentences by appeal to
analytic inferences and analytic truths permitted by the sentences themselves.
Fodor and Lepore take Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” into consider-
ation, to prove that no consequence as for semantic holism comes from the
theory expressed in the paper.
Actually, they are skeptical about Quine having endorsed meaning holism
in that paper: they deal with it because it has often been brought as a support
to meaning holism. Indeed, Fodor and Lepore are right in thinking that the
main argument of Quine’s paper is what they call confirmation holism – i.e.,
the thesis that statements about the world can be evaluated only in connection
with all the other statements of the theory they are part of. This is renown
under the name of Duhem-Quine or Quine-Duhem thesis (Q/D thesis in Fodor
and Lepore’s abbreviation). One of the possible formulations of the thesis we
have already met:
Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic
enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. [. . . ] Conversely, by
the same token, no statement is immune to revision.37
They may be right in thinking that Quine, at least in this paper, was
not interested in semantic holism. However, I would be more cautious on this
point, because Quine talked rather interchangeably about languages and about
theories,38 and this seems one of those cases where he claimed the distinction
to be ininfluent.39
However, for the present discussion, it is of no importance whether Quine
was or not a holist about meaning, and whether he had or not an argument
for being or not being one: as a matter of fact, he is believed to have been
one. Here is the argument which semantic holists are claimed to have found in
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” according to Fodor and Lepore. The argument
raises putting together confirmation holism and verificationism:
The Q/D thesis says that confirmation is holistic; that is, that ev-
ery statement in a theory (partially) determines the level of con-
firmation of every other statement in the theory. Verificationism
says that the meaning of a statement is determined by its con-
firmation relations. The invited holistic inference is that every
statement in a theory partially determines the meaning of every
other statement.40
37Quine (1953), pg. 43.
38Cf. Chomsky (1969), pg. 53.
39Cf. Quine (1969), pg. 310.
40Fodor and Lepore (1992), pgs. 41 f.
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What this argument really means depend on what we think is an appro-
priate definition of ‘statement,’ and this can depend, in its turn, in what we
think that Quine was actually claiming when defending the Q/D thesis.
Statements
Fodor and Lepore claim that Quine’s preferred reading of the Q/D thesis
(which we have just quoted) makes it necessary that we have some independent
way of identifying statements across theories. Their proposal is to consider
semantic properties as essential in individuating statements. Anyway, if we
do, no holism can hold, neither about confirmation nor about meaning.
Confirmation holism would not follow because it is the thesis that confirma-
tion relations are not essentially related to a given statement. That, together
with the doctrine that confirmation relations have a semantic nature, entails
that statement cannot have essential semantic properties.
Meaning holism, on the other hand, is the doctrine that sentences have
a meaning because of the language they are sentences of, i.e., their semantic
properties are derivative and not essential. Thus, meaning holism is contra-
dictory with the posit of essential semantic properties of sentences.
So, our proposal would be of not identifying statements through semantic
properties. Fodor and Lepore claim that it is doomed to fail, for two orders of
reasons. First, we leave statements ambiguous for what concerns both their
meaning and their linguistic affiliation. Second, this entails that we cannot
be sure whether we have one or more statements in cases of ambiguities. I
propose to solve both problems by stating clearer how to assign sentences to
languages. Let us first briefly see how this would solve Fodor and Lepore’s
problems, and then try to develop a theory to do so.
Semantic and Linguistic Contingency The first problem that Fodor
and Lepore have with statements being identified by means of their morpho-
syntactic properties41 is that not only the semantic properties of statements
are contingent, but that also the “linguistic affiliations” of statements are
contingent.42
However, consider that a certain part of the semantic properties of every
sentence is definitely dependent on its morpho-syntactic properties.43 Thus,
take Fodor and Lepore’s example: “The duck is ready to eat.”44 If we indi-
viduate this statement by means of its morpho-syntactic properties, it cannot
be ambiguous. For the syntactic properties of the statement are exactly what
41They do not make any mention of phonological properties, but I think that the argument
is quite indifferent to their presence.
42Ibid., pg. 45.
43Cf. Borer (2005a) and Borer (2005b).
44Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 45.
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make the difference between the reading in which “the duck” is the object of
“eat” and that in which it is its subject.
Also, the morpho-syntactic properties of a sentence are dependent on its
linguistic affiliation, i.e., from what language it is a well-formed formula of.
Vice versa, the morpho-syntactic properties of a sentence may help us in defin-
ing its linguistic affiliation. Even if some uncertainty among all the different
idiolects that allow it as a well-formed formula will remain, it does not follow
that the statement is contingently a statement of one or the other idiolect:
on the contrary, given the morpho-syntactic properties of the statement and
the rules of those idiolects, it is necessary that the statement is allowed as a
well-formed formula by any of those idiolects.
In claiming semantic and linguistic contingency, Fodor and Lepore seem
to be speaking of statements as utterances, which have, indeed, “both their
semantic properties and their linguistic affiliations contingently.”45 This is
because utterances, taken as such, lack morpho-syntactic properties by which
we could individuate them and which give them some semantic properties and
linguistic affiliation.
Note, also, that, if semantic holism is true, linguistic affiliation and seman-
tic properties are not to be distinguished: the semantic properties depend on
the linguistic affiliation. And holism accounts for the vaguenesses and ambigu-
ities we have found: a statement in isolation, taken with its morpho-syntactic
properties cannot be assigned to exactly one language and we cannot know its
exact meaning because to do so we need the other statements of the language.
Or such is the holistic claim.
Now, it is true that morpho-syntactic properties are not enough to make
it possible for us to assign a meaning and a language to a statement. They are
enough, though, to make a rough assignment that can be exploited as a base
for further investigation, and that could be subject to revision given enough
data about other statements. All this issue will become clearer when I will
enter in more detail about the process here involved, which I have to postpone
until § 4.2.7.
Semantic Individuation Fodor and Lepore have problems with the morpho-
syntactic individuation of statements also because they think that it is a tru-
ism that statements are individuated by their semantic properties.46 My first
answer to this is that it cannot be a truism at all, since we do not know yet
what statements are.
Fodor and Lepore think they need such an assumption to build the fol-
lowing argument, “in the spirit of ‘Two Dogmas,’”47 to show that a system
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statement that it is raining:
Premise 1: The statement that it’s raining (R) is partially con-
firmed by the statement that the streets are wet (S). (Metere-
ological platitude.)
Premise 2: Confirmation relations are ipso facto semantic. (Peir-
ce’s thesis [i.e., verificationism].)
Premise 3: Statements are individuated by their semantic prop-
erties; or, as we will sometimes say, they have their semantic
properties essentially. (Truism.)
Lemma: R is individuated, inter alia, by its relation to S.
Conclusion: Any theory that contains R must contain S. A for-
tiori, no theory could contain just R.48
The problem is with Premise 3, of course. It does not seem to me that such
a premise is very much in the spirit of “Two Dogmas.” For Quine believed that
“the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science.”49 Fodor and Lepore
claim that this formulation is ambiguous,50 and we can agree with them. But
something must be clear in spite of all the ambiguity. If, according to verifica-
tionism, confirmation relations are ipso facto semantic, then statements have
no semantic properties deriving directly from confirmation relations. Because,
if there is a non-ambiguous reading of Quine’s claim, it is that only the whole
science is susceptible of being confirmed or disconfirmed. Therefore, state-
ments cannot have their semantic properties essentially, but only indirectly,
thanks to the role they play inside a theory.
Now consider how this translates when we are talking about language. It
seems that all boils down to the platitude that a sentence can have a certain
meaning only if considered as a sentence of a certain language. And now we
must ask how we decide which language a sentence is formulated in.
Take (1), for instance. It is an ambiguous utterance, inasmuch as it can
mean “Romans’ calves are beautiful” in Italian and “Go, o Vitellius, to the
sound of war of the Roman god” in Latin.
(1) I Vitelli dei Romani sono belli.
Do we have one sentence with two possible meanings or two different sen-
tences? Fodor and Lepore would say that, if meaning comes not into the
question as an essential property of sentences, we are presented the same
sentence. I would say that, since sentences are related to languages and lan-
guages to speakers, then the decision about meaning and language should take
speakers into consideration.
48Ibid.
49Quine (1953), pg. 42.
50Fodor and Lepore (1992), pgs. 40 f.
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Now, one difference between languages and theories is that a theory is
essentially shared, while a language can be thought of as essentially individual.
The notion of linguistic community is vague and perhaps derivative, for our
purposes, of that of idiolect.51
On this regard, I propose to compare how we assign statements to theories
and how we compare theories with the case of languages. The notion of com-
mon language, as I said, is vague, as it is often difficult to state which idiolect
is part of which common language, and, therefore, what are the characteristics
of common languages. Theories, when we talk about them seriously,52 have
no such vagueness. In some respect, public scientific theories will show to be
like idiolects.
Is the Q/D Thesis Trivial?
Back to the general case of Q/D thesis, then. Suppose we decide to hold
onto statement s, come what may, and that to do so we have to make some
adjustments to other statements in our theory. If the meaning of s did not
change after changing the theory, holism would not hold. If it changed, though,
Fodor and Lepore would claim that we have trivialized the Q/D thesis:
It’s only epistemologically interesting that you can hold onto “Burn-
ing is the liberation of phlogiston” even in the face of Lavoisier’s
results if “Burning is the liberation of phlogiston” means that burn-
ing is the liberation of phlogiston. It’s no news that you could
hold onto it in the face of those results if it means that Greycat
has whiskers.53
I propose to show that this trivialization can be avoided without assigning
unchangeable meanings to the statements. The idea, as I have already sug-
gested, is to pay attention to what it is for scientific statements to be true or
false in the context of a theory. I think, as I have said, that this can give us
some insight in what it means for a sentence to have a meaning in a language.
This Way Out The way to save Quine’s reading of the Q/D thesis, together
with the holistic desire to have statements change their meanings depending
on the theory they are in, can be to exploit an idea by Kuhn:
The claim that two theories are incommensurable is [. . . ] the claim
that there is no language, neutral or otherwise, into which both
51Cf. § 1.2.
52That is, as “fairly specific bod[ies] of speculation or propositions with a definite subject
matter” (Hacking (1983), pg. 175). I am not claiming that this is the right interpretation
to give to Quine’s discussion of theories, but that this interpretation is consistent with what
he said, and, for independent reasons, the most convenient (cf. ibid., pgs. 174 ff).
53Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 47.
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theories, conceived as sets of sentences, can be translated without
residue or loss. [. . . ] Most of the terms common to the two theories
function the same way in both; their meanings, whatever those
may be, are preserved; their translation is simply homophonic.
Only for a small subgroup of (usually interdefined) terms and for
sentences containing them do problems of translatability arise.54
To understand what use I have in mind for this idea, consider this passage
from one of Fodor and Lepore’s notes:
[. . . ] Quine likes an ecumenical story according to which the con-
nectives mean different things in classical and intuitionistic logic.
But, again, barring some trans-theoretic notion of statement iden-
tity, it’s unclear how you decide which connectives it is that the
two kinds of logic assign different meanings to. (The thought that
there are perhaps no theorems that classicists and intuitionists can
both accept seems, to put it mildly, unintuitive).55
On this regard, I have to acknowledge the insuperable chasm between
my notion of what is intuitive and Fodor and Lepore’s. Never would I have
imagined that one could have intuitions about theorems of formal logic.
If intuitions were not an issue, though, it would seem obvious to me that
Quine was referring to a way of identifying connectives by way of their symbolic
role in the theory. When we compare theories, we do so under the point of view
of some theory. Correspondingly, when we compare languages, we do so in a
language. Therefore, we can decide to procede to identify statements (hence,
in the present case, connectives) in a omophonic way, and acknowledge the
shift of meaning by their presence in theorems that are accepted in one formal
theory but whose omophonic counterparts are not accepted in the other.
As in the case of classical connectives vs. intuitionistic ones the shift that
meaning is allowed to do intervenes on a preceding omophonic identification of
statements and connectives, so, in the former example, the shift that we must
do in the meaning of, say, “phlogiston” (or, maybe, of the phrase “liberation
of phlogiston”) in order to be able to hold onto “Burning is the liberation
of phlogiston” even in the face of Lavoisier’s results is limited, because it
cannot be arbitrary. It is precisely the shift that is triggered by the fact
that, now, “phlogiston” will appear in some true statement that used to be
considered false. Fodor and Lepore could ask what determines the meaning of
these statements, then. I answer that meaning assignation is achieved at first
by homophonic connections, just as Kuhn believed, and then by subsequent
adjustments and feedbacks from one statement to the other.
54Kuhn (2000), pg. 36. Cf. also § 6.2.1 below.
55Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 218 n. 10, emphasis in text.
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Sameness of Meaning? Note that we do not have said much when we say
that we want “Burning is the liberation of phlogiston” to mean that burning
is the liberation of phlogiston. For the quoted statement is something that we
want to be true (indeed, we want to hold onto it whatever the evidence may
be), while, in our understanding of it, it is false that burning is the liberation
of phlogiston – and this is because there is no phlogiston. Now, that seems to
me like trivializing the Q/D thesis. I will change the example to get the point
clearer. In the Middle Age they used to hold (2) as a true statement.
(2) Unicorns are white.
Suppose that, in the face of zoological evidence that there is no unicorn, we
want to hold onto (2), and we want it to mean that unicorns are white. We
want, i.e., (2) to have the same meaning of a proposition that assigns a colour
to hypothetical, non-existent creature. Now, that is definitely epistemologi-
cally uninteresting.
My point is that we do not understand quite well what the meaning of
sentences containing “phlogiston” or “unicorn” should be if they must have
existing references. Of course, we can say that, whatever that meaning is, is
different from that of (3). But this is not because we know that the meaning
of (2) is different from (3), but only because we want it to be different and we
stipulate it to be so.
(3) Greycat has whiskers.
If I am on the right track, this would imply that we cannot choose to hold
onto one statement in isolation, but we must also decide to preserve some of
its relations with other statements. This boils down to the unsurprising thesis
that when we need to change our theory, it will not help to simply decide what
we want to leave unchanged, but also what changes to operate.
∗∗∗
Once again, what has all of this to do with language? Perhaps only confusion
will ever arise from confounding language and theory. But maybe we can learn
from the case we have raised that what we want to do with the linguistic side
of the problem (i.e., finding a way to assign sentences to languages without
assigning them essential meanings) could be done in a dynamic process, a pro-
cess starting with assumptions, making hypotheses, acquiring data, revisiting
and revising old hypotheses and making new ones, and so on. This is the kind
of theory we will try to sketch in the next sections.
4.2.3 Semantics As an Empirical Enterprise
A clear consequence of the theory seen so far is that it leaves interpretation
largely indeterminate. In fact, we cannot know from mere behaviour how to
interpret others’ utterances, because we cannot be sure about which utterances
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in our language should be considered their right translation. Quine proposed
to introduce a principle of charity to reduce indetermination. He proposed,
that is, to attribute to the speaker whose sentences we want to interpret a
system of beliefs similar to ours. Of course, this will not always be possible:
Tolerance is bound to have been exercised if a native sentence, be-
lieved by the whole community with a firmness that no stimulus
pattern of reasonable duration would suffice to shake, is trans-
lated as ‘All rabbits are men reincarnate’. To translate a stimulus-
analytic native sentence thus into an English sentence that is not
stimulus-analytic is to invoke translator’s licence. I think this ac-
count gives such a translation quite the proper air: that of a bold
departure, to be adopted only if its avoidance would seem to call
for much more complicated analytical hypotheses. For certainly,
the more absurd or exotic the beliefs imputed to a people, the
more suspicious we are entitled to be of the translations; the myth
of the prelogical people marks only the extreme. For translation
theory, banal messages are the breath of life.56
In Quine’s system, such a principle of charity is just a prudence principle.
Quine took evident advantage of it, but he gave no principled justification
for it. In fact, the principle of charity seems to have at least partially the
purpose of taking account of our intuitions; nevertheless, according to Quine,
intuitions are legitimate in their territory, but we must sometimes put them
aside when developing a coherent theory.57
We may decide to give to the principle of charity a more central position
in our theory of interpretation.58 If we decide to renounce an utterly behav-
56Quine (1960), pg. 69. Stimulus is, in Quine’s theory, a time-dependent variable. Those
sentences that would solicit assent no matter what stimulus the speaker is faced with are
considered analytic. But it suffices to vary the temporal gap considered to let the distinction
fall. For instance, if we considered as stimulus a speaker’s entire life, the category ‘analytic’
would doubtlessly lose any point. Cf. ibid., pg. 63.
Quine spoke of “stimulus-analytic” sentences since he did not believe in the possibility of
drawing distinctions between synthetic and analytic sentences not grounded on behavioris-
tical bases. Cf. Quine (1953), chpt. 2.
57Cf. Quine (1960), pgs. 66 f., where the issue is with analitycity, not with the principle
of charity:
The intuitions are blameless in their way, but it would be a mistake to look
to them for a sweeping epistemological dichotomy between analytic truths as
by-products of language and synthetic truths as reports on the world. I suspect
that the notion of such a dichotomy only encourages confused impressions of
how language relates to the world.
Without a theory to support them, intuitions can at best furnish us a guide in our
investigation, but never constitute integral part of it. I think that there is no reason to limit
these considerations of the drawbacks of resorts to intuitions to those about analyticity.
58Cf. Davidson (2001), pgs. 228 f.
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ioristic account, we can give intuition and introspection the place they seem
to have in our daily practice of linguistic interpretation.59
According to Quine, we have seen it, interpretation is an empirical enter-
prise; therefore, it needs empirical hypotheses. More than one hypothesis can
be consistent with the same evidence. To see how a principle of charity can
help in individuating the right theory, we must first state what we expect from
an empirical theory if interpretation.
Let us begin with Tarski’s definition of truth, as we saw it in § 1.3. It
consisted in defining truth for a formal language L (‘object language’) with
respect to another languageM (‘metalanguage’), containing a predicate ‘true
in L’ which cannot be a predicate of L itself. If M contains a constant for
every sentence p of L, and, for every sentence pn of L, a sentence sn translating
it, we can say, inM,
‘pn’ is true in L if and only if sn.
Call sentences of this kind T-sentences. Tarski could construct meanings
by other means, and his is only a theory of truth. As such, though, it tells us
nothing about meaning. In other words, we cannot exploit the correspondence
created by T-sentences to ground the notion of meaning, and to find what
sentence in L mean.
Donald Davidson proposed another way of exploiting T-sentences. He
suggested that any acceptable theory of meaning should entail all and only
the true T-sentences. T-sentences, thus, should be used as a test to compare
inferences of a theory of meaning developed by other means, rather than as
the starting point of a theory of meaning. This enables us to see semantics as
an empirical enterprise: we know, in fact, what results we expect the theory
to produce as its outcome, and, therefore, we can test it.
∗∗∗
Davidson’s problem is to explain how the right kind of theory should be de-
veloped. Consider that we are looking for a theory which entails all the true
T-sentences like “‘Snow is white’ is true in English iff snow is white,” while
forbidding T*-sentences like “‘Snow is white’ is true in English iff grass is
green.” Note that the problem with T*-sentences is not that they are false,
therefore we must find another criterion to discriminate between them and
actual T-sentences. Call this “the extensionality problem.”60
Another requirement for our theory of meaning that we must consider
is that it must start abruptly without former knowledge of meaning in L.
Otherwise, we should ask where that knowledge comes from. In other words,
we are asking for a theory of meaning that is achievable by a radical interpreter,
someone that is faced with the problem of radical interpretation.
59We might notice how, from the theories seen in § 2.2, to the behaviorism just delineated,
to the theory we are about to describe, we are increasing the importance of considering
language as a human faculty and activity, and not just a theoretical independent entity.
60Cf. Fodor and Lepore (1992), pgs. 60 ff.
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To summarize, Davidson problem was to solve the extensionality problem,
while meeting the radical interpretation requirement. This matters to us,
because it can be seen as a reformulation of the problem we had in last section.
There we wanted to know the meaning of sentences (and this we can do by
solving the extensionality problem) within a theory which does not individuate
sentences via their meanings (that is, a theory within which sentences are
initially taken as susceptible of any meaning, i.e., a theory that meets the
radical interpretation requirement). Davidson’s problem is just our problem.
Fodor and Lepore individuate and discuss three possible solutions to the
extensionality problem suggested by Davidson:
Suggestion 1: Exploit the fact that natural languages exhibit
compositional semantic structure; in particular, that the same
expressions can recur with the same meanings in (indefinitely)
many formulas. This is the main strategy contemplated in
“Truth and meaning.”
Suggestion 2: Require that the T-sentences in favored truth the-
ories be laws. This is the strategy contemplated in the “Reply
to Foster” and in note 11, added to “Truth and meaning” in
1982.
Suggestion 3: Require the favored truth theory for L to entail
T-sentences according to which most of the sentences that
speaker of L hold true are true. This is one version of David-
son’s “principle of charity” and is the main strategy contem-
plated in “Radical interpretation.”61
This is the order in which Fodor and Lepore discuss the suggestions, and
they interpolate a discussion about the plausibility of the radical interpretation
requirement between the first and the second. Finally, they briefly dismiss the
question about all three suggestions working together. Maybe they should
have paid more attention to this final complex suggestion, because if it is
true, as they claim, that “the issues raised by suggestions 2 and 3, unlike those
raised by suggestion 1, are intimately concerned with the question of radical
interpretation,” then suggestion 1 should always be considered in connection
with the other two.62 For Davidson held the radical interpretation requirement
to be unavoidable. Anyway, we will discuss this at due time.
61Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 62, emphasis in text.
62This is confirmed, for instance, by the fact that in “Truth and meaning” there is mention
of radical interpretation and of the principle of charity (Davidson (2001), pg. 27). Note 11
is claimed by Davidson to be a clearer restatement of the text it refers to, but this should




The first suggestion considered by Fodor and Lepore is that our theory of
meaning derives T-sentences “by exploiting the linguistic structure of the for-
mulas whose truth conditions they specify.”63 The theory, therefore, must
derive the semantic properties of one sentence from the semantic properties
of its lexical parts considered together with its syntactic structure. This con-
straint is holistic in the sense that the theory of meaning that we must derive
should hold for all sentences at the same time, hence we must avoid contradic-
tions between the semantic properties of lexical items appearing in different
sentences, or between syntactic structures shared by different sentences. Thus,
e.g., a T*-sentence like “‘Snow is white’ is true in English iff grass is green”
“could not belong to any reasonably simple theory that also gave the right
truth conditions for ‘That is snow’ and ‘This is white.’ ”64
Necessity of Compositionality
Fodor and Lepore comment that this suggestion entails that there cannot
exist noncompositional languages, for the expressions of such languages could
not have determinate truth conditions.65 But, in fact, such a language is not
impossible, or so they claim:
Suppose there is a child who has (to all appearances) mastered the
entire nonrecursive apparatus of English. So he can say things like
“It’s raining,” “Snow is white,” “Grass is green,” “That’s snow,”
“That’s green,” “That’s frozen,” “Everybody hates me,” “I hate
spinach,” and so forth, but not “Snow is white and grass is green”
or “Everybody hates frozen spinach,” and so forth. We take it that,
assuming that everything about the child’s speech dispositions in
respect to this nonrecursive part of the language is exactly like
that of the corresponding normal adult, it is very plausible that
when the child says “Snow is white,” he means that snow is white.
[. . . ]
But now consider a child who is just like this one in his speech
(and inferential and, generally, cognitive) dispositions axcept that,
whenever child 1 would use “Snow is white” to say that snow is
white, child 2 uses the unstructured expression “Alfred”; [. . . ] and
so forth.
[. . . ] Then, barring tasks that require the comprehension or
production of recursive sentences, let it be that the traslated ver-
balizations of child 2 are indistinguishable from the verbalizations
63Ibid., pg. 63.
64Davidson (2001), pg. 26 n. 10.
65Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 65.
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of child 1. Nevertheless, if compositionality is a necessary condi-
tion for content, then there is an a priori argument that child 2
couldn’t mean anything determinate by what he utters. We take
it that is just obvious that such an argument couldn’t be sound.
After all, whether the child means anything by his utterances prob-
ably depends on the intentions with which he utters them. What
a priori argument would show that a child couldn’t utter “Sam”
with the intention of thereby saying that snow is white?66
I think that there are several problems with this thought experiment. First
of all, it is not clear what the appeal to intentions should solve. In fact, it is yet
to be proved that the meaning of sentences is dependent on the communicative
intentions of the speaker. Even if this is so, our attribution of intentions to
child 2 seems to be dependent on some kind of intuition, and it will become
clear that nothing different from the principle of charity is at stake here. We
will discuss it after introducing the theme of radical interpretation.
We can also ground intention attributions on behaviour. However, it is
easy to see that child 2 has a linguistic behaviour very different from that
that would allow us to attribute him any intention to mean, say, that snow
is white when he utters “Sam.” In fact, as Chomsky once pointed out, we do
not know how to identify stimuli prompting such an intention.67 Moreover,
part of the intention to mean that snow is white is probably the intention
to predicate something of something else. But in “Sam” there is no trace of
predication, because it is unstructured.
On the other hand, we might say that intention attributions do not matter
here, because intentions can ground meaning even if we are not able to identify
them. This can be perfectly right. My only concern is why we would want
to speak of language in such a case, given that we could not even trace a
systematic and consistent use of utterances. The language spoken by child 2
would be the classical example of a private language, and there is something,
in a private language, that strikes us as not linguistic at all. In fact, sentence
in a language have a meaning even independently of intentions: for instance,
I could intend to say that snow is white, but a slip of the tongue makes me
say “Snow is wise.” Does my utterance mean that snow is white or that snow
is wise? I think that it means the second, and that is why I can say I was
mistaken in uttering it. If this is true, then appealing to our intuition about
intentions is pointless here, because intentions are not grounding meaning.68
66Ibid., pgs. 65 f., emphasis in text.
67Chomsky (1969), pgs. 57 f.
68I incidentally underline that I am not saying that, in the example above, we must follow
our intuition that “Snow is wise” mean literally. Rather, this is what our behavior towards
such an utterance shows: we apologize and correct ourselves, state what we actually meant,




It might turn out that something else is grounding the meaning of child 2’s
utterances. However, this does not seem the case. For consider that child 2
himself cannot know when he is mistaken. When he utters “Sam,” he can never
know whether, for some reason, “Mary” would have been more appropriate in
that occasion. For that would mean not only that he knows the meaning of his
utterances independently of his intentions, and we can grant it for the sake of
the argument, but also that he is capable of knowing the propositional content
of his intentions in order to compare it with his utterances’ meaning. But in
order to make such a comparison, he has to attribute propositional attitudes
to himself, or else exploit some compositional device in order to attribute to
the same entity both that it is an intention and that its content is “Sam.” But
our hypothesis was that child 2 has no compositional structure. Therefore, he
cannot even know what his utterances mean, thus leaving us with the suspect
that his might even be not a language at all.
Note that there would seem to be, theoretically, the possibility that child
2 does not actually know the meaning of his utterances, but that some (atom-
istic) symbol/world relation grounds meaning nonetheless. However, consider
that if child 2 does not know anything about this symbol/world relation, he
cannot use his symbols consistently with it. To postulate such a relation is
pointless, because this relation has no effect whatsoever on the child, nor on
his use of language, nor on the linguistic output itself, nor on the listener
or interpreter. Only an omniscient being could know the real meaning of
such utterances, and whether child 2 has intentions that correspond to that
meaning:
Omniscience can obviously afford more bizzarre theories of mean-
ing than ignorance; but then, omniscience has less need of com-
munication.69
Consider child 1, now. If a case can be done about child 2, and we grant
Fodor and Lepore that the cognitive dispositions of the two children are ac-
tually the same, this means that also child 1 is not really a speaker of any
language. Indeed, his sentences only seem to have structure, because we can
interpret them as structured, being able to connect them (homophonically)
to sentences in our language, in which we can individuate syntactic and se-
mantic components. But child 1 cannot do anything of the like, therefore
he cannot compare “Snow is white” and “This is snow” as both being about
snow. To do this, he should know that these sentences are compositionally
structured, which he does not know for hypothesis. His sentences, then, are
as unstructured as child 2’s, and his language is as impossible as child 2’s.
Note that we have to conclude that both languages have no semantics at
all, and, therefore, they are not properly languages at all. Actually, we could
assume, as noted before, that they have semantic properties, but that they are
69Davidson (2001), pgs. 26 f.
96
4.2.4. Compositionality
simply inaccessible except for some omniscient being. Such an assumption,
though, is in contrast with Davidson’s requirement that a theory of meaning
should be empirically testable.
∗∗∗
What we have said about Fodor and Lepore’s thought experiment can be used
as a proof against the possibility of noncompositional languages. Consider a
possible objection:
Children actually do go through a “holophrastic” stage in the
course of normal language acquisition. Could there be a tran-
scendental argument showing that the utterances they produce
at this stage have no truth conditions? But, in fact, the child’s
holophrastic utterances are quite often interpretable.70
The fact that something is interpretable, however, tells us nothing about
its truth conditions and about the speaker’s linguistic knowledge. Even dogs’
whines are interpretable, and much involuntary behaviour as well is often
considered interpretable. We can ascribe meaning to a sentence by a speaker,
only if we assume the speaker has beliefs and desires similar to ours. But these
beliefs and desires can be assumed only in presence of a linguistic behaviour
mostly coincident with ours. There is nothing wrong in thinking that a child
cannot have the semantic subtleties of an adult. And there is nothing wrong,
thus, in thinking that a child does not mean what an adult means in uttering
utterances homophonic to the adults’ ones. Of course, this line of argument
is leading us towards the issue of interpretation. This will be the topic of the
sections from 4.2.5 on.
Sufficiency of Compositionality
Before analysing the role of radical interpretation in Davidson’s theory of
meaning, we need to deal with another piece of argument by Fodor and Lepore.
Not only they claim that compositionality is not necessary to solve the problem
of extensionality, but that it is also not sufficient. In fact, if we consider a
pair of coextensive but not synonymous atomic predicates, then there will be
no compositional test that will help us distinguish them, unless we appeal to
intensional contexts.71 This seems to have unwanted consequences:
But if the compositionality solution to the extensionality problem
must appeal to these contexts, then it seems to be implied that
there could not be an entirely extensional language whose sentences
have determinate truth conditions (contrary, it goes without say-
ing, to the widely held view that, really, there couldn’t be any
other language whose sentences do).72
70Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 224 n. 6, emphasis in text.
71Ibid., pgs. 66 f.
72Ibid., pg. 67, emphasis in text.
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Such a consequence does not seem to be really entailed. In fact, let us ask
how we identify coextensive but not synonymous atomic predicates. Again,
it seems that some sort of omniscience is required. But the very assumption
that such a pair can exist in a language lacking the means to distinguish
them (such as a language deprived of intensional apparatus) seems to beg the
question. Again, in fact, an atomistic symbol/world relation is assumed, and
such relation cannot be described in any way, because it bears no relation to
the way language is used or to the way we interpret it. Does such a notion of
meaning have any sense or utility?
Moreover, consider that an atomistic theory of meaning would not be able
either to deal with the extensionality problem without appealing to intensional
contexts and semantic properties of such contexts. So, the problem spotted
by Fodor and Lepore is a problem for all theories of meaning, and cannot
therefore be used to discrimine among them.
Our solution to this problem, then, will be simply to bite the bullet, but
not in the sense wanted by Fodor and Lepore. We will not claim that there
is no successful theory of meaning for extensional languages. We will state,
instead, that in the case of this languages it is pointless to speak of pairs
of coextensive though not synonymous atomic predicates. In an extensional
language all coextensive atomic predicates are synonymous.
If this is true, then the other objection to the appeal to compositionality
advanced by Fodor and Lepore fails too. They claim that the term “intension-
ality” is not at a semantic metatheory’s disposal. In fact, there is no way for
such a theory to identify intensional contexts before the theory of meaning is
complete. I am perfectly fine with such an objection, provided that from the
present discussion should be clear that no mention of intensionality is needed
at all. We can do exactly how Fodor and Lepore, as it seems, assume: after
having provided a theory of meaning and having tested it, we recognize co-
extensive atomic predicates and we decide whether they are synonymous or
not by looking for contexts discriminating among them. Contexts that will
do will be called intensional. If no such context can be found, then we will
assume the predicates to be synonymous. This, in fact, is the way they are
used, and this is the way the speakers themselves intepret them. Any further
consideration would imply semantic omniscience.
∗∗∗
On this regard, let me stress again the difference between the two approaches
to semantics that here are at stake. Our discussion of semantic theories shows
that there are two ways of dealing with meaning in natural languages. One
way necessarily take into consideration only empirically testable hypotheses.
Therefore, we will end necessarily with a theory that makes assumptions on
the nature of language on the basis of the evidence that we have for it. Nev-
ertheless, it could be that the real metaphysic nature of meaning does not,
in fact, mirror the phenomenic nature of meaning, which we study. From
this point of view, any theory of meaning can be right or wrong. However,
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right and wrong themselves seem inappropriate in such a context, because we
cannot ever decide which is the right theory and, moreover, even if we knew,
it would not help us in everyday use and study of language. Therefore, the
way that starts from interpretation of language and leads to a corresponding
theory of meaning seems the only tenable. And this seems the reason behind
Davidson’s requirement that theories of meaning must be empirically tested.
∗∗∗
The empiricist requirement can also account for another objection put forward
by Fodor and Lepore. They note that if a theory entails the T-sentence “‘Snow
is white’ is true in English iff snow is white,” and LT is some accepted logical
truth, then the theory entails also “‘Snow is white’ iff snow is white and LT.”
Davidson’s response to that is that a derivation of T-sentences entailed by a
theory of meaning should be canonical, in the sense that no additional axioms
should be required. The aberrant T-sentence of our example, then, should be
ruled out, because it requires the addition of logical apparatus to the core of
the theory of meaning.73
Fodor and Lepore reply that the aberrant T-sentence could be derived not
only by appending “and LT” to the canonical T-sentence, but also from an
axiom added directly to the core set of axioms of the theory of meaning. I
think that we can respond along Davidson’s lines that, since the theory of
meaning must be an effective empirical theory, we must have justifications for
adding axioms.
Punctate Languages
Fodor and Lepore end their discussion of the compositional solution stating
that, even if the problems they found should be mended, you could neverthe-
less have a language all of whose sentences are token-reflexive:
[. . . ] there is no argument so far that you can’t have a language all
of whose sentences are token-reflexive. [. . . ] If, however, you can
have a language that contains only token-reflexive sentences, what
argument shows that you can’t have a language that contains only
one sentence, so long as it is token-reflexive?74
The problem with this objection is again that it overlooks the empirical
nature of a theory of meaning. In fact, how can we understand what an
utterance of the intended kind (e.g., “This is blue”) means? We cannot test
our hypotheses: we cannot put blue objects in front of speakers and expect
them to utter, “This is blue.” Intentions are beyond our survey, because we
need other linguistic clues to decipher them. Maybe we can utter the sentence
with an interrogative inflexion? But interrogative sentences are different from
73Ibid., pgs. 67 ff.
74Fodor and Lepore (1992), pgs. 69 f., emphasis in text; cf. § 2.1.2.
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affirmative ones, therefore they are by hypothesis excluded from the language
we are questioning. Worse than that, speakers themselves cannot interpret
their own language, wonder about the meaning of their utterances, nor claim,
“‘This is blue’ is true in English iff this is blue,” because this is a different
sentence from the initial one.
Perhaps someone [. . . ] will be tempted to say, ‘But at least the
speaker knows what he is referring to.’ One should stand firm
against this thought. The semantic features of language are public
features. What no one can, in the nature of the case, figure out
from the totality of the relevant evidence cannot be part of mean-
ing. And since every speaker must, in some dim sense at least,
know this, he cannot even intend to use his words with a unique
reference, for he knows that there is no way for his words to convey
this reference to another.75
4.2.5 Radical Interpretation
The discussion in the last section should have made it clear that what we
think about the nature of meaning (i.e., a theory of meaning) has important
connections with the way we come to determine meaning (i.e., a theory of
interpretation). Of course the two theories are not the same one, because in
the case of interpretation we can always imagine some cognitive device to cut
corners, so to say. But they are not separable under two respects:
1. The two theories must be compatible. The explanation provided by
one on its subject matter cannot contradict or entail consequences that
contradict explanations and entailments of the other. Of course, this
leaves plenty of space for accomodation and explanation of apparent
contradictions.
2. A theory of interpretation furnishes the privileged way to test a theory
of meaning, because the former is nothing more than a description of
the actual empirical results of the axioms and theorems of the latter.
This is why an examination of the radical interpretation requirement is
now needed. In particular, we must see if something similar to radical inter-
pretation is ever possible, and, if it is, what the exact requirements for it are,
and what the consequences of such requirements are for the holistic nature of
the theory of meaning.
Viewed in this context, a radical interpretation (RI) theory seeks
to do two things. First, it must specify the kinds of empirical evi-
dence that a successful meaning theory may be required to account
75Davidson (2001), pg. 235.
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for. In this context, “empirical evidence” includes any contingent
propositions that the radical interpreter may legitimately appeal to
to warrant his interpretation. [. . . ] Second, since different ways
of constraining the evidence will lead to different T-theories being
selected, an RI theory must justify the imposition of one set of
evidential constraints in preference to others.76
The first objection to RI theory is that it seems to contradict the Q/D
thesis.77 This is because “the justification of the evidential constraints that
an RI theory imposes must be a priori,”78 while “Q/D asserts that what counts
as evidence for an empirical theory is always to be determined a posteriori.”79
In fact, RI requires only that it is a priori determined what sort of evidence
must be at disposal of the theory, but it does not determine a priori what
pieces of evidence actually there must be. In other words, it simply states a
priori how the evidence that we decide to treat as such should be considered,
but it does not say what is considered as evidence given a certain theory.
Thus, there seems to be no contradiction. In fact, even according to the
Q/D thesis choices among the theories and among evidence are not always
made a posteriori, as Fodor and Lepore claim. All sorts of requirements can
be imposed on theories and on evidence, such as methodological constraints,
ethic or esthetic considerations, metaphysical claims, and so on.
∗∗∗
Talking of the possibility of RI, Fodor and Lepore identify two possible lines
of argument. The first is to claim that some actual activities, like the work
of field linguists, or the acquisition of language by children, have so much in
common with RI that their possibility is direct evidence for the possibility of
RI.80
In both cases, Fodor and Lepore individuate some element that seems to
get out of the RI requirements. For field linguists have of course a preexistent
theory about language, which they exploit to discriminate among evidence,
and children are claimed to have something analogous, a universal grammar
(UG) that enables them to choose the right evidence and to organize that
evidence in the right kind of theory.
Again, the contradiction seems to me only apparent, and it originates,
probably, from not considering what the reasonable requirements for an RI
theory should be, if we want it to be some empirical theory. Of course linguists
have some preexistent theory, but either this is warranted or not. If it is
warranted, for instance by experience, we should ask how this warranty was
76Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 71, emphasis in text.
77Ibid., pg. 225 n. 12.
78Ibid., pg. 71.




possible. We probably would end up with the very RI that we were looking
for.
However, it seems more plausible to think that no empirical theory is
completely warranted by experience, and this is essentially the Q/D thesis.
Therefore, it seems that RI theories are not in a different position from sofisti-
cated linguistic theories: both kind of theories are somewhat underdetermined
by empirical data. This is not a problem: all that it shows is, as we already
knew, that as in the case of the field linguists, the radical interpreter has to
make some assumptions a priori, which will constrain his theory. It is not
obvious that such assumptions should concern language. In fact, as we will
see, the most important assumption of this bundle is the principle of charity,
which is a methodological assumptions regarding, in its most general form,
rationality as a human characteristic. Other methodological assumptions are
certainly part of the bundle: assumptions regarding economicity of the theory,
or elegance, and so on, which are shared by virtually all empirical theories.
As for the child’s case, even granted that UG constitutes, indeed, a preex-
istent linguistic cognition, again there is nothing particular different between
the child’s situation and the radical intepreter’s. The major difference is that
the child’s initial assumptions (i.e., UG) are not conscious, while the radical
interpreter’s one probably are, being characterized as methodological require-
ments. This would account for the greater ability of the child in retrieving
what we can call the right theory of meaning for the language. Consider,
however, that this is a rather misleading way to speak: not much because it
can be doubted that what the child has is, in fact, a theory,81 but because, in
this case, there is no such a thing as the right theory. We must acknowledge
that starting from the same data more than one theory is possible, and the
only criterion to rule out the wrong ones is by way of T-sentences. Children
are more efficient in doing so, probably because the conscious application of
a rule can always be seen as a more difficult process than its unconscious ho-
mologous. However, there does not seem to be a reason to look at the child’s
theory as somehow unwarranted, as Fodor and Lepore would say:82 no more
than any other theory is.
∗∗∗
The other argument discussed by Fodor and Lepore seems to be connected
with what we have already said:
If there is any fact of the matter at all about what the interpre-
tation of a language is, then the evidence which selects a meaning
theory for that language must in principle be publicly accessible
data. [. . . ]
The problem with this line of argument is that, though it may
show that the evidence that determines the choice of a T-theory




can’t be “hidden” in principle, it doesn’t begin to show that it
can’t be hidden from the child/linguist/radical interpreter.83
But I think that this can be shown if we let the two lines of argument
converge. For Fodor and Lepore seem to be, towards the requirements of
the RI thought experiment, both too restrictive (when they claim that RI
requires knowledge of just contingent behavioural facts) and, paradoxically
enough, too liberal (when they claim that radical interpretation is possible
for an omnscient being that knows all the nonintentional facts and what laws
and counterfactuals are supported by those facts).84 Truth, perhaps, lie in
between: we need not know all true counterfactuals supported by facts, and
even not know all facts. We need to have, though, some methodological prin-
ciple which allows us to infer counterfactuals and laws from facts. Now, we
know that something of the like is probably metaphysical in nature, and that,
e.g., induction is never supported by facts. Indeed, this is enough to believe
that even an omniscient being knowing all counterfactuals supported by facts
would have more than one theory to choose from.
The question we should ask, then, is not whether radical interpretation is
possible, but how to define radical interpretation in a reasonable way; that is,
we have to specify better than Fodor and Lepore what knowledge the radical
interpreter is allowed to have. This is my proposal: together with knowledge
of contingent behavioural facts, radical interpreters are allowed to know facts
concerning truth and meaning of their own languages. One might object
that everybody has such knowledge. Indeed, radical interpretation is just an
extreme example showing that the mechanisms explaining it are exactly the
same mechanisms involved in our interpretation of our neighbors’ discourses.
And this is exactly what makes it matter to philosophy of language.
4.2.6 Nomologicity
We can now discuss the second of the three Davidsonian suggestions to solve
the extensionality problem. This consists in considering T-sentences as laws
– natural laws, in a sense. This should help solving the problem, because
T*-sentences are not lawlike, since they cannot support appropriate counter-
factuals to solve our twofold extensionality problem, i.e., distinguishing both
between “‘Snow is white’ is true in English iff snow is white” and “‘Snow is
white’ is true in English iff grass is green,” and between “‘x is F ’ is true in
L iff x is F” and “‘x is F ’ is true in L iff x is G,” where F and G are two
coextensive but not synonymous atomic predicates of L.85
Fodor and Lepore claim that T-sentences fail the test of counterfactuals
as well, and therefore cannot be considered lawlike. On one hand, their being
83Ibid., pg. 80, emphasis in text.
84Ibid., pgs. 80 f.
85Davidson (2001), pg. 26 n. 11.
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laws would contradict the arbitrariness of language.86. On the other hand,
and for the same reason, the counterfactual world in which, say, “Particles of
like charge do not repel each other” is true is one in which the conventions of
English are different from here, and not a world where the laws of physics are
different.87
However, both the problems can be solved if we relativize T-sentence to
languages, speakers and worlds. In this way our T-sentence will be “‘Snow is
white’ is true at world w1 in Johnw0 ’s language iff snow is white at w1,” where
w0 is John’s world (probably the actual world), Johnwi is the counterpart of
John at world wi (whatever our theory of counterparts is), whose language we
are considering, and w1 is the world were we are evaluating truth.
This solution, which seems more or less equivalent to the proposed amend-
ment of Fodor and Lepore,88 takes into account what they call the principle
of conventionality. But here is the problem, according to Fodor and Lepore:
radical interpreters cannot derive as laws our (amended) T-sentences, because
they do not know about the principle of conventionality.89
I think that this conclusion holds only in one formulation of such principle.
If we define such a principle as stating that languages are essentially arbitrary
in their relation to the world,90 then we should doubt that such an assumption
can be make by the radical interpreter. If, on the other hand, we think of
the principle of conventionality as stating that each speaker has an idiolect
for which a peculiar theory of meaning holds, then we do not see why we
should not assume knowledge of this by the radical interpreter. For it merely
translates in this requirement: assume that the radical interpreter does not
know from the beginning the theory of meaning for L, and that from the
beginning there is no reason to expect such a theory of meaning to be the
same as one that the radical interpreter already knows. It seems to me that
this is a fair restatement of the radical interpretation requirement, and that,
therefore, it is fair for us to ask that it be satisfied by the radical interpreter,
whose task is defined by that requirement.
There is one objection by Fodor and Lepore that still seems to hold: the
case of children. It seems fair to say that while field linguists can very well
accept the prudential principle of not assuming that all people they come in
contact with are speakers of the same language, children do not know about
such a principle. In fact, they acquire a unique language, while were they to
assume that every other speaker has a unique language, they should acquire
the (overlapping) grammars of all the speakers they come in contact with.
Of course, the two situations would have more or less the same cognitive
86Fodor and Lepore (1992), pgs. 84 f.
87Ibid., pg. 85.
88Ibid., pgs. 86 ff.
89Ibid., pg. 89.
90Which, by the way, should make us dub this “principle of arbitrariness,” since conven-
tionality is another thing. Cf. Davidson (2001), chpt. 18.
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output, but let us assume, for the sake of argument and because it seems more
plausible, that the child from the beginning has one language, and according
to the theory of meaning of that unique language interprets what is said by
all other speakers. In Fodor and Lepore’s words:
It’s only when they are told about there being lots of languages
other than English that they understand that there are nearby
worlds in which “Snow is white” is true even though snow isn’t
white.91
To show that there is no contradiction in this case, we need to introduce
the principle of charity. I still postpone its discussion to § 4.2.7, but here is
a sketch of what I have in mind: suppose that the radical interpreter was not
to assume from the beginning that L is an unknown language. Suppose, in
fact, that interpretation begins by trying to match L with one’s own language,
and only when this proves impossible because of some empirical evidence, the
interpreter tries to adjust the theory of meaning so to match the data. In
the case of children, this is our explanation: children assume that everybody
speaks the same language, and acquire that, as if it was one language, unless
too much contrasting evidence leads them to prefer acquiring different sets of
rules. When interpreting, then, they first try to match what they are told
with the set(s) of rules they already know, and only after that they try to sort
out the problem by making adjustments, as slight as possible.
∗∗∗
The first problem that Fodor and Lepore note, even with such an elaborate
adjustment to the nomologicity suggestion, is similar to the one noted above
with regard to compositionality. Assume that “Water is H2O” is a law. Then
there is no way to distinguish between the meanings of “Water is wet” and
“H2O is wet.”
This problem, too, is solved by considerations about charity. In fact, it
is perfectly acceptable to assume ignorance of the technical term H2O, while
the term “water” is considerably more common. In translating a language
that shows only one of the two terms, then, the latter translation is to be
preferred. In translating a language with two different terms, the latter will
be associated to the most common in L.
∗∗∗
The second consideration put forward by Fodor and Lepore is that it is not
at all clear that nomologicity entails holism. An argument from the former
to the latter should prove that the only way to give nomological strenght
to T-sentences (i.e., to amended T-sentences) is by taking into consideration
different sentences of L. If this cannot be proved, we have no argument for
the impossibility of punctate languages and, therefore, for holism.92
91Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 89.
92Ibid., pgs. 91 f.
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I agree with the conclusion that nomologicity alone is not enough to prove
holism. But I think, as it should be clear from the present section, that I also
think that nomologicity needs, to be true, the principle of charity, and there
are reasons to believe that the principle of charity does entail holism.
Nomologicity, anyway, is not pointless: it plays the final role of our seman-
tic explanation. From the theory of interpretation grounded in methodological
principles to a theory of meaning a step is necessary, a step to rid us of under-
determination of theories of meaning with respect to behavioural evidence. I
think that this step is accomplished by a nomological principle, which enables
us to treat the T-sentences found through a theory of interpretation as laws
which support counterfactuals. Perhaps some other underdetermination will
be at stake: the Q/D thesis probably holds in this case. But, if this is true,
then theories of meaning are in the company of all empirical theories, which
is exactly the company we want them in from the beginning.93
4.2.7 Interpretation with Charity
We now turn to the discussion of the third Davidsonian suggestion: the prin-
ciple of charity. Faced with the intrinsic underdetermination of semantic the-
ories (i.e., of the underdetermination that semantic theories have inasmuch as
they are empirical theories), Davidson proposed his own principle of charity
to dispose of some hypotheses without verifying them through experience. He
believed Quine to be too restrictive when he called evidence just the speaker’s
behaviour. There is, in fact, also our own linguistic behaviour, and according
to it we can interpret others’ behaviour as non-deviant.
Here is Davidson’s proposal:
A good place to begin is with the attitude of holding a sentence
true, of accepting it as true. This is, of course, a belief, but it is a
single attitude applicable to all sentences, and so does not ask us
to be able to make finely discriminated distinctions among beliefs.
It is an attitude an interpreter may plausibly be taken to be able to
identify before he can interpret, since he may know that a person
intends to express a truth in uttering a sentence without having
any idea what truth.94
Holding true, thus, is the crucial attitude to begin interpretation. We can
identify such an attitude, because we know what it is like to hold a sentence
true, and because we are assuming that the speaker we want to interpret is,
under this respect, akin to us. But to attribute someone this attitude we need
to attribute them a whole lot of beliefs and attitudes similar to ours. In fact,
93More on the subject of semantics as theory of meaning, as opposed to theory of inter-
pretation, will be said in the next chapter.
94Davidson (2001), pg. 135, emphasis in text.
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there can be no definite list of things that must be believed by someone who
understands a sentence and holds it true. Endless connected beliefs might be
necessary.95 Therefore it is clear that, unless our first move is to attribute
such beliefs and attitudes, we cannot make it intelligible that our subjects
hold something true.
But the point is that, according to Davidson, the principle of charity is not
only useful for our interpretation of other people’s speech: it is also necessary.
If we do not assume that the cognitive system of the speakers we are sur-
veying has almost the same characteristics as ours, we cannot even consider
it a cognitive system, nor consider them as speakers, as opposed to incom-
prehensible babblers. Therefore, we would lack reasons to decide to construe
their utterances as carrying some meaning. The principle of charity, hence, is
not mere prudence: it is essential to our mastering of language as a means of
communication.
We must obviously apply this criterion cum grano salis, for the speaker
can after all be mistaken.96 Anyway, mistakes can be intelligible only if most
beliefs are actually shared. We need a common background to indicate what
the different beliefs are.97
∗∗∗
We have seen that both within a behavioristic theory or within a theory
grounded on a strong principle of charity, the very first move to do is to
determine whether the speakers hold their sentences true or false. In Quine’s
theory, this leads to a trial and error procedure to determine possible mean-
ings of the sentences under scrutiny, taking other sentences and other such
procedures into consideration. In Davidson’s theory, the attribution of such
an attitude leads to the determination of meaning, because even an attitude
like that of holding a sentence true cannot be intelligible unless we assume the
common human background of beliefs and attitudes, of which holding true is
a part.
Belief Attribution
One way of understanding how assuming the principle of charity entail seman-
tic holism is to see it as entailing an inference from belief holism to semantic
holism. The system of beliefs appears to be holistic because belief interpre-
tation is constrained by the principle of charity, which entails holism.98 In
fact, in order to have a certain belief (or other propositional attitude) it is
necessary to have other propositional attitudes, for we can interpret someone
as having a belief only if we can interpret that belief as being related in a
95Cf. ibid., pg. 158.
96Ibid., pg. 136.
97Ibid., pgs. 199 f.
98Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 113.
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certain way to other intentional states.99
The movement from belief holism to semantic holism is made by what
Fodor and Lepore call primacy of belief thesis:
The conditions for content attribution inherit the conditions for
belief attribution; hence, if the former are holistic, then the latter
must be too.100
Note that the name “primacy of belief” is misleading, because, as it will
become clearer later, what is claimed is that the individuation of intentional
states comes before the attribution of content. This, if true at all, is true for
beliefs as weel as for desires and speech acts. With this caveat in mind, we
can stick to Fodor and Lepore’s phrase.
The reason for believing in the primacy thesis, prima facie, is that it seems,
thanks to the principle of charity, that the attribution of beliefs is essential to
attribute semantic content to utterances. In other words: only if the speakers
have certain beliefs, their utterances have certain meanings. This is because
uttering something depends on performing certain speech acts, which depends
on its turn on having certain propositional attitudes.101 And, as we have said,
only in the context of a system we can identify propositional attitudes, because
propositional attitudes are functionally identified by the relation they bear to
other mental states and, specifically, to other propositional attitudes.102
Fodor and Lepore are willing to concede that much, but they claim that
neither the primacy of belief thesis follows, nor, therefore, semantic holism. In
fact, semantic holism would follow only if the functional role that is essential
for the identification of beliefs (and, in general, of intentional states) is also
what determines the intentional content of beliefs. Fodor and Lepore propose
an alternative: content derives from mental states, viz., mental representa-
tions.103 If the identification of mental representations is not a functional
process, then holism cannot be inferred:
So, then, to summarize: the species of mental representation the-
ory we have in mind [. . . ] tells one kind of story about the dif-
ference between believing and, as it might be, wanting and quite
a different kind of story about the difference between believing
that P and, as it might be, believing that Q. The former story is
bona fide functionalist: believing and wanting are both modes of
entertaining mental representations, but they differ with respect
to the causal (associative/computational) roles that the mental
99Ibid., pg. 107.
100Ibid., pg. 114, emphasis in text.
101Ibid., pg. 122.
102Ibid., pgs. 115 ff.
103Ibid., pgs. 122 f.
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representations play (that is, with respect to how the representa-
tions interact with inputs, outputs, and one another). By contrast,
the difference between believing that P and believing that Q in-
vokes the semantic properties of mental representations, and these
are supposed to be grounded in mind/world relations rather than
functional roles.104
I would rather say that the difference is one of mind/world relations, that is
of functional roles. Fodor and Lepore would want their mental representations
to have a direct causal relation with “the things they denote and the properties
they express.”105 This is the reason why they judge that content attribution
is not a functional process:
Whatever bestows semantic evaluability upon mental representa-
tions, it can’t be that they are used to express beliefs or intentions.
Mental representations aren’t “used” at all; and we typically have
no beliefs or intentions with respect to them.106
If this is true, I wonder what mental representations are doing in the theory
at all. Whenever we investigate our thoughts, we never find such mental
representations as distinct from beliefs or intentions. On the other hand,
consider how the property of being a determined mental representation of P
gives rise to a belief about P or an intention about P . This difference must
arise from the different functional role played by the mental representation.
But if this is so, we can assume that the same functionalistic mechanism is
responsible for both the content and the form of the intentional state. Another
passage by Fodor and Lepore is worth quoting, in order to get my point
sharper:
Maybe thinking that the cat is on the mat is just saying to one-
self “The cat is on the mat.” However, if it is, then “saying to
oneself” must differ from “saying” tout court. For saying tout
court is normally the consequence of deciding what to say; that
is, of decision-theoretic processes which invoke beliefs and desires.
Whereas, saying to oneself can’t presuppose believing or desiring,
since, according to the present account, believing and desiring are
themselves species of saying to oneself.107
I would like to reply that, “normally,” “saying tout court” is anything but
“the consequence of deciding what to say.” In most cases, in fact, conversation
104Ibid., pg. 127, emphasis in text.
105Ibid., pg. 125.
106Ibid., pgs. 125 f.
107Ibid., pgs. 126 f.
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is carried out almost in an automatic way, especially in the case of largely rit-
ualized conversations, like greetings, ceremonies, narratives, and so on. These
acts surely are very important when we want to specify possible uses of our
language.
Conversely, we can ask a reason for each of these acts. And a reason is
an explication in terms of beliefs and desires. It is the same with saying to
oneself. There seems to be no reason for a thought to come in our mind instead
of another, but are we sure that scrutiny would fail to reveal any? Usually,
an accurate inquiry leads always to reasons for any thought: the causal origin
of any mental representations is grounded on other mental representations.
Indeed, if the causal relation between mental representations and denoted
objects were as Fodor and Lepore imagine it, it would be determined by the
object which mental representation is aroused. In fact, it is not so: different
people have different mental representations towards the same objects.
It can be said that this happens because of different physical conformations
that alter the causal connection. But then we should explain why different
people come to have the same mental representations toward some objects and
different ones toward some others. It seems that some intentional explanation
must enter the picture, somehow.
Every linguistic act (like every act) has physical causes, but if we examine
the relation between the act and its cause, we realize that, to characterize the
act as an act, there must be a rational component between them. If we now
consider the origin of the rational component, another intentional element
must reveal itself, together with a physical cause.
The problem is difficult because here tradition considered to be dealing
with two distinct and opposite areas, while it is probably a continuum. To
be more precise: before any theoretic determination, there is no principled
difference between an act and an event. After theoretic determination, there
is a border, which can always be moved further by further investigations; but
there is an end to investigations. When we reach it, we have two options.
Either we try to root all the chain to the external world by way of causal
relations, or we ground it in human rationality. The first route is difficult to
pursue, because the end we have reached is arbitrary, so there is no possible
justification for causality to attach exactly to that point of the chain and
not to another. The other route, though, presupposes an analysis of human
rationality and human nature, which I will not attempt here.
Suffice it to say that rationality, under this perspective, works like a regula-
tive principle: unless we consider the human intentional system as complying
with our ideal of rationality (which is holistic, as it states that it is possible to
find reasons for every intentional state), we fail to attribute intentional content
to human mental states.108 In fact, nothing warrants us that human actions
are anything more than a mere causal response to external stimuli. However,
108More on this subject will be added in § 4.3.3.
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this hypothesis is incompatible with our actual interpretative practices.
∗∗∗
To this line of argument it might be objected that we could fail to appreciate
certain differences (e.g., between a belief and another) that nevertheless exist:
The problem is that if the Projectivist account of the (putative) in-
terpretive element in belief attribution is right, then what you can
believe depends on what your interpreter can say. But if anything
is metaphysically independent of anything, surely your repertoire
of potential beliefs is independent of anybody else’s repertoire of
potential speech acts. There is, no doubt, an “element of inter-
pretation” in talk about mountains; where does the mountain end
and the valley begin, after all? But only a megalomaniac could
suppose that whether there are mountains depends on whether he
can say that there are.109
Indeed, my potential beliefs do not depend on my interpreters’ potential
linguistic expressions, but the intelligibility of my beliefs to them – i.e., what
they can think about me and my belief – does. In a sense, it exists (if it exists
at all) only what we can say it exists, because we cannot even wonder about
the existence of something else. The world’s ontology does not depend on
vocabulary, but the part of it we can know and understand does.
Fodor and Lepore try to build a counterexample:
Consider the following kind of case: Smith’s three-year-old hears
him prattling about the analytic/synthetic distinction, and it oc-
curs to the child that Smith must have some beliefs about this
distinction that he, the child, does not understand and could not
express. On the present analysis, this thought – which intuition
might plausibly take to be true – is self-contradictory, since it en-
tails both that Smith is in some state that would normally lead
the three-year-old to say that “blah, blah, blah, analytic/synthetic,
blah, blah, blah” and that there is no such state.110
But the point here is not that there is no state which would lead the child
to utter that, but that the child does not know which state it is, and therefore
cannot correctly interpret Smith’s words. On the other hand, because some
(extended) principle of charity is applied, the child still knows that there is
such a mental state, and that Smith’s words are, in fact, meaningful, and not
mere prattling. Indeed, even the latter option is open to the child, and it
often happens that children, and sometimes adult people, take for insensate
prattling what they do not understand. And sometimes to assume that a
109Ibid., pg. 140, emphasis in text. Projectivism is the label that Fodor and Lepore attach




discourse is meaningless is just the right move, because sometimes people do
consciously utter nonsense – e.g., for amusement.
∗∗∗
Another objection advanced by Fodor and Lepore is the following:
If there’s a law that makes being in intentional state A nomolog-
ically sufficient for being in intentional (and/or) behavioral state
B, then, given the knowledge that a creature is in state A, you
can predict that it will (come to) be in state B, whether or not the
transition from A to B is rational. The upshot is that the argu-
ment that infers charity about rationality from the presuppositions
for intentional prediction fails because it begs the question against
there being intentional laws.111
But intentional laws are recoverable only if some principle of charity is
assumed. In fact, we can connect two intentional states A and B by a law
even not knowing how the transition from one state to the other goes, but it is
only because we believe that, were we to inquire on this issue, we would find
some reason, i.e., some rational connection,112 that we take this connection as
lawlike and supporting conterfactuals and previsions. None of the examples
put forward by Fodor and Lepore to support their thesis points in a different
direction.
∗∗∗
The last objection against the possibility of inferring semantic holism from
the practice of radical interpretation, has a skeptical flavour:
But, one might suppose, it’s always possible that the intepreter
should havemisidentified the causes on which the informant’s hold-
ing-trues are contingent – in which case, the interpreter might
operate on the principle of making the informant’s judgments true
by the interpreter’s lights, and yet, for all we know, the informant
might be saying something that is actually false. It looks as if
the principle of charity leaves open the possibility of folie à deux
(which is, of course, just what the skeptic always thought).113
I have no metaphysical problem with the acceptance of skepticism on this
issue, as I have already made clear. But consider two things: first, future
interactions between the interpreter and the informant will reveal misunder-
standings and misinterpretations. Second, even if the principle of truth (i.e.,
the principle according to which the speaker utters mostly truths) is unten-
able, still there is a role played by the notion of truth that is useful for us. This
is not the idea of truth as the absolute objectivity to which we must compare
111Ibid., pg. 152, emphasis in text.
112Cf. Davidson (1980), pg. 233.
113Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 159, emphasis in text.
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what we say, but as a kind of intersubjective space where we, as human beings,
can interact. For everything that matters to us, this is the only kind of truth
we should care: what is held for true by human beings. This, together with
the principle of charity, gives us enough room to be wrong about the world,
to find our mistakes, and to correct them. Which is fine, because we happen
to make some mistakes from time to time – that is, we sometimes happen to
undermine interactions.
It should be clear, now, that the notion of truth is central for these holistic
theories, while those of reference and meaning can only be derivative. To
attribute meaning or reference to a sentence or its constituents before having
decided (albeit provisionally) its putative truth value would oblige to make
way more assumptions about the contingent status of the speaker’s cognitive
system. In other words, we could not limit ourselves to determining whether
the speakers hold their sentences true or false, but we would have to determine,
as a start, what they are talking about and what they are saying about it.
Such determination would be a very difficult task to accomplish, and would
increase dramatically the risk of error.
For a Correct Understanding of the PoC
Some of the problems that Fodor and Lepore have with the principle of charity
depend on its definition as they construe it:
[. . . ] truth conditions must be assigned to formulas of L under the
constraint that most of the sentences held true by a speaker of L
are true. This principle is supposed to imply content holism on
the intended interpretation, which is that “most of the sentences”
means a lot of them.114
This is a slightly incorrect way of putting things. Here is how Davidson
stated the principle:
This method is intended to solve the problem of the interdipen-
dence of belief and meaning by holding belief constant as far as
possible while solving for meaning. This is accomplished by assign-
ing truth conditions to alien sentences that make native speakers
right when plausibly possible, according, of course, to our own
view of what is right. What jusitifies the procedure is the fact that
disagreement and agreement alike are intelligible only against a
background of massive agreement. [. . . ]
The methodological advice to interpret in a way that optimizes
agreement should not be conceived as resting on a charitable as-
sumption about human intelligence that might turn out to be false.
114Ibid., pg. 93, emphasis in text.
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If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other be-
haviour of a creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent
and true by our own standards, we have no reason to count that
creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything.115
Under this interpretation, holism is of course entailed. And it is quite
evident that a principle of compositionality is entailed too. This is because to
have the background of massive agreement required by Davidson one must ob-
viously consider more than one single sentence, and perhaps a lot of sentences,
which is enough to satisfy Fodor and Lepore’s definition of holism. The prin-
ciple of compositionality, which provides the systematicity which we require
under our definition of holism, is entailed because we cannot assume agree-
ment concerning a term, unless that term is consistlently used in agreement
with our own usage.116
Thus, of the two points against the utility of the principle of charity (PoC,
as Fodor and Lepore abbreviate it), the first (the fact that it would not prevent
punctate languages) is already defused. The second claim is that the PoC is
in fact pointless, since it is the merely repetition of “the truism that a good
theory had better comport with the data.”117
In fact, it is more than that. The PoC allows us to give a first interpretation
of the data, because it tells us that if what we are faced with are utterances,
then we better interpret them in agreement with our beliefs. When we want
to interpret a speaker of L, first of all we look for the utterances held true
by speakers of L. Then, we assume that they are right in holding true their
utterances, and look for the sentences that we would have held true in the
same circumstances, and identify the meanings of the sentences. Of course,
this process is subject to error.
The PoC intervenes several times in this process: first of all, in choosing
to identify an attitude which we can recognize, we are implicitly assuming
the rationality of alien speakers. Second, in tracing a correspondence between
our linguistic behaviour and those of the alien speakers, we are employing the
principle of charity. Finally, in assuming that we can sort out the errors, and
make the alien speakers rather mistaken than irrational, we are holding onto
the PoC. Of course, if one assumes the PoC to be formulated in Fodor and
Lepore’s way, none of these uses is allowed, and the principle indeed reduces
to a truism.
∗∗∗
Fodor and Lepore carry on, attempting to prove that the PoC is not even
sufficient to solve the extensionality problem, which is the reason it was intro-
duced in the first place. They build an elaborated example to explain their
115Davidson (2001), pg. 137, emphasis added. Cf. Quine (1960), pg. 69.
116Cf. Davidson (2001), pg. 168.
117Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 96.
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point.118 The problem with it, without going into details, is that they are not
explicit in the difference between object language and metalanguage, so that
it is never clear if the pair of nomologically coextensive but not synonymous
terms “white” and “F” that they mention belongs to the former, to the latter,
or both.119
However, the problem with their appeal to pairs of nomologically coexten-
sive but not synonymous terms is general: how can the speaker be sure that
the difference between F and white is clear to any interlocutor, if in no context
and in no verbal explanation such a difference can be explicit? The speaker
is always at risk of being misinterpreted. Moreover, the Wittgensteinian ar-
gument against private language applies, because the speaker can never be
assured of being consistent with a difference that is never explicitable. In
such a situation, the two terms come to be synonymous, because this is the
way they are used, and if the theory of meaning has to comport with the data,
this is precisely what the data show. I will repeat myself: nothing forbids to
assume that words and terms have a meaning that is never shown by their
use, except economicity of explanation.
∗∗∗
The last possibility that Fodor and Lepore contemplate, “in a spirit of com-
prehensiveness,”120 is the following:
Suppose there are expressions which (1) don’t appear in token-
reflexive utterances (or don’t appear in them often enough to mat-
ter) and (2) which are syntactically atomic. Well, by assumption,
the interpretation of these expressions can’t be fixed by their be-
havior in token-reflexive utterances; and since they are syntacti-
cally atomic by assumption, their interpretations can’t be deter-
mined compositionally from the interpretations of their parts. We
don’t know whether there are such expressions, but we don’t see
why there couldn’t be. Very theoretical terms like “proton” would
be among the likely candidates. The suggestion is that it is in the
radical interpretation of these sorts of expressions that appeals to
charity somehow play an ineliminable role.121
However, Fodor and Lepore claim, if the interpretation of such terms is
achieved thanks to their connection to other terms which do appear in token-
reflexive utterances, no charity is needed, because interpretation of token-
reflexive utterances does not need charity. And if no such connection is given,
118Ibid., pgs. 98 ff.
119Also the fact that they are never able to furnish a single example from a real natural
language seems telling to me. Although it does not diminish the logical importance of their
argument, still it gives the impression that in actual interpretation with real languages this
sort of problems are in fact solved.
120Ibid., pg. 100.
121Ibid., pgs. 100 f., emphasis in text.
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if therefore the term appears only in purely theoretical contexts, then it is
precisely in such contexts that we expect some disagreement and, therefore,
the principle of charity not to apply.122
This is certainly true, but again it is just a consequence of having mis-
understood the principle of charity. If we take it back to the methodological
status that is its own, we can see that it is precisely because of the principle
of charity, and not in spite of it, that we assume highly theoretical contexts
to trigger disagreement. And it is because of the principle of charity and of
the empirical enterprise that has it as a methodological principle that we start
looking for token-reflexive utterances in the first place, and that we know how
to identify them (they are, usually, those whose truth conditions are related
to the context of utterance).
4.3 Interpreting One’s Own Sentences
We have seen how, according to the account given in the last section, semantic
holism is able to give us empirical hypotheses to interpret others’ sentences.
Interpreting is a procedure that starts with attributing our own system of
beliefs to interpret other’s sentences as if they were produced by ourselves,
and then proceeds making the necessary changes to reduce as much as possible
the attribution of incoherences and irrationalities. The behavioristic account,
though more indeterministic in its results than the other one, is not dissimilar
from it: the mention of a system of beliefs can indeed be avoided, though
perhaps not completely replaced, through behavioristic means. Whether we
stick to one or the other theory, though, we need some account of our intuitive
comprehension of our own sentences.
4.3.1 An Atomistic Knowledge?
This is the place where an atomistic account may seem to intervene: although
we need holistic means to interpret others’ speech, we may think that the
meaning of every sentence we produce is known to ourselves through one of
the ways we have seen in § 2.1. After all, the speaker is the one who produced
those sentences, and therefore knows their meaning. But this move sounds
illegitimate:
Perhaps someone [. . . ] will be tempted to say, ‘But at least the
speaker knows what he is referring to.’ One should stand firm
against this thought. The semantic features of language are public
features. What no one can, in the nature of the case, figure out
from the totality of the relevant evidence cannot be part of mean-
ing. And since every speaker must, in some dim sense at least,
122Cf. Kuhn’s remark about incommensurability, quoted above in § 4.2.2.
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know this, he cannot even intend to use his words with a unique
reference, for he knows that there is no way for his words to convey
this reference to another.123
In other words, since language has an effective use as a means of com-
munication, and since the exactness of reference individuation cannot ever be
reached, we must conclude that the latter cannot have any importance for the
success of communication. By saying this, I mean that an element of indeter-
mination always remains, but this indetermination only occasionally hinders
communication. Hence, there is no benefit for the theory in assuming that
meaning is known to the speaker in an atomistic way.
Let us try, then, to explain with other means how speakers know the
meanings of their own sentences. Odd as it may sound, I believe some kind of
principle of charity is at work in this case, too.
4.3.2 Social Speakers
One characteristic of language that we have neglected so far is that language
is social. I do not mean that it is not possible to use language in private, but
I think that it is better to study it when it is exploited for social purposes.124
This is the reason behind the principle of charity. Since language is a social
instrument, and a society can be established only among peers (i.e., people
judging each other on the same level with respect to some relevant quality
or characteristic),125 we must attribute those qualities or characteristics we
deeply feel as ours to those we wish to understand. In fact, language is a
characteristic universally attributed to human beings. Although there might
be human beings completely cut out of the linguistic interaction,126 it is not
them we think of first when we think about human beings: we think of people
we can speak to.
Not only, in relating to others, we put them on the same level as our-
selves: conversely, we also attribute to ourselves the same characteristics that
we attribute them. In particular, this is true for what concerns one’s linguis-
tic conduct. Just as we reconstruct the meaning of other people’s speech by
assuming that their sentences are coherent with their beliefs and motives, we
can look at our sentences as being coherent with our beliefs and motives, and
123Davidson (2001), pg. 235.
124This is not equivalent to claiming that the purpose of language is communication, which
I think it is not (cf. Chomsky (1980), pg. 230). After all, communication is only one form
that social interaction may assume. Anyway, I will not pursue this issue any further here.
125I keep vague, here, because societies can come in great variety.
126I stress that this is strongly dubitative: we talk to human non-speakers in a variety of
occasions, and we often assume that there is some interaction mediated by language, even
though we are quite sure that there is no comprehension in the narrow sense of the word.
Some people talk to relatives in a coma, and most cultures contemplate speaking with the
dead. Although the declared motivation is sometimes to attain self-comfort, there is often
the (sometimes not so) hidden motivation of being sensed, if not heared and listened at.
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thus reconstruct their meaning. And, again similarly to the case of interpre-
tation of others’ speech, we can correct our mistakes, when we realize that
our words had indeed a different meaning from that which we wanted them
to convey.
In other words, we interpret other people’s sentences because we under-
stand our own language, and we attribute it to them, or at least we attribute
to them the system of beliefs and motives that produces it. We understand
our own language, then, because we attribute to ourselves that very system
of beliefs and motives. Our next question, therefore, must be how this latter
attribution is possible. I think that, again, we should look first at how this is
possible towards other people, and then try to apply what we have found to
ourselves.
It is true that we start with assuming other people’s systems of beliefs and
motives. But this is possible, first of all, because they, at least sometimes, do
tell us about their beliefs and motives. I want to suggest that people know that
their beliefs and their motives are there, and what they are, because they can
verbalize them. We take notice of the content of our mental representations –
and of their existence in general – only when they take part in the verbalized
system of our linguistic acts.
To assume the existence of mental representations even when we cannot
verbalize their content is totally irrelevant for the present argument. In fact,
even if unconscious representations exist, they can have an effect on our con-
scious life either inasmuch as non-representational causes, or inasmuch as rep-
resentations. In both cases, direct reasoning and consciousness are not sup-
posed to interact with them, for they are unaware of their existence. Thus,
we cannot determine from the effect they bear on our conscious life what their
nature and the nature of their interaction with our conscious mind really are.
In other words, we cannot infer from the presence of some unconscious effect
the existence of unconscious mental representations. If we want to assume
such existence (for economy of explanation, maybe), of course we can: we are
allowed to do it by the existence of conscious mental representations, which
we are assured of because of conscious awareness and interaction, of which
verbalization is a privileged form.
4.3.3 A Rational System
One could object that the explanation I give is, in fact, a vicious circle, since
it explains linguistic meaning resorting to beliefs and motives, and beliefs and
motives resorting to linguistic meaning. So we should state clearly what comes
first.
I think that the right answer is that neither comes first. The two elements
at stake – i.e., the semantic system and the system of beliefs and motives –
are not two separate stages of a procedure that goes necessarily from one to
the other and cannot go back. They are parts of a whole system, which we
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can dub ‘rationality,’ or ‘rational system.’
Each one of us, somehow, is firmly convinced that the ancient definition of
man as a rational animal is, more or less, right. This definition may seem not
quite right concerning other people, but everyone knows that it is right for
herself or himself. I do not mean that people are always rational, of course,
nor that everyone judges himself or herself as having been always rational.
I mean that, looking retrospectively to events in our lives, we can rationally
reconstruct our conduct so that we can regard it as the product of a rational
being.
In other words, our own sentences have a meaning not because they are
formulated in some abstract language whose semantic rules we happen to
know, but because that language is our language; we know their meaning
because we have produced them, and this production is part of our life. In
this sense, the real primitive of such a holistic theory of interpretation is
rationality. Every human being is rational (and this explains how each one
can produce meaningful sentences in the first place), and can attribute such
rationality to others (and this explains how each one interprets the meaning
of the sentences others produce). Rationality, then, is axiomatic: noone can






Interpretation is more a psychological or anthropological matter, rather than a
properly semantic and linguistical one. Despite a tendency in modern linguis-
tics to consider the faculty of language specific of human beings, it is very rare
that the study of linguistic mechanisms and laws themselves makes any appeal
to this specificity. The answer to the properly semantic question I mentioned
above can vary, depending on what opinion one entertains about the relation
between language and human nature. Therefore, I will now discuss this issue.
5.1 The Place for Linguistics
There are scholars who programmatically choose to deem language a kind of
structure which could be implemented by different cognitive systems rather
than human:
The main question I will attack in this paper is the one that is
really central [. . . ]: it is the question as to whether the role played
by Universal Grammar can be assigned to a completely abstract
and, we might say, platonic object, one that is unrelated to any
particular biological characteristics of human beings.1
Nothing in the nature of the human being, as biology and evolutionary
theories describe it, implies that the faculty of language is necessarily part
of it. In fact, according to those theories and disciplines, there is nothing
necessary about human nature and its history.
Conversely, according to Goldsmith, nothing in the nature of language
as linguistics describes it implies that it is necessarily a human being that
possesses and exploits it. He claims that his position is not at all different
from the original generative one.2 Anyway, there is certainly a physicalistic
1Goldsmith (2007), pg. 13.
2Ibid., pgs. 13 and 31.
121
5. Holistic Meaning
turn in Chomsky’s views and in those of his followers, which is opposed by
Goldsmith:
[. . . ] like every other linguist, Chomsky and his colleagues are not
capable of establishing where and how their theories of grammar
are instantiated in the brain; but they interpret their failure to
do so not as a challenge to physicalism, but as an IOU, that is, a
promise that at some unspecified future date, a physical location
in the brain will be found. There is no difference between promis-
ing, some day, to do something in a yet undiscovered way and not
promising to do it at all. It is not the linguist’s job to determine
how the brain works: that is a good thing, since there are few
linguists with any serious training in neuroanatomy. It is the lin-
guist’s job to figure out how language works, and as that challenge
continues to be handled, linguists and neuroscientists will be able
in the future to come up with a synthetic view.3
Goldsmith may perhaps be misled in one point. After all, very few linguists
(if any at all) have their agenda written by neuroscience, and Chomsky is not
among them. Besides, there is no reason to wait until a further development
of linguistics to let it interact with other scientific enterprises. All sciences, in
fact, are developing and changing all time, and there is no chance to foresee
the complete development for even one of them.
Even if Goldsmith may be wrong in his attack against Chomsky and the
physicalist turn he imposed to generative linguistics, he gets one point: al-
though the study of language should not isolate itself from other disciplines, it
needs not depend on them, either. Perfectly legitimate theses in linguistics and
philosophy of language can deal with language as a structure, independently
on the way such a structure is instantiated, and to what extent.
Such a position about autonomy of linguistics could be interpreted in two
different ways. In one reading (call it the weak reading), linguistics is au-
tonomous with respect to other disciplines in the sense that it is not submitted
to restrictions from those disciplines, but it cannot be excluded that linguis-
tics itself may set restrictions to, for instance, neurological or psychological
researches. In another reading (call it the strong reading) the object of linguis-
tics, i.e., language, is radically different from the object of other disciplines,
and no interaction is possible.4
It is remarkable that, given one linguistic theory, it can usually be read and
interpreted according to both readings. This is especially true for what con-
3Ibid., pg. 30, emphasis in text.
4In April 2007, Goldsmith gave a lecture in Pisa, on the subject “Towards a new empiri-
cism in linguistics.” When, in that occasion, I asked him about this double reading allowed
by his views, he told me that he could not say which interpretation better described his
position.
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cerns syntax. There are indications that the same thing holds for phonology
or morphology.5
Although this can be generally true also in the case of semantics, some
specification is needed. Leaving the details for later investigation, it suffices for
the moment to say that we may think the semantics of a particular language
either to be an autonomous system, or to have strong relations with some
conceptual system or conceptual structure, which is yet to specify.
According to the first alternative, to understand the mechanisms and laws
governing the semantics of our language, we need not make any assumptions
concerning human psychology or neurology. This could be a very much wel-
come idea, since there is little agreement about the former, and the major
agreement about the latter is that we are probably only beginning to un-
derstand how it functions. The second alternative, therefore, is relatively
unfavoured by semanticists: in spite of their programmatic declarations, they
tend to resort very rarely to disciplines external to their own for a solution to
key problems. In the rest of this section I will try to describe what holistic
semantic theories of both kinds might look like.
5.2 Formal Semantic Theories
Let us examine first an instance of a semantic theory that starts from a per-
spective which traces a boundary between the linguistic and the conceptual
features of meaning. It is fairly intuitive that whatever we say means what
it means for two different reasons: one is the language it is formulated in,
and the other is what we know about the world – i.e., at least that part of
the world we are talking about. We want now to examine our question about
semantics under the hypothesis according to which the two systems implied
by these two orders of reasons (i.e., the linguistic system and the conceptual
system) do not work in strong connection, but are, by and large, independent.
5.2.1 The Two Components of Meaning
First of all, we should ask ourselves what makes such a hypothesis sound
reasonable and plausible. Consider the sentences in (1):6
(1) a. This is too little carpet for the money.
b. There are three wines in the cellar.
c. Cat came.
d. The three Kims I met yesterday were all tall.
5Cf. Celata and Calderone (2008).




These sentences show some very well known facts about English, viz., the
possibility of exploiting count nouns as mass nouns, and viceversa, and the
possibility of exploiting proper nouns as common nouns, and viceversa. It is
easy to see that coercion – i.e., the overriding of the semantic properties that
we usually associate with terms such as ‘carpet’ or ‘wine’ (in this case, their
being count or mass respectively) – is carried out by the particular syntactic
context in which such terms are used.
We may make the hypothesis that the meanings of the terms are given by
the specification for each term of the syntactic contexts in which it can occurr,
together with the value that it will assume in each of those contexts. Such
a hypothesis, though, would not be very economic. In fact, there is a huge
quantity of contexts in which an individual term might occurr – perhaps an
infinite number (depending on what we consider to be the relevant syntactic
context).
Since we are imputing to syntactic contexts the shifts of meaning here
under examination, there is no need to attach the knowledge of syntactic
contexts to the knowledge of terms: we can just accept that syntax itself is
responsible for meaning. In other words, we need not specify for each term
the value it assumes for every syntactic context, because that value depends
entirely on the syntactic context; therefore, syntactic rules can account for it.
It might be objected that, of course, there is something in the meaning of
one term that does not depend on its syntactical function. This is certainly
true, but we have to be more detailed than that in specifying the extent of the
non-syntactic component contribution. Consider (2), for instance, and what
Borer has to say about it:
(2) The red under fived lunch.
While Harley and Noyer actually cite (2) as an impossibility [. . . ],
it turns out that native speakers of English are perfectly capa-
ble of assigning an interpretation to it (some creature with some
‘bottom’-related properties, for example, a bottom-dweller, which
is red, ate lunch five times; multiplied its lunch by five; divided
its lunch by five; etc.). Of considerably more significance is the
fact that (2) is not a word salad. It has an understood actor, the
red under, who acted in some manner pertaining to five on some
target, lunch.7
What this example shows, then, is that even the kind of ontological entity
associated with a term depends on its syntactical position. In the syntactic
context of (2), in fact, ‘five’ is an action, ‘under’ is an agent, therefore some
7Ibid., pg. 9. The example is quoted by Borer from Harley H. & Noyer R., ‘Mixed
nominalizations, object shift and short verb movement in English,’ Proceedings of the North
Eastern Linguistic Society 28 (1998), University of Massachusetts at Amherst: GLSA.
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kind of creature. Besides this kind of (syntactic) determination of the onto-
logical role of what the term may stand for, our encyclopedic knowledge about
the world provides a possible account of what might have that role. In the
concrete case, while the syntactic context of (2) determined that ‘five’ in that
context has to refer to some kind of action, our encyclopedic knowledge of the
word ‘five’ tells us what conceptual area ‘five’ is about. We then put together
the information, picking from the vast conceptual area triggered by ‘five’ the
meaning (or the meanings, as Borer suggests) corresponding to some kind of
action.8
The distinction between the linguistic component and the conceptual one
is also shown by the fact that not all overridings of meaning are permitted,
but only of meaning that is not carried by linguistic means. Thus, consider
the ungrammaticality of (3):9
(3) a. *a lot of wine is/are many
b. *there are too much carpet in this room
c. *too much carpets
Here, the count–mass features of the nouns cannot be coerced, because they
are assigned by linguistic means (use of singular or plural form in absence of
determiners). It is of no importance, for what concerns (3b-c), that ‘carpet’
is usually considered a count noun. This information, simply, is not read by
the grammatical system, which decides grammaticality or ungrammaticality
of sentences and phrases. This is what Borer thinks of the question, then:
We opt to leave within the linguistic computational system pre-
cisely those features which the grammar cannot override or ignore,
relegating those which the grammar does regularly override to a
different cognitive component, the conceptual one. If this is indeed
the division of labour, the coercibility of the (ontological) mass–
count distinction with respect to N-stems emerges quite simply
from the fact that the grammar performs computations based on
those formal features which it recognizes, and the fact that N-
stems, as such, have none. The grammar does associate distinct
structures with mass and count interpretations, but it does so re-
gardless of the conceptual properties of the N-stems embedded
within these structures. Coercion, then, is but the conflict that
emerges when the grammar returns a computation which is not
fully compatible with the conceptual properties of listemes em-
bedded within these structures.10





Thus, the idea is that information about meaning is stored in two different
ways. There is linguistic information, carried by computational structures,
and encyclopedic information, that is carried by some concept associated with
a word or a phrase. It is not the case, though, that the two systems might
carry the same information. In fact, the very system in which the information
is stored changes the information, for instance, with regard to the possibility
of overriding it by coercion.
5.2.2 On the Relationship between the Linguistic and
Conceptual Systems
As conceptual information is sistematically overridden by grammar, we cannot
assume any influence from the conceptual system to the linguistic one. In any
case of conflict, it is always the grammar that prevails – to such a point that,
e.g., in (2), ‘under’ is by no means a preposition, but a noun:
In the event of a mismatch [between the conceptual and the gram-
matical assignments of features], the grammar will always prevail.
The interpretation put forth by the conceptual component can and
will stretch, as much as possible within the confines of the concept
under consideration, so as to match the rigid, absolute interpreta-
tional constraints circumscribed by the grammar.11
∗∗∗
As for the opposite relation, we might expect that, since grammar is the
prevailing system of the two in case of a mismatch of information, it also has
some influence on the conceptual system. Actually, it is not so. The very fact
that a mismatch is possible, in fact, shows that the two systems are largely
independent, and they come to a comparison only in the case of establishing
the meaning of a sentence or phrase.12 But, of course, this is not all that the
grammatical system does: there is much grammar that is not semantic rules.
And, for sure, we exploit our conceptual system in many tasks that are not
linguistic.
The idea of an influence of language on the conceptual system13 may come
from the fact that the concepts associated with words in different languages
rarely appear to overlap. For instance, the Welsh terms gwirrd, glas and l lurjd
cover together the range of the English green, blue, gray and brown, so that
while speakers of one language would speak of different hues of the same color,
speakers of the other would speak of different colors. Hence, we might think
that the Welsh conceptual system divides in three colors the range that the
11Ibid., pg. 11.
12Actually, Borer assumes that such comparison takes place in yet another cognitive
component, which she dubs the “‘making sense’ component” (ibid.).
13For different positions on such an influence, and on the more general relationship be-
tween language and concepts, see § 5.3 below.
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English conceptual system divides in four, and the only way to explain this
difference is to appeal to the difference in the two languages. Another instance:
Quine mentioned a people in whose language there is one single word for both
half-brothers and pelicans.14
To assume speakers of different languages to live in different conceptual
worlds may lead to paradoxes. According to Donald Davidson, we cannot
reasonably claim that someone has a different conceptual scheme than ours.15
Such a claim, in fact, would entail either that our conceptual scheme and the
other are absolutely different, or that there are partial overlappings. In the
first case, we must note that it becomes impossible to interpret the other per-
son’s language, since, by assumption, we are not able to project our cognitive
system (e.g., our beliefs) by means of the principle of charity. The principle
of charity, however, is the only way we can attribute humanity, rationality,
and a language to other creatures. For, what would the point be in assuming
the existence of languages whose relation to the world is not recoverable by
any means? Assuming an absolutely different conceptual scheme, we cannot
be sure of what attitude other than holding true is crucial to communication.
And even assuming that truth is still the central notion can be of no help:
And the criterion of a conceptual scheme different from our own
now becomes: largely true but not translatable. The question
whether this is a useful criterion is just the question how well we
undertand the notion of truth, as applied to language, independent
of the notion of translation. The answer is, I think, that we do not
understand it independently at all.16
If interpretation cannot even begin, there is no chance to be able to under-
stand the grammar of the allegedly different language. But, without grammar,
we are not even allowed to speak of language at all. It might be objected that
there can be a grammar, even if we are not able to understand its rules.
Again, let me stress that there is no point, from a scientific point of view, in
assumptions of existence of entities or laws that, by stipulation, we cannot
test.
Now we can see also why even assuming some partial overlapping be-
tween conceptual schemes cannot work as an example of different conceptual
schemes. Such overlappings, in fact, must be necessarily construable and over-
rideable, and this can be done only by assuming that differences are small,
contingent, and periferic with respect to the whole system of beliefs:
Since charity is not an option, but a condition of having a workable
theory, it is meaningless to suggest that we might fall into massive
14Quine (1960), pg. 77; his source is Lienhardt G., ‘Modes of Thought,’ in Evans-
Pritchard E.E. (ed.), The Institutions of Primitive Society, Oxford 1954.
15Davidson (2001), chpt. 13.
16Ibid., pg. 194. Recall, in reading this passage, that in Davidson’s view translation and
interpretation are fundamentally the same task.
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error by endorsing it. Until we have successfully established a
systematic correlation of sentences held true with sentences held
true, there are no mistakes to make. Charity is forced on us;
whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must
count them right in most matters. If we can produce a theory that
reconciles charity and the formal conditions for a theory, we have
done all that could be done to ensure communication. Nothing
more is possible, and nothing more is needed.17
∗∗∗
Thus, we have seen that there is no theoretic way to associate the differences
we witness among languages to differences in the speakers’ conceptual schemes.
Fortunately, we need not make such an association. We can simply think that
the mapping of words on concepts is different in different languages, and still
believe that the concepts are the same for every human being.
5.2.3 The Linguistic System
Now that we have sketched the cognitive topography of the theory under ex-
amination, let us consider in somewhat greater detail the two systems involved
in it. Let us start with the linguistic system. We must ask some questions
about it: first of all, whether it is a holistic system, and how we can tell.
Then, even if we assume independence between this system and the con-
ceptual, we can ask whether the linguistic system is eminently human or a
theory describing it might be considered more general than a theory about
merely human linguistical processing. In other words, we must show in what
sense we consider such a theory of the linguistic system a formal theory.
Finally, we must account for the differences that we see between linguistic
systems, keeping in mind that radical differences give rise, under the present
perspective, to impossibility of interpretation. Of course, this is not a welcome
result: it clashes both with evidence (we know that we can interpret every
sentence in every language in the world, no matter how different from our
own) and with our initial assumptions (in fact, we have stressed several times
that only if the task of interpretation is possible we are allowed of talking of
language at all).
Structural Holism
To approach the answer to the question about holism, let us consider what
the picture of the linguistic system as it emerges from the theory sketched
in the past sections is. What we have is that, mirroring the separation be-
tween linguistic and conceptual system, lexical material in a language can
be divided into two different categories: those elements which are hints of
17Ibid., pg. 197.
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the compositional structure of the sentence – call them functional elements
(e.g., articles, quantifiers, numerals, and also inflectional morphology)18 –, and
properly lexical items, which Borer calls listemes19 and considers capable of
being coerced by compositional structure in the sense given to this notion in
the discussion above.20
If we consider again sentences like (2), we can see that the division sketched
in the last paragraph is not as sharp as we may think at first sight. Numer-
als and prepositions are certainly involved in the compositional structure of
language: therefore, they should count as functional elements in the proposed
distinctions. However, they can be coerced in other roles as well.
Two explanation of the phenomenon can be given. One is that, after all,
what looked like a feasible dividing line corresponds to no actual distinction.
But such an explanation fails, in fact, to explain the phenomenon of coercion
at all. To see that this is true, consider once again (2):
(2) The red under fived lunch.
It is definitely true that here under and five (which would normally count as
functional elements) are coerced, respectively, as a noun and as a verb. But
it is also undeniable that this coercion is operated because we can reconstruct
a syntactic form in which they have such roles by means of other functional
elements, viz., the and the past tense attached to five.
We might think that this shows that, after all, the distinction between
functional elements and listemes is a real one, but numerals and prepositions
belong to the latter category, not to the former. However, consider (4) and
(5):
(4) a. Five wines.
b. *Five wine.
(5) a. Under pressure.
b. Under good.
It cannot be denied that here both five and under have the functional role
required to assign respectively wines and pressure to the role they have in
the expressions. This is proved also from the fact that it is because of the
functional properties of five that (4b) is ungrammatical;21 and it is because
18Borer distinguishes two kinds of functional elements: head features, which combine
with lexical items though not morphological in nature (the plural inflection of English being
an example of these), and “independent grammatical functional formatives,” which can be
bound or free, thus combining or not with lexical items (the morpheme -ing being an example
of the former and the article the of the latter). Cf. Borer (2005a), pgs. 31 ff.
19Ibid., pg. 11.
20Ibid., pg. 10.
21Of course, now that we have learned how to treat five as a verb, we might assume that
(4b) contains it as a verb, for instance in an imperative form; thus, it would be deemed
grammatical. I would not consider this case, now, because what I am interested in is why
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of the functional role of under that we can say that good in (5b) is a name
rather than an adjective.
It seems, thus, that some items can belong to both the categories we have
introduced, or, which is probably the same, that the division we want to trace
is not sharp. Nonetheless, there is a distinction to be made, as it is proved
from the fact that even in the case of words that can behave both as functional
items and as listemes we are able to distinguish very well the former cases from
the latter ones.
Therefore, the explanation of the dividing line I am proposing goes along
the lines drawn by Borer:
[. . . ] it appears desirable to assume that it is the structure which
determines the category membership of such items [as five or un-
der ], classifying them as functional or lexical, in the relevant sense.22
The fact that such an intermediate “twilight zone”23 between the two cat-
egories exists, and that the categorization of the elements in this twilight zone
is decided by means of syntactic context shows that even a simple information
like this – i.e., whether an element is functional or lexical – is not atomisti-
cally stored. This does not hold for all items: some are completely functional
in every use, like articles or demonstratives (except for use in quotational
environments, of course).
It is important to stress, however, that these fully functional elements
cannot be the base for an atomistic semantics. In fact, their contribution to
the global meaning of the sentences they appear in is, if we consider them as
lexical items, very small: they become significant only when we associate to
them a structure (both syntactic and morphological) that they can impose on
other lexical items to coerce an interpretation of their role in the sentence.
We may think that this structure is part of the lexical meaning of these
functional items. However, it is not at all clear that this move roots meaning
atomistically. In fact, what the fully functional elements actually do is instan-
the phrase can be judged ungrammatical when it is, not whether there are chances that is
not.
22Ibid., pg. 10 n. 4. Consider, e.g., the following sentence, as opposed to the double
reading of (4b) I hinted to in the previous note:
(i) a. *I tried five wine
b. I tried five wines.
(ii) a. I tried fine wine.
b. I tried fine wines.
In (i) it is undeniable that the grammaticality or ungrammaticality is given by the whole
structure of the sentences, and that five has in both sentences a functional role that helps us
to discriminate between them; such a functional role, on its turn, is bestowed to five from
the structures of the sentences. Contrast this with the non-functional role of fine in (ii).
23Ibid.
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tiate the rule of the language, but only some syntactic rule each. The meaning
of a sentence is, of course, strictly dependent on the rules employed in it, but
rules can build up a meaning only if considered together. The contribution of
one single rule to the meaning of a sentence is dependent on the other rules
that are used in the sentence. And which rules are to be used in a sentence
to give rise to a particular meaning depends on the whole system of rules.
Instantiation
Let us now skip to the second question mentioned above: whether the system
we have been sketching in this section needs to be instantiated by the human
mind or the human brain or not. Let us start from Borer’s opinion on the
matter:
Within any generative approach to the study of the language fac-
ulty, what is common to all languages may, in principle, come for
free. While it might still be in need of description, the null hy-
pothesis is that it is fundamentally part of the human biological
structure, however described. The true challenge is to account,
within a biological approach to language, for precisely those facets
of linguistic behaviour which differ from one language to the other,
and hence, by assumption, are sensitive to the facets of the input.24
We note that the question about the nature of the faculty of language is
strictly related with the question about linguistic variation, which will be the
subject of next subsection. We note further that the hypothesis of a biological
instantiation of the language faculty is put forward to account for the universal
characteristics shown by all human languages. However, nothing here contra-
dicts the picture that Goldsmith has in mind, which was the subject of § 5.1
above. In effect, we can think that language has some universal characteristics
and that these characteristics are biologically instantiated in human beings,
or even that they are consequences of human biology and, nonetheless, think
that the right way to investigate these characteristic is not through appeal
to the biological mechanisms that give rise to them. This is, indeed, what
modern linguistics does. Moreover, the fact that some peculiar characteris-
tic has a determined (evolutionary) origin does not preclude the possibility
that different (evolutionary) processes may result in the same characteristic.
Speaking of biology, this happens every time: the eye, for instance, is said to
have been “invented” several independent times.
The very separation between the linguistic and the conceptual spheres
shows that there is no reference, here, to human beings. In fact, the theory




from our concepts. This is the same as claiming that there may exist crea-
tures with different concepts but the same grammar as our own.25 Or there
could be some entity, for instance some machinery, which instantiates both
our conceptual and linguistic systems, but in a very different way: viz., not
biologically.
It is only when we want to confine our linguistic investigation to human
language – i.e., to the language of human beings as it is different from, e.g.,
the language of any machine or any other creature which may ever be capa-
ble of linguistic capacities – that we need to furnish an explanation of the
instantiation of the linguistic system in human beings. Such an explanation,
though, cannot be a task for linguistics. Rather, it is an issue that psychology
or neurology should address.
Linguistic Variation
When we ask for an explanation of linguistic variation, we can receive two
different kinds of answers. In general, asking for the origin of a phenomenon
can be interpreted as asking for the genetic origin – i.e., what fact in the
past is responsible for the phenomenon – or for the mechanism that originates
the phenomenon. Of course the two readings are connected: after all the
mechanisms must have a genetic origin themselves, and we can count that as
the genetic origin of the phenomenon altogether.
To answer to the first kind of question calls for a theory of acquisition,
which has to explain how all human beings acquire different languages in the
first years of their lives. This is a still debated subject, and a lot of literature
has been written on it. We need not summarize it here.
As for the second reading of the question, we are asking for a theory to
explain what makes languages different. It is obvious that different languages
have different rules, and that is what makes them different. But our question
now is what the difference between rules amounts to.
The standard and most widely accepted answer to this question has been
based for decades on the Chomskyan Principles and Parameters approach.
In a nutshell, this theory claims that every human being is born endowed
of a Universal Grammar (UG), which sets several linguistic universal to be
equal for all human beings (and which is sometimes claimed to be biological,
although this claim might be seen as not necessary), while leaving some under-
specified rules. These, in turn, are set by the process of linguistic acquisition.
Rules are underspecified, but they are not totally unspecified: the freedom of
the system is betweem the choice of one or another settings of precise parame-
ters, which are to be thought of as switches capable of a small number of fixed
positions, possibly only two positions for each switch. Within this approach,
25We have given independent arguments to think that such a thing as having different
concepts is possible only within certain limits. See § 5.2.2.
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research has flourished to individuate parameters – possibly a small number
of them – and to establish a reliable hierarchy among them.
Note that, within this theory, together with a common core of rules shared
by all languages, it is assumed that all languages are somewhat different and
apart from each other depending on how many parameters received a different
setting. This should explain the difficulty of learning a new language after the
time of acquisition, and the fact that some languages can be easier to learn in
the adult age than others.
We ought to be explicit, though, on the strenght that we attribute to
such settings. For, if they are too strong, it is hard to see how they can be
overridden in the learning of a new language. And if they were not strong
enough, we could not grasp the rules of our own language.
Possibly, everything depends on acquisition, i.e., on the way parameters
are set, and on what hints we have to set them. Under the view that we
have sketched here, the natural candidates for the role of hints which trigger
the acquisition of rules are the grammatical formatives, i.e., the functional
elements of the sentences. If this is true, then functional elements are also the
ultimately responsible for linguistic variation.26
Also, if this view is correct, a partial revision of the Principles and Param-
eters approach is needed:
[. . . ] rather than looking at a picture of language variation which
includes ‘big parameters’ which involve disjunctive statements of
principles or the domain of their application [. . . ], we are attribut-
ing the distinct properties of any single E-language to whatever
emerges from the interaction between universal principles and the
specific subset of computational properties associated with mem-
bers of the functional lexicon. As such, the set of constructions
instantiated in any given language is determined by the subset of
UG-specified features which are associated with the inventory of
the specific formatives available in any given language.27
Again, if this is correct, it means that all languages are fundamentally one
and the same language, and they differ only because of their different lexicons,
and of the different rules associated to parts of lexicon. I would like to quote
another passage by Borer to state what is the consequence of that:
It is worthwhile noting that if we are indeed on the right track, the
expectation that emerges is that there should not be any syntactic
variations between languages which are substantially different from
variations which may be found language internally. To the extent
26Cf. Borer (2005a), pg. 264.
27Ibid., pg. 261. “E-language” stands for “external language,” i.e., the language as it
phenomenically appears, as opposed to the I-language (internal language), i.e., the language
as a system of rules, as a grammar.
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that some languages appear to have a clustering of properties,
these should be reducible to morpho-phonological generalizations
which may constrain these languages. [. . . ] In turn, should it turn
out to be the case, as is often true, that the morpho-phonological
generalizations under consideration are not iron clad, we expect,
and indeed we find, a given language instantiating more than one
mode of range assignment to a particular value.28
Interpretation Again
Note, finally, what relationship such a theory bears with the issue we exam-
ined in last chapter, viz., interpretation. We might think that if we can assure
ourselves of the soundness of the present approach, e.g., by testing its em-
pirical consequences, then we may have a proof for the possibility of radical
interpretation and for some attenuated form of the principle of charity. For, if
every language can potentially express all meanings that other languages do
by means of the same rules as those other languages, it is easy to see that we
could figure out the meaning of every sentence we hear by appealing to our
cognition of our own grammar and the means it provides us with.
However, consider that the possibility of radical interpretation is a neces-
sary premise of this scientific enterprise, and cannot therefore be proved by
its results. First of all, without that premise it would be difficult to identify
languages, which are the very subject of study. In fact, we have seen that
only to systems susceptible of radical interpretation by means of the principle
of charity is appropriate to refer as languages. Thus, the principle of char-
ity and the radical interpretation that it enhances have more power than the
present linguistic theory. The latter, as all scientific theories, puts forward
an explanation of some phenomenon, but the way the phenomenon is known
and interpreted before the theory can work on it cannot come from within the
theory.
The phenomenon to understand, here, is the possibility of interpreting all
languages. If the linguistic theory came first, then the possibility of interpre-
tation would not be assured, and the possibility of an error would always be
open. The error I am referring to, though, is not the kind of error that a
trial and error procedure could individuate and take care of, nothing that a
principle of charity whatsoever could account of. Without some metaphysical
premise for what concerns the common nature of all languages, we could never
know that the universal principles that we are finding really apply to all lan-
guages. But it is exactly this premise that we are applying when discharging
some theory that makes untenable claims about the nature of the universal
principles: if we were not assured of the existence of universal principles, we
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I think that here is exactly the same thing as with every other scientific the-
ory. All science, in fact, has some metaphysical premise – e.g., the nomological
homogeneity of the universe across time, i.e., the assumption that scientific
laws do not change from time to time. Such premises cannot be proved by
any scientific discovery, because they are the very origin of every scientific
discovery. Thus, discoveries by physicists cannot be used as proofs of the
nomological homogeneity of the universe across time.
Of course, the success of some scientific discipline depending on some meta-
physical assumption can be used as an indirect proof of the plausibility of that
assumption. It can still be maintained that this tells us more about ourselves
and our scientific practices than about the metaphysical constitution of the
world. This division, though, may be untenable.29
5.2.4 The Conceptual System
Let us now concentrate on the conceptual system, as it emerges from this
perspective. First of all, let us recall what the function of such system is,
according to the present view. While the linguistic system sets the categories
of the terms appearing in a sentence together with the roles that the sentence
attributes to their references in the event as it is described by the sentence
itself, the conceptual system must connect this skeletal structure to the world,
providing references to the terms.
The conceptual properties of listemes are twofold:
It seemed to me that to be able to use a word is, on the one hand,
to have access to a network of connections between that word and
other words and linguistic expressions: it is to know that cats are
animals, that in order to arrive somewhere one has to move, that
an illness is something one may be cured of, and so forth. On the
other hand, to be able to use a word is to know how to map lexical
items onto the real world, that is, to be capable of both naming
(selecting the right word in response to a given object or circus-
tance) and application (selecting the right object or circumstance
in response to a given word). The two abilities are, to a large
extent, independent of each other [. . . ] The former ability can
be called inferential, for it underlies our inferential performances
(such as, for example, interpreting a general regulation concerning
animals as applying to cats); the latter may be called referential.30
Thus, semantics is claimed to be, overall, threefold: there is a referential
component, an inferential component, and a compositional or structural com-
ponent,31 which properly pertains, as we have seen, to the linguistic system.
29Cf. Davidson (2001), chpt. 13.
30Marconi (1997), pg. 2, emphasis in text.
31Cf. ibid., pg. 77.
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The last kind of properties, as we have seen, are holistic. The inferential com-
ponent seems to be holistic too, because inferential properties can be identified
with the role that the expression play in inferences, and there is no limit to
the number of inferences an expression can play a role in.
Fodor and Lepore ask how inferential roles are to be identified: for, depend-
ing on their being more or less fine-grained, different accounts of synonymity
can arise.32 But there is no need to identify inferential roles once and for all:
in fact, our intuitions on synonymy and coextension, if any, can vary across
time, and we would want our semantic system to allow for such variation.
For what concerns referential properties, consider that it is true that the
referential relation necessarily goes from one symbol to the world, and that
there does not seem to be any appeal to the symbol position in the linguistic
system. But it is also true that such relations are acquired all together. A
referential system is like a classification of perception into categories, and in
such a classification every category is defined by its boundaries, i.e., by its
relations to other categories.
Fodor and Lepore object that the indipendence between the two kinds of
properties cannot prevent “radical mismatches between intension and exten-
sion.”33 But this is good, because we indeed find such radical mismatches in
brain-damaged patients.34 Our question could then be why such mismatches
do not appear often. “Water” could have “the extension of a kind term but the
logic of a number term.”35 I think that an answer to this point should make
reference to the way expressions are acquired and used. In other words, it is
a matter of enhancing communication that such mismatches do not appear.
I will not enter into details about the reasons that led Marconi into thinking
that the referential and the inferential competence are largely independent
one from another. Suffice it to say that there are both empirical evidence and
philosophical arguments sustaining this claim. Granted this, let us concentrate
with some more details on the two subsystems we have individuated.
Inferential Competence
From the examples given above in the passage by Marconi, we can say that
knowledge concerning the inferential aspect of our concepts is what we as-
sociate with the phrase “world knowledge.” The problem with this kind of
competence is that it is not at all clear how to distinguish the relevant infer-
ences from the irrelevant ones. Consider (6):
(6) John has a moustache.
Provided that I have a moustache, too, both (7) and (8) are valid inferences.
32Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 169.
33Ibid., pg. 171.
34Marconi (1997), chpt. 3.
35Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 171, emphasis in text.
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(7) John has hair on his upper lip.
(8) John and I have at least one facial feature in common.
One would say that to be able to infer (7) is necessary to be considered compe-
tent with ‘moustache,’ while to be able to infer (8) is not.36 We can note that
the difference between (7) and (8) is that the former is what has been called
an analytic inference, since it is grounded on the meaning of the word ‘mous-
tache,’ and the latter is a synthetic inference – it is grounded on contingent
world knowledge.37
The problem, in a slightly different formulation, is that inferential roles
seem not to be compositional: e.g., we can believe that neither “brown” nor
“cow” entail “dangerous,” while thinking that “brown cow” does entail “dan-
gerous.”38 The problem is that every time we try to make adjustments like
taking “cow→ x such that, if brown, then dangerous,”39 we will end up stating
that all inferences are analytic.
I do not think that such conclusion is necessary, nor that it is a real
problem for us, because if we reject the a/s distinction, we reject also its
terminology. Remember also that the notion of analyticity appeals to some
notion of meaning, which is precisely what it should help to define.40 We
should look at the question on the other way around: despite Fodor and Lepore
tell us that thinking that all inferences are analytic is “perfectly mad,”41 the
theory we are sketching is precisely that (at least a part of) meaning is to
be identified with inferential role; therefore, all inferences are constitutive of
meaning, and this is exactly to say that all inferences are analytic. This may
simply mean that we do not have a clear intuitive idea of what is analytic.
On the other hand, it seems obvious that some inferences are less impor-
tant than others. Perhaps this is true. But this difference in importance
emerges only when we compare the meanings of our words with those of other
people, and find that we associate quite different inferential roles to the same
expressions. In other words, there is not a constitutive problem about thinking
that all inferences are analytic (which is the same of depriving analyticity of
any use, of course, since analyticity is a notion that has sense only if opposed
to a notion of syntheticity), but only an interpretive problem, because, were
it true, we could not share another person’s language if we do not make the
same inferences. But this is fine: a theory of interpretation will account for our
successful linguistic interactions even in the absence of a common language.
36Cf. ibid., pg. 27.
37Cf. § 2.1.3.
38Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 177.
39Ibid., pg. 181.
40Cf. Quine (1953), chpt. 2 § 4.
41Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 182.
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Of course we might not want to jump to the conclusion that any distinction
between analytic and synthetic truth is completely useless.42 It may certainly
have some practical use: when we are faced with contradictions that force
us to revise some of the truth values we associate to our sentences, there
are some immediate candidates for such revision, while other sentences seem
more difficult to consider false. We can say that the former are the synthetic
sentences and the latter are the analytic ones. However, there is nothing
so certain about which sentences cannot be revised. We can discover, for
instance, that we have been misusing a word all the time, and that its meaning
is different from what we thought it to be.
My conclusion on this issue is that there is some intuitive value in the
distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences, when we intend such
distinction as a hierarchy of sentences according to their availability for re-
vision. Such hierarchy, though, cannot have any use in our inquiry about
meaning, for it is not definitive at all. Hence, we need a picture of inferen-
tial competence that avoids mentioning analyticity, even surrogate hierarchic
analyticity.
Individual Inferential Competence Whether such an account of infer-
ential competence (one which avoids bringing back the analytic/synthetic dis-
tinction, and respects our intuitions regarding the different relevance of (7)
and (8)) is possible depends on which picture of language we have in mind.
Our theory would be very different if we think that what we are looking for
is meaning in a common language – i.e., in a language that is shared among
speakers – or meaning in idiolects.
We have already seen that it is hard to sustain a classification of common
languages without considering idiolects primitive. In other words, the notion
of common language cannot be but derivative. Let us consider what is the
relationship between individual competence and a linguistic community, in
Marconi’s opinion:
[. . . ] at the lexical level, individual competence, even idealized in-
dividual competence, does not coincide with encyclopedic knowl-
edge, that is, with the totality of true belief that can be ascribed
to the linguistic community as a collective entity. We also saw
that is extremely hard to isolate a plausible subset of encyclopedic
knowledge as being constitutive of (lexical) semantic competence,
that is, a set of propositions we all ought to know or believe in
order to be regarded as lexically competent. As a matter of fact,
each of us knows or believes partly different things (partly different
subsets of the collective encyclopedia), yet we are all competent
in the use of our language. Could lexical competence be defined
42See Marconi (1997), pgs. 32 ff. for some discussion about the possibility of reviving
some humble concept of analyticity.
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as the intersection of such different individual competences? In
principle, no, for we have no guarantee that the intersection of all
competences is rich enough to be considered adequate as a com-
petence (it is quite possible that the set of beliefs we all share
about, say, gold is very small, too small to constitute an adequate
competence with ‘gold’). It remains that we regard the notion of
absolute competence as empty at the lexical level: on this level,
we only have competences, in the plural. We ought to speak not of
a unique lexical competence, only of individual competences. In
this sense, there is no language, only idiolects.43
Our problem of distinguishing between a theory of competence for idiolects
and a theory of competence for speakers in a linguistic community can be
reframed in another dicotomy, between a theory of individual competence
and a theory of what Marconi calls convergence,44 i.e., a theory to explain
how individual competences meet in the ordinary use of language as a means
of social interaction. The latter is equivalent, in my opinion, to a theory of
interpretation, and the exposition given in the first part of this chapter can
account very well for it.
If what we are interested in is individual competence, the distinction be-
tween (7) and (8) cannot entail any problem. Let us consider again (6). We
want to know if Mary is competent with the word ‘moustache’ and ask her if
(7) and (8) are true inferences, given (6). We expect her to say that (7) is a
correct inference from (6). As for (8), we expect her to say that, if she knows
me, it is a correct inference from (6), or, if she does not know me, that the
inference would be correct if I had a moustache myself. In other words, the
alleged analytic or synthetic character of a given inference is not relevant to
decide of someone’s competence. What is relevant is Mary’s being prepared to
draw both (7) and (8) as inferences from (6), given some background knowl-
edge or experience. And there cannot be any limit to the inferences that she
should be prepared to draw, if she is competent with ‘moustache.’
A moral that we can draw from this story is that appeals to our intuitions
are always disputable, because our intuitions themselves are not as clear as
we would like them to be. Besides intuitions about the dependence of (7) on
word meaning, in fact, there are intuitions about the fact that all that we say
depends on word meaning.45 Must we decide between some analytic/synthetic
distinction (or, better, word meaning/world knowledge distinction)46 and the
intuition that every inference depends on word meaning?
43Ibid., pgs. 52 f., emphasis in text.
44Ibid., pg. 172 n. 39. Cf. also ibid., chpt. 4.
45Such intuitions can be so strong that we want to call it a truism.
46If intuitions about a distinction between what in our sentences is due to word meaning
and what to world knowledge is perfectly maintainable, it seems very unplausible that there
exist intuitions about the analytic/synthetic distinction.
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I think we need not choose. As long as we need a guide for everyday use of
language, our intuitions about it are the best guide we can imagine, albeit they
might be blurred or even inconsistent one with respect to the other. After all,
our intuitions have been working well ever since human beings acquired their
language faculty. As for philosophical or scientific reasoning on the subject of
language, all intuitions must yield to evidence and arguments.
Coming to the point in question, we are not claiming that all inferences
are a matter of word meaning. We are simply stating that there is no way to
tell when it is a matter of word meaning and when world knowledge enters the
picture. Maybe this distinction is simply too blurred to be of any use for the
present discussion. Moreover, and partially because of this fact, there is no
way to tell how much of the conceptual system is needed to be assured about
the competence on one single concept. One thing is for sure, though, and I
will repeat it: there cannot be any limit to the inferences that one must be
prepared to draw, to be considered competent with a concept.
Inferential Holism The question now is whether this absence of limit
amounts to holism. Marconi thinks that the answer is no, because holism
has unwanted consequences for a theory of competence:
Now suppose that holism holds, so that a constituent’s seman-
tic value (like the semantic value of every expression of any lan-
guage) is a function of the linguistic system as a whole, in any
prima facie plausible sense: for example, a function of the sys-
tem’s structural properties and the semantic values of the system’s
other units. It follows that understanding any sentence involves
the understander’s entire semantic competence, for it requires that
information be used relative to the whole linguistic system, struc-
ture and elements. Understanding would thus be impossible for
a mind like the human mind in memory and computational re-
sources. Only God would understand the sentence ‘All men are
mortal’.47
Marconi’s position, then, amounts to a form of molecularism, because he
claims that some subset of the whole system can do, although he admits that
there is no way to establish which subset:
As I anticipated, the moral is the following: we feel that our knowl-
edge of how to use a word is inextricably intertwined with our
knowledge of how to use many other words. This is true up to a
point: it does not entail that to be able to use one word, we must
know how to use all other words, nor that we must know how to
47Ibid., pg. 49, emphasis in text.
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use the other words to the same extent as we know how to use the
original word.48
I would like to note that Marconi, here, is assuming again a communitarian
perspective on language. His mention of all the words, and also of the extent
of knowledge about the use of a word, makes me think that what he has in
mind is evaluating such an extent with respect to a norm of use established
in a community. For an analysis of the problem from the point of view of
idiolects, though, it is not a relevant objection that one needs not know how
to use all the words used by the linguistic community. Our problem is, in fact,
whether the global knowledge of how to use all the words that one knows how
to use is involved in the knowledge of how to use one single word. This view
does not entail that only God would understand ‘All men are mortal.’ Such
a conclusion is entailed, in fact, by the former view, which Marconi rightly
refuses, and which, as we have seen, is different from what semantic holism
about idiolects would claim.
Again, let me stress what the problems with a molecularistic view are. If
you think that some subsystem is sufficient to assure inferential competence
with a certain expression, you have two options as for the identification of
such subsystem. Either you believe that we cannot identify such subsystem
and we will never be able to, or you believe that such an impossibility is just
due to defects of the theory, which will be mended with further research.
The former position strikes me as dogmatic and undefensible. The latter
is at least coherent, although there is a lot of job to do in order to shape it into
a working theory. We need an effective strategy to individuate the relevant
molecule attached to a certain expression, and we need it not to be a holistic
strategy. Until now, there is no sign of such strategy in sight.49
Referential Competence
Let us now take a look to the referential component of the conceptual system.
It seems that, at least for what concerns this, holism is out of the question.
Indeed, it seems that an explanation of the connection of each concept with
its reference (i.e., with some part of the world or the other) can be explained
without appealing to the connections of other concepts. A causal connection,
for instance, could explain reference.
The idea behind such a suggestion is that the connection between the con-
ceptual system and the world is operated by the perceptual causality of the
world on the conceptual system. But perception is not enough to assure the
wide variety of features that distinguishes one concept from the other. The
problem is that the causal theory of mental content is, fundamentally, an em-
piricist theory, and, as all empiricism, has to confront with the rejection of
48Ibid., pg. 55.
49On this subject, cf. § 3.3.1 above.
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what, according to Quine, is the second dogma of empiricism, viz., the dis-
tinction between observational content and theoretical content. In particular,
the rejection of the dogma is at the basis of the claim that theoretical – i.e.,
conceptual – content is always involved in any observation.50
One way to read such a claim is to see every observation as in some way
already interpreted. Another way to put it is to claim that there is no such a
thing as mere observation, as long as what we are interested in is the relation
with the conceptual system. Of course, objects (in a broad sense of the word)
have a causal effect on the conceptual system; but in order to do so, they
must be filtered by some cognitive structure. The purpose of such cognitive
structure should be to make the referential system be like a classification of
perception in categories. As we already pointed out, in such a classification
every category is defined by its neighborood, i.e., by its relations to other
categories, and this is how holism is entailed by this picture.
One reason to believe that there cannot exist such a thing as pure ob-
servation is that, according to cognitive studies, not even perception can be
deemed the pure reception of external stimuli. Every perception, i.e., every
perceptive stimulus that plays a cognitive role, has precisely the cognitive role
it has in virtue of the possible interaction between the subject and the object
of the perception. Such a possible interaction, when recognized in such a way
by the subject, is called an affordance.51
Perceptions, with their affordances, are not yet to be considered concepts.
We should ask what is the difference between the two notions. The major
difference is that concepts are modality free, in the sense that they are not
necessarily connected with one sensory modality, as perceptions inevitably are.
In spite of this, it is not at all evident that concepts lose their affordances also.
It seems, indeed, that an important part of the way we conceptualize entities
is knowledge of the kind of relation – therefore, of interaction – that they can
bear with ourselves. In fact, we cannot have the concept of something which
we do not know how to relate to, or at least how to compare our position in
the world with its own. Even the most abstract concepts we could entertain
are clearly there to be exploited by abstract reasoning.
Ontological issues are not at stake here: we can have a concept of some
entity even if we are not quite certain of what kind of entity it is, or if it is a
legitimate entity at all. What matters, in terms of our conceptualization, is
the relationship between ourselves and those putative entities, whatever their
ontology should turn out to be. For instance, it may happen that some kind of
abstract entities (e.g., properties) are reducible to concrete entities by way of
some metaphysical theory. This reductivism does not prevent us from having
concepts of properties, nor it implies that our concepts of properties reduce
to our concepts of concrete objects. This is because our relationship with
50Hanson (1958), pp. 8 ff.
51Bermúdez (1998), pgs. 112 ff.
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properties is different from our relationship with concrete objects: even if they
should turn out to be the same ontological kind of entities, we are nonetheless
conceptualizing them in different ways. This difference in conceptualizing
depends on the difference of relationship, because, accordingly, that is the
only difference between those two kind of entities.
For a less controversial instance (though not at all an uncontroversial one),
consider the case of tracks in a bubble chamber: where I see merely tracks,
trained physicists see different kind of particles. This is because trained physi-
cists know how to interact with particles, whereas I do not know, therefore
they know how to apply the concept to the tracks in the bubble chamber,
and I do not know. And this application is what constitutes the referential
competence.
This example does not imply, however, that I and the physicists have
different conceptual schemes: only that we have different practices, because
we have different goals, and beliefs, and so on. Now, if the individuation of the
reference of the concepts depends on the relationship between the subject and
the world, then what is important, in this process, is to consider the subject’s
cognitive system as a whole. For, to understand one’s relationship with the
world, it is essential to regard oneself in a certain way – which is sketched in
§ 4.3 above. To make a long story short: we interpret our behaviour and our
interaction with our world according to an axiom of rationality. By doing this,
we are able to connect the concepts to their references, because only certain
such connections can make our actions rational. This can entail a certain
amount of underdetermination, especially intersubjectively: but this is not a
problem if we consider that intersubjective connections between concepts (or
language) and the world should be controlled by the principle of charity and,
in general, by the mechanisms that enhance interpretation.
5.3 Cognitive Semantic Theories
Let us now examine another kind of semantic theory, according to which the
linguistic side of semantic phenomena cannot be discerned from the conceptual
side. We can also put it in a somewhat weaker formulation, and say that there
is some interdependence between the two aspects of semantic phenomena that
allows us to think that we are facing a continuum, probably originated by in-
teractive systems. The result does not change, as we must accept the practical
impossibility of making clear distinctions in the fuzzy boundary between the
phenomena imputable to one or the other system.
Of course, the relation between the language faculty on one side and other
cognitive faculties on the other can go both directions. I believe that this is
the reason why there is yet no agreement about the extent of the influence
of language on conceptual structure and on reasoning and, conversely, on the
influence of conceptual structure and reasoning on language.
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One of the sides of the debate is represented by what is known as the
Sapir-Whorf thesis (or hypothesis). It is the hypothesis according to which
the way a particular language is structured and the features of reality that
a particular language is able to convey shape the culture of human beings
speaking that language, by affecting the way they look at the world. Whorf
made some controversial examples about Hopi language not having means to
express the notion of time and, consequently, about Hopi people not having
any notion of time at all.52 He also thought that gesturing while speaking
is typical of Western culture, and is connected with the fact that, in Indo-
European languages, most talk about the mind sphere exploits metaphors
from the physical and spacial spheres.53
Under this view, most of the semantic work is done by the linguistic sys-
tem. In fact, not only the syntactic role of words in a sentence are to be
reconstructed by way of linguistic rules, but also the range of possible mean-
ings that certain words can assume is determined by linguistic rules, which
give to the sentence more or less “semanticality,” i.e., make it more or less
acceptable under the perspective of meaning:54
[. . . ] the boundary between what we formally take to be linguistic
or lexical knowledge and that which is sometimes referred to as
“commonsense knowledge” might appear fuzzier than ever. Once
we start enriching our lexicon with information that, to a linguist,
appears better suited for a knowledge base, there may appear to
be no systematic means to judge where to stop [. . . ]. Yet, the fact
that there appears to be a continuum between these two types of
knowledge doesn’t mean that there are not clear cases of paradig-
matic linguistic behavior that are better treated as language spe-
cific knowledge, rather than in terms of general inferencing mech-
anisms. One of the goals of the present work has been not only to
argue in favor of richer lexical representations and compositional
mechanisms, but also to show that these structures and devices are
still language specific in identifiable ways. What is different about
the approach taken here is that there are clear and obvious means
to interface lexical knowledge with commonsense and pragmatic
inferences.55
In order to put conceptual information in the position of playing a linguistic
role, Pustejovsky gives great importance to lexical information. This move is,
as we can recall, exactly opposite to Borer’s one, which amounts to the claim
that all lexical information is, qua lexical, irrelevant to the linguistic system.
52Cf. Whorf (1971), pgs. 57 ff.
53Ibid., pg. 154 f.
54For the notion of “semanticality,” cf. Pustejovsky (1995), pgs. 40 ff.
55Ibid., pgs. 232 f.
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In her theory, the syntactic scheme played a preeminent role, and the syntactic
scheme was reconstructed by way of functional items, which, as such, were
devoid of any lexical information. In Pustejovsky’s theory, every lexical item
carries with itself the possible syntactic schemes in which it can appear. To
each lexical item, in fact, is associated a semantic structure which defines the
relations between that linguistic item and all others (this is possible thanks
to the individuation of conceptual lattices which define the various relations
between concepts, especially hyponymy). If this skeletal grasp of Pustejovsky’s
theory is correct, then, in spite of what the emphasis on the lexicon and on
the study of lexicality may make us expect, this can legitimately be called a
holistic theory.
∗∗∗
Let us now concentrate on the other direction of the possible interaction be-
tween the linguistic and conceptual systems, i.e., the interaction that goes
from the latter to the former. The debate about this side of the issue origi-
nated as well from Sapir and Whorf’s ideas. In fact, it is not clear the direction
they had in mind, when they spoke about an interaction between language
and concepts. The issue is of course complicated by the indistinction between
language and theory, or language and culture, where the latter element of each
pair stays for some kind of conceptualization of the world:
Before beginning in earnest, I should say something about my
distinction between “culture” and “language.” To linguists this is
a natural distinction. To anthropologists it is not. My own view of
the relationship is that the anthropological perspective is the most
useful, but this is exactly what this paper purports to show.56
It must be noted, in this regard, that speaking of conceptualization of the
world is misleading, as we have stressed several times before. We can think of
such conceptualization, though, as the way one comes to acquire an interaction
with the world, and this, in a sense, is the same of acquiring a world itself.57
According to this second view (which is more or less equivalent to func-
tionalist approaches to linguistics), the cultural and conceptual efforts made
by each human being to interact with the world have a great impact on the
structuring of the linguistic system. Daniel Everett holds an extreme posi-
tion in this regard. He discusses a few peculiarities of the linguistic system of
Pirahã (an Amazonian language), such as the following:
[. . . ] the absence of numbers of any kind or a concept of counting
and of any terms for quantification, the absence of color terms, the
absence of embedding, the simplest pronoun inventory known, the
56Everett (2005), pg. 622.




absence of “relative tenses,” the simplest kinship system yet doc-
umented, the absence of creation myths and fiction, the absence
of any individual or collective memory of more than two gener-
ations past, the absence of drawing or other art and one of the
simplest material cultures documented, and the fact that the Pi-
rahã are monolingual after more than 200 years of regular contact
with Brazilians and the Tupi-Guarani-speaking Kawahiv.58
All these features are reconducted to one single source: “the restriction of
communication to the immediate experience of the interlocutors.”59 Notice the
difference between this kind of approach and the one sketched before. There
we had a theory which regarded the linguistic system as responsible for all
possible reasonings about what words mean or, at least, for the vast set of
most common reasonings about it. Here, instead, reasonings are responsible
for language, but since our investigation of reasoning lies principally on lin-
guistic clues, this means that we can safely attribute only the reasonings that
a speaker can share with us.
This can have two consequences, depending on our position about interpre-
tation. If we judge the principle of charity unavoidable, then we have to hold
that all human beings reason in the same way; and since reasoning grounds
language, all languages must be more or less the same, they have to share
their structure. On the other hand, we may feel that the superficial diversity
of natural languages is a hint of different kinds of reasoning taking place in
human minds, depending on culture, that is, on historical contingencies and,
perhaps, on the environment.
For a strict functionalist position, though, the first option is untenable. In
fact, according to this position, the conceptual structure is the only source of
linguistic change: if the conceptual structure is the same for all human beings,
we have no way to explain why languages are different. Radical functional-
ism, hence, entails intranslatability and incommensurability between distant
languages which are expression of distant cultures.60
Radical functionalism has also other flaws.61 For instance, it is difficult if
not impossible to explain linguistic acquisition from such a standpoint. The
usual functionalist picture of linguistic acquisition grounds it on the typical
processes of human reasoning, which, by way of some kind of induction, re-
constructs the rules of the grammar. Anyway, such a general theory of human
mind cannot account for the specifity of language, if some innate knowledge of
what the object of such induction is is not presupposed too. In other words,
the child must have means to distinguish that portion of the world which
is linguistic – i.e., relevant for an induction of linguistic rules. But this is
58Ibid., pg. 621.
59Ibid., pg. 622, emphasis in text.
60Cf. Everett (2009), pg. 28 and Gordon (2004), pg. 498.
61For a more complete examination of functionalism, cf. Newmeyer (2005), chpt. 5.
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equivalent to assign the linguistic acquisition to a dedicate faculty, somewhat
separate from the other cognitive faculties of the child, which is precisely the
solution that functionalists do not want.
Another problem is methodological. Since functionalism must explain all
linguistic phenomena relatively to the function that those phenomena have in
the conceptual life of human beings, it is hard to find an explanation for rare
linguistic phenomena, and in particular for those which virtually never occur
spontaneously, but that can be easily elicitetd. In fact, strict functionalists
deny scientific validity to the practice of elicitation altogether:
Each construction in each language should be studied in its appro-
priate linguistic and cultural contexts before drawing any conclu-
sions about it. This is one reason I almost agree with a statement
that I overheard from a field linguist a few years ago that no one
should be allowed to write an article about a language before they
have written an entire grammar of the language. Only after writing
a grammar of a language can you contextualize your understand-
ing of how structures and constructions and meanings work in that
language.62
The reason of these flaws is that a strict functionalism, i.e., a theory which,
given a culture, would reconstruct a language, must deny an innate faculty
of language. At most, it can accept a biological community between human
beings, and explain similarity of linguistic behaviour from this community:
Whatever the general properties are that distinguish human brains
from those of other species, those might well be investigated before
coming to the conclusion that there is a module in the brain or a
language organ dedicated strictly to language.63
In a nutshell: functionalism is methodologically very different from other
more generally accepted approaches to linguistics, and it is very difficult to
think that results obtained from functionalist premises can be shared by the
entire community of linguists. I would say, paradoxically enough, that strict
functionalism investigates a different subject than, for instance, generativism,
and this accounts for the atmosphere of incommunicability that surrounds
those works where the two point of views come to a clash. However, let me
62Everett (2007), pg. 12. Such a position should not be confounded with the holis-
tic position detailed in the last chapter. The holism that here is entailed, in fact, leaves
room for incommensurability and intranslatability; the holism about interpretation excludes
this possibility by specifying that the comprehension of the appropriate linguistic and cul-
tural contexts is to be achieved by projecting as much of our own linguistic and cultural
background into the picture as possible. Everett, instead, seems to hint to the possibility
of depriving oneself of any bias and achieving freshly utterly new linguistic and cultural
structures.
63Ibid., pg. 28, emphasis in text.
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stress once again that the two theories sketched in this section are not mutually
exclusive. There is no need to endorse radical functionalism, of course, nor
to adopt a theory which accounts only for one direction of the relationship
between the conceptual and the linguistic systems. The two systems, in fact,
can be in a reciprocal relationship of mutual interdipendence. It is necessary,
though, that both sides acknowledge which are the differences between the
premises that they accept or do not accept, and that lead them to different




We come now to reviewing semantic holism as it has been detailed in the pre-
vious chapters, in order to point out potential flaws in the arguments leading
to the present theory. Furthermore, an eye will be kept, as for semantic atom-
ism and semantic molecularism, to the connection between semantic holism as
a theory of philosophy of language and of understanding and other disciplines
such as ontology, epistemology, linguistics, and so on.
6.1 Internal Problems
Although throughout the previous treatment we have already described –
and (hopefully) confuted – most of the major objections which may be moved
against semantic holism, there are still details for which semantic holism might
be reproached. Most of the following criticisms are indeed sound, although
their actual status as flaws may depend on the methodological stand from
which we regard semantic problems.
6.1.1 The Problems with Interpretation
Our holistic theory of interpretation is twofold, dealing with the interpretation
of other people’s sentences as well with self-interpretation. Hence, in order
to see whether everything is alright with such theory, we have to examine
both sides of it. Although the theory of self-interpretation is arguably the
most speculative and doubtable of the two, we will start with the proper
theory of interpretation right away, and we will see that it is not completely
unreproachable itself.
On the Management of Radical Interpretation
We have already seen what the problems with a behavioristic approach along
Quine’s lines are, and how we could fix them by means of Davidson’s prin-
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ciple of charity. We have also examined some of the objections that might
be raised against such an improved theory of radical interpretation, and we
managed to confute all of them. The objection I would like to consider now
is quite different in its spirit, in that it does not question neither the form of
the argument, nor the sustainability of the task of the radical interpretation.
Rather, it points to the abstractness of the theory, to question its effectiveness
for what concerns the actual practical cases of interpretation. In other words,
although holistic theorists of interpretation boast that they take into consider-
ation actual practices of interpretation, and their theories are therefore more
reliable, we may doubt that it is really so.
This is an objection we have somewhat already been confronted with: se-
mantic molecularists, in fact, claim that taking into consideration the particu-
lar circumstances of a given utterance is the only way to correctly interpret it
and keep faithful to the constraints that rule the actual practice of interpreta-
tion. We have said, on this regard, that this may very well be true, but that it
does not lead us anywhere if we lack an effective way of individuating relevant
circumstances – or localities, as we have dubbed them after Bilgrami’s use of
the term.
Our argument for the holistic theory of interpretation that stemmed from
the task of radical interpretation was that, by accepting it, we put ourselves in
the condition of being able to effectively restrict our interpretive practice in the
way which seems more comfortable, while still being assured that, on a more
abstract and theoretical level, we are moving within a general background of
interpretive freedom. To put it in another way, it would be a mistake to reduce
interpretation to the individuation of localities, not only because our ability
of recognizing one could fail in unpredictable ways, but also because, when it
does, we cannot know whence to drag into the picture the elements that would
enable us to give an interpretation. Moving within a holistic picture, instead,
assures us that any element is available for our interpretations, or attempts
thereof.
∗∗∗
There are three considerations still to be made on this regard. The first is that
maybe the theory so far detailed is not really a holistic one: perhaps is just
a more complicated form of molecularism. Instead of having several different
localities which are detached and independent one from another, we can stick
to a picture of several overlapping localities, sharing some element but not
another, enabling some interpretations but not others.
Putting things in this way is still misleading, though. On one hand, we
may still be faced with the question about the recognizability of localities.
This is not an unsurmountable problem, now: it is no more difficult than im-
plementing our theory in a trial and error procedure, and we obtain the quite
welcome results that interpretations requiring less local elements are processed
in less time (which we would expect), and that interpretations requiring lo-
calities already exploited will be processed in less time than interpretations
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requiring novel ones.
On the other hand, the real difficulty concerns the problem of having some
kind of cognition of all the possible localities that might come useful. This is
arguably impossible: since we cannot put an upper bound to the different ele-
ments that are or might be necessary to interpret utterances in circumstances,
we might end with having to deal with infinite many contexts of interpreta-
tion, some overlapping, some simple, some very complicated. We would have
a better time if we imagine that localities – i.e., contexts of interpretation –
are built, when they are needed, again by means of a trial and error procedure,
which does not choose among them, but connects the various conceptual ele-
ments into one locality. Under such a picture, holism and molecularism need
not be contrasting pictures. While holism gives, as I have said, the freedom we
need to build all the different contexts of interpretation we might ever need, it
is by means of a molecularistic theory of interpretation that we put any single
one of such localities at work.
My second consideration is connected to the first – as the third will be,
too. It goes like this: although everything said in the last paragraphs is very
plausible, it is still a theoretical and abstract construction, and therefore it
does not meet the initial objection – i.e., that holism does not give a concrete
explanation of the actual practice of interpretation. In fact, it may be argued
that in most cases there is no such thing as a construction of localities, since
we know very well which one of many stored localities (which has worked for
precious interpretations) we have to apply. Not only that, but we may even
argue that we never are faced with circumstances so novel that we need to
build a new context of interpretation for it.
The latter proposal seems too strong: it is certainly counterintuitive that
we never encounter novel circumstances of utterance of previously known sen-
tences, as well as novel sentences altogether. But I have expressed more than
once a suspicion about appeals to intuition, and I do not think that this
case is any different, at least in the relevant reading of ‘novel,’ the reading
that does not make the appeal to intuition a truistic platitude. For all we
know, human beings may be (genetically, biologically, or somehow ontologi-
cally) programmed for being able to interpret an infinite number of sentences
and utterances in only a finite number of different circumstances. I am not
going to argue against this conclusion. Rather, in what follows I will try to
dismantle the premises that lead to it.
Before that, though, let me add a further consideration about the rela-
tionship between holism and molecularism that emerged from the previous
paragraphs. For this purpose, let us consider once again Bilgrami’s example
of the two different localities which entitle the attribution of two different
water-concepts.1 I will sum up it briefly again. My concept of water (and
therefore any utterance containing the word “water” in its literal sense and
1§ 3.2.
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depending on the context for its interpretation, such as “That is water”) has
a different content in the following two situations. In the first situation, I
am thirsty, and, wanting to quench my thirst with the least expensive drink
available, I get a glass of water from the tap. In the second situation, I am
a chemist in a lab, and I am preparing a solution of one part of sulphuric
acid and nine parts of water. Bilgrami’s claim is that the two water-concepts
are arguably different, since the second, but not the first, has as a part of its
content the proposition that water is H2O.
I am not going to repeat here the reasons why I find such a conclusion
disputable.2 My point here is not a theoretical one. Even granting some the-
oretical possibility to Bilgrami’s example, we still have to show that things
are in fact as he depicts them. And this seems to me an empirical task, some-
thing that we can assess only by speculation on the results of some practical
experiment.3 For instance, we can put subjects in the two different situations
detailed above (or give them a text to provide them with the same background
of notions), then see how long it takes to process an utterance containing the
word “water” used in its literal sense and in an utterance whose interpre-
tation depends on the given context, once we present the subject, before the
processing, with priming information4 which, according to Bilgrami’s account,
is relevant only in one locality but not in the other, e.g., the chemical compo-
sition of water.5
Bilgrami’s prevision should be, in a rather uncharitable – but, hopefully,
not too misleading – interpretation of his theory, that we have facilitation of
processing in one case, but not in the other. Of course, this is not the only
prevision that we can make, given Bilgrami’s theory, nor my own perspective
on the subject entails only one possible experimental account. Rather, the
question is an empirical one exactly because we need to rely also – though not
only – on the interpretation of some experimental result in order to clarify our
ideas about the issue.
∗∗∗
I would like to add here a consideration of a different order about the objections
I am presently dealing with. Although there is a sense in which they are
perfectly legitimate, there is also a sense in which they completely miss an
important point. In fact, they are dealing with semantic holism as if it were
a theory about an infinite set made up of an infinite number of element,
which our cognitive system must assemble in different ways in order to permit
2See § 3.3.1.
3I want to stress that I do not believe that more philosophical insights come from empir-
ical foundings than from any other source. I only want to say that practical experience, and
in particular scientific experiments, are not a source that philosophy can afford to ignore.
4Priming information is some kind of information which the subject registers though
being unaware of it, and that interferes, positively or negatively, with the cognitive task
that is being studied.
5The first idea of such an experiment occurred to Marta Ghio during a conversation with
me.
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interpretation. However, this is hardly what people should understand holism
to be.
Holism, as it should be clear by now, is a theory whose primitive notion
is not that of a pool of elements from which to choose some and create the
localities we may happen to need, overlooking the elements we do not need
for the moment. The primitive notion of semantic holism, rather, is that of
an organic system which has the power to signify and interpret (or to permit
signification and interpretation).
The primitive notion of holism, therefore, is that of rationality. It is be-
cause our rationality is structured in the way it is that we are able to recognize
into it elements and subsystems – i.e., aggregates of elements. But it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that the individuation of elements and aggregates cannot
be prior to the operation of rationality itself, because such an individuation de-
pends on the operation of our rationality. As a matter of fact, the two notions
tend perhaps to be coincidental: any operation of our rationality is the indi-
viduation of some kind of element or aggregate of elements that is relevant to
the rational interactions of the rational being. By converse, any individuation
of such elements or aggregates is, trivially, an operation of rationality.
I say that the latter is trivial, because we have already shown that any indi-
viduation of elements and aggregates is grounded on some kind of tassonomy.
And tassonomy is the way rationality projects its purposes on the object of its
interaction. It is in this sense, I believe, that we should understand Christo-
pher Peacocke’s idea that ackowledgment of identity is a cognitive primitive.6
Such an idea should not be understood to mean that there is no cognitive
notion to which we can reduce acknowledgments of identities, because such a
notion exists: it is rationality. It is true, though, that, even if we understand
rationality to be something more than simply acknowledgment of identities,
the reduction of the latter to the former is uninformative in the sense that we
still lack a satisfying definition of rationality. In this sense, any reduction of
some faculty to rationality as a cognitive primitive is not a proper reduction,
in that it is less informative than we should expect a proper reduction to be.
Before digging some more in the rationality field, I would like to state
now in what sense I think that the objections I have faced in this section are
legitimate. They are legitimate because, even if they do not meet the funda-
mental theoretical premises of semantic holism, there is nothing that compels
the opponent of holism to accept those premises. In this regard, what we have
achieved by being confronted with such objections is the acknowledgement
that holism and molecularism are both legitimate and coherent in themselves,
although they stem from very different theoretical premises. Moreover, a
domesticated form of holism can be implemented without much ado into a
molecularistic account, and a domesticated form of molecularism is perhaps
the best way to take shortcuts in a holistic theory of interpretation.
6Cf. Peacocke (2008), esp. chpt. 4.
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Rationality as a Primitive
Christopher Peacocke’s idea is that the recognition of identities is a cognitive
primitive, and happens, therefore, thanks to an implicit conception of what
is identical with a certain object (or, more broadly, with any entity which we
already have fixed as reference for some of our terms or phrases). He advances
this theory to account for meaning and understanding (especially the latter)
in a way that bears some resemblance to the theory I have been detailing in
the previous chapters. Personal experience of meaning and understanding,
according to Peacocke, is crucial in order to proceed to interpretation of other
people’s sentences and utterances.7
Although Peacocke’s stress is not on the globality of the experience, but
rather on the single experiences which are invoked and compared from time
to time, we have already seen that in order to know how to attribute some
kind of mental state to other people, we have to attribute to them the general
shape of our cognitive system as a whole. I think that it is quite easy to
implement such a modification in Peacocke’s theory, although he may not be
willing to do so, for other reasons that will appear clear.
Perception and Representation of Identities The problem Peacocke
has with holistic attempts to account for understanding, and the objection he
would perhaps voice against an account along the lines of the previous chap-
ters, is that the central notion, for him, is that of reference. Hence comes the
stress he puts on the notion of immediate or privileged access to reference that
comes from being aware of one’s own mental modifications (which accounts
for the semantics of mental),8 or from perceiving object and properties (which
accounts for the semantics of external objects together with their properties).9
We have more than one reason to be skeptical about the latter proposal.
After all, it is not at all clear that our understanding of perceptible properties
comes primarily from our knowledge of what it is to be perceived as having
that property. First of all, we must consider that it is quite unclear how
the recognition or assumption of an identity between a perceptible property
and some other property occurs. Peacocke acknowledges this, and therefore
considers such a recognition or assumption, and the idea of identity that is
entailed by them, an implicit conception.
While appeals to implicit conceptions can indeed be explanatory,10 this
may happen only when just a few of them are invoked. In the case of identities,
though, a new implicit conception has to be called for every different property
which is recognized as identical with another. I will not committ myself to
7Ibid., pgs. 175 f.
8Ibid., chpts. 5 ff.
9Ibid., chpt. 1.
10Cf. ibid., chpt. 4, § 4.
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the claim that there are infinite many such properties, but their number is
definitely high (just consider, e.g., that every different hue is such a property).
Moreover, there is no sense in which recognizing that for an object to be
oval it is to be as some oval object that I perceive as oval is different from
recognizing that for an object to be yellow is to be as some yellow object that
I perceive as yellow. Both recognitions call for one and the same cognitive
explanatory principle. My claim is that this explanatory principle is rational-
ity itself. Thus, I would stick to Peacocke’s implicit conception theory, while
preventing it from having too many implicit conceptions to deal with.
There is still a greater problem. Our understanding of unperceived per-
ceptible properties must appeal to some understanding of that property that
goes beyond the mere perceiving it. Otherwise any perceptional illusion would
baffle not only our present understanding of the world and of the descriptions
we can give of it, but also our understanding and meaning faculties altogether.
Imagine, for instance, that John has never been faced with ovals, but only with
open curves seen from a perspective such that they appeared oval, and that he
learned to call such shapes “ovals.” It is not at all clear, in my opinion, that
John refers to open curves perceived as ovals when he utters the word “oval.”
But, under Peacocke’s theory, he cannot refer properly to oval-shaped objects
perceived as oval or to objects identical to oval-shaped objects perceived as
oval, because he does not know at all how such objects are perceived, and he
does not even know whether such objects exist at all.
Appeals to intentions and mental representations are void, because there
is no detectable difference in John’s talking under an intention or another, or
under a representation or another, unless his hearer construes his intentions
and mental representations. And these are construed by ways of interpreting
John’s behavior and dispositions towards, say, ovals. Among such dispositions
are also his referential dispositions, the circumstances in which he is willing to
attribute the property of being oval to something he may or may not perceive,
and he judges more or less identical to objects he may or may not perceive.
These, I repeat, are all circumstances that can be exploited as hints to construe
the meaning of John’s utterances of sentences containing the word “oval,” but
they are by no means the only sources of our understanding of them.
The problem, so far, is that an interpretation theory relying basically on
the individuation of identities between references presupposes an ontology
of perceptible objects and properties prior to the rational intervention of a
subject’s cognitive faculties. While this presupposition might seem inoffensive,
the claim that our language and our cognitive system is shaped as to be in
perfect agreement with such an ontology is not. Peacocke tries to justify the
second claim by appealing to an evolutionary process:
My own view is that the easiest way for such complex, relationally
individuated states to occur is for states of their kind to have
evolved by a selection process, one which favours the occurence of
155
6. Evaluating Semantic Holism
those states whose representational content is correct.11
Here Peacocke seems to misunderstand the claims of evolution theory, and
what claims it can be appealed to to support. If we are undoubtedly justified
in thinking that being able of representing reality as it is would be an evo-
lutionary advantage, in the sense that it would enhance the survival of the
fittest, this does not imply that our cognitive system has such a property, nor
that an evolutionary story that tells how a cognitive system might acquire
such a property is the easiest explanation of the origin and nature of our rep-
resentational faculties. In fact, all that is required from a cognitive system as
a whole to enhance the survival of the organism is that it prompts appropri-
ate answers to given stimuli, and this may happen even if representations are
constantly but coherently incorrect.
The real flaw in reasoning, though, seems to be that of thinking that
there is a way in which the world is, which is prior to our understanding and
representing of it, and that our presence in the world as rational perceivers
and rational agents does not affect the way the world is in any way. In other
words, we are probably not entitled at all in talking of the world as separate
from the ideas and representations of it that we have, nor as separate from
the ways we interact with it. Our struggle to make sense of the world in order
to act and interact with it consigns a world to our cognitive system, so that it
is meaningless to ask how the world is without a rational mind to make sense
of it. I will come back again on this issue.
∗∗∗
Another problem a conception like Peacocke’s has to face is that of relations.
If our understanding starts with references and truths, we must be told what
it is to be counted as the reference of a relation. Moreover, we need here
not the set-theoretical entity proposed by standard atomistic semantics, but
something that, as in the case of “oval,” can be identified by means of an
implicit conception of what it is to be identical as something that is presently
perceived as having some certain property. The only difference is that, now,
the property is no more a monadic one.
Suppose I see two men, George and Mark, and that I perceive George to
be taller than Mark. It is plain to see that any theory that assumes different
perceptions as grounding sources for the references respectively of George and
Mark’s heights and the relation between them is not a good theory. For there
is no different fact to be pointed at in perception. We can assume perhaps
that relations merely supervenes on perceptibles, so that the only properties
that are grounded in perception are George and Mark’s heights, and then I
derive that George is taller than Mark. But this is hardly what happens, since
no inference is involved in such a recognition.
The case of relations, however, is not special. It is just an instance of
a more general case. My perception of the oval shape of an object is never
11Ibid., pg. 267.
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detached from a perception of, say, something that is coloured. Nonetheless, in
my reference to something oval, I know that I am abstracting from its colour.
This can be explained only if, within our perceptual interactions, we assume
some general taxonomic form, which enhances our referential competence,
together with all the rational courses of actions and interactions that are part
of our rationality.
Beyond Rationality Nothing of what I said so long about the central role
of identity and reference should sound utterly new, for it is merely a repro-
posal of the theory of previous chapters. But dealing with Peacocke’s theory
is important also because it provides us with clarifications to my past argu-
mentation concerning self-interpretation.
To establish the meaning of sentences concerning states of mind, or mental
actions, Peacocke assumes a privileged access provided by first-person asser-
tions and attributions of such states of mind and mental actions, and then
the recognition that other people are selves in the same sense in which I am a
self: i.e., they have the same privileged access to their own states of mind and
mental actions that I have to my own. Recognition of these facts (my access
to my states of mind, the fact that this access is due to the possibility of using
the first person, and, therefore, that each person capable of using the first
person like I do is a subject in the very sense I am one) are enough to explain
the interpretation of all talk about mental states and mental actions.12
To understand to what extent Peacocke’s theory is in agreement with my
own, and to what extent, instead, is in conflict with it, let us begin with what
he describes as a “‘thin’ account of what it is to have the conception of a range
of subjects that includes oneself:”
A range of subjects is conceived of as a range of things of the same
kind as me, standing in the same kinds of relations to the world,
events, objects, and actions as are required for me to exist.13
The reason why such an account is called thin is, I think, that it is neutral
as to the priority of conceiving of oneself as a subject with respect to conceiving
of other people as subjects.
If, for one reason or another, you are sceptical of the existence
of an intermediate level of minimal subject-involving thought, you
could still consistently accept this thin account. You would just
be committed to a more holistic understanding of the specification
of the content of the thin account, an understanding according to
which the first person and the conception of a range of subjects
are explained simultaneously.14
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This is where my theory, as expressed in § 4.3, and Peacocke’s agree. I
also agree that when others talk about their sensations, or mental states or
actions (like taking decisions, or struggling to believe) we understand them by
projecting our experience of thinking beings and rational subjects upon them.
There is a difference in this projection that should be noticed, though, for I
think that it is the whole of the rational system that is attributed to other
people, and that is how we can make sense also of sensations or mental states
or mental actions that we heve never been quite into, as long as we can see
how it is that it is rational for our interlocutor (or for the rational being that
we figured our interlocutor to be) to be into them or to entertain them.
The major point of conflict between my projective theory and Peacocke’s,
though, is in the role of the first person. Even if Peacocke’s thin account leaves
open the possibility of a simultaneous identification of oneself and other people
as subjects, the access to the interpretation of talk about mental states and
actions is always mediated, in his theory, by the self-attribution (via the first
person) of such mental states and actions. Vice versa, such self-attribution
is an immediate and privileged access to the meaning of expressions dealing
with mental states and actions.
In § 4.3 I proposed instead that self-attribution is interpretable because
of our sharing of the same cognitive system with our rational peers (our in-
terlocutors), and our talk of mental states and actions is interpreted in no
different way than that in which we interpret other people’s talking of the
same subject; namely, we know when our own utterances mean such and such
mental state or action because we manage to identify the position of such
utterances in our own reconstructed rational way of living.
It is important to notice that I do not want to deal with the problem, which
seems instead rather central in Peacocke’s theory, of the privileged access one
has to one’s own mental states and actions. What I am interested in is the
mere verbalization of such access, though I suspect that such verbalization
has an essential role for what concerns general access.
The point is to explain the reference of the first person, and possibly to
explain it without circularity. For if we appeal to the privileged access that
we have, as subjects, to our mental states and actions, i.e., to that peculiar
feeling of acknowledging things from within, we must be assured, first, that
the peculiar role of the first person in our languages has nothing to do with
that. This is a difficult task, because it is not at all clear neither whether this
is in fact the case, nor how we could realize that, if it were.
My opinion is that here we are bordering a great problem about the founda-
tion of any theory of understanding whatsoever, especially those which appeal
to some primitive notion of holistic rationality, such as mine. For I suspect
that the first person (i.e., utterances of sentences involving the use of the first
person) is constitutive of our knowledge of what it is to be a subject; in a
sense, then, it is not appropriate to ask whether such knowledge is prior to
the first person or vice versa. They are, so to speak, two aspects of the same
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global question, that concerning our own rational life as subjects.
The problem is, then, about the foundation of such rational life, and of
our reliance on principles such as the principle of charity or the principle of
rationality as guides for our interpretations. It is difficult to understand in
what sense such principles can act as regulative principles, as axioms, and yet
be perceived, as per the Q/D thesis, as in some sense revisable. My answser
is that they are indeed not revisable, and in this sense thay are deemed as
utterly a priori, but this is so only within our human and rational practice.
As human beings, we cannot help regarding our own lives as regulated by a
rational principle, and this means interpreting our doings as informed by such
a rational principle. At the same time, as if outside proper philosophy, we
cannot help wondering about those beings that we see as excluded by such a
rational principle, whether there is a quasi-rational principle for them, or even
whether they possess their own special rationality, which is not only unknown
to us, but utterly alien to the kind of rationality that regulates our actions
and interpretations. As philosophers of mind, I think, we must resist this way
of speaking, since there is no rationality outside rationality, and there is no
coherence outside rational coherence, i.e., outside the coherence that we can
understand as such.
I think that it would be inappropriate to conclude, then, that there is
nothing at all outside our rational experience. It is not that there is something,
admittedly, but there is not nothing, too. Outside our rational experience lies
the realm of silence.
I admit that this conclusion may sound unsatisfactory to many, and rather
mystical to most. This is perhaps a problem of holistic theories of interpre-
tation: having to deal with the rationality that lies at the core of human
nature as a whole and shows itself into action, holism cannot help surround-
ing rationality with mistery concerning its roots. I do not think that such
a conclusion about rationality is avoidable by adopting a different semantic
theory rather than holism, nor I feel forced to state that such a conclusion
should be avoided at all. After all, it may very well be that the only answer
to the question concerning the reason why we are the kind of beings that we
are is, “by chance.” I do not feel compelled to find a better answer now; I only
wanted to note that such a universal problem is quite soon encountered dig-
ging for the foundation of a holistic theory of understanding, while, perhaps,
atomism and molecularism are better at ignoring the matter.
6.1.2 The Problems with Holistic Semantics
For what concerns the properly semantic part of the holistic theory of meaning,
we still may have doubts regarding the feasibility of a theory trying to link
the meaning of any single utterance to the architecture of the whole linguistic
system. First of all, we might infer from the distinction between a theory
of interpretation and a theory of meaning in a narrow sense, that the two
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faculties are somehow distinct themselves.
If this is true, we may ask what is the role of the faculty of meaning and the
conceptual faculty (which are the two main faculties we individuated in our
discussion of holistic semantics, at least according to one kind of theory), as
opposed to the interpretive faculty. In fact, it seems to be clear that the only
faculty which has an observable effect on our behavior and on our cognitive
activity is the interpretive faculty. After all, assuming for the moment that the
other faculties indeed exist, and that our theory of interpretation is generally
correct, any activity taking place in our cognitive system (hence, also activities
of the linguistic and conceptual faculties) is filtered to our consciousness by
the interpretive faculty.
Now, there is a reason why we need to keep distinct the interpretive system
and the semantic system, although they are all part of the rational cognitive
system which is assumed as fundamental for the functioning of at least the
interpretive process. For the interpretive system, as such, is not a productive
system, in the sense that interpretation is not enough to explain the production
of always new meaningful sentences. It merely guarantees that for any novel
sentence we should encounter, we are capable of finding an interpretation
adequate to the circumstances in which it is uttered.
When we start to think about the semantic system (either with its division
into a properly linguistic and a conceptual system, or as a complex global
system which unifies the two aspects) as the productive side of our linguistic
mastery, we cannot help asking whether there is a more reasonable way to
deem the productive and the interpretive side of the matter as merely two
ways of thinking about the same faculty or system, rather then two different
systems working together. After all, there is an important sense in which
our interpretation strictly depends on our capacity of producing the utterance
with the meaning we are attributing to our interlocutor.
While this is true (at least according to the theory detailed in the past
two chapters), we cannot ignore that the faculties of producing and interpret-
ing meaningful utterances are sometimes detached. Some aphasic subjects,
for instance, show a double dissociation between them, some being able to
understand speech but not to produce it, while others are conversely able
to produce correct speech, though uncapable of understanding it. We can
have the same kind of evidence concerning the distinction between a linguis-
tic (mostly syntactic) system and a conceptual one; and of course we already
quoted such evidence when dealing with the distinction between a referential
and an inferential competence of the conceptual system.15
We still may wonder what all these empirical evidence is supposed to prove
or show. My answer is that, outside a complex theory, it does not show or
prove much. Only a theory about the architecture of our cognitive system




round is, in my opinion, simply wrong. While it is correct to expect different
theories from different areas of research to dialogue, we cannot expect one
discipline to dictate another one’s agenda.
In this sense, such evidence is not at all conclusive for our attempt to
reconstruct the human cognitive architecture. In fact, we are still faced with
the dilemma we described in the previous chapter.16 We may think that these
cases of double dissociation and the fact that we are able to distinguish dif-
ferent tasks developed by the cognitive system are hints of the existence of
different subsystems – which, of course, would be interconnected and interde-
pendent as for the developing of those tasks. Otherwise, we may think that
there is only a cognitive system, and it is illegitimate to distinguish subsys-
tems in it: we are only entitled to think of different tasks, but it is not the
case that there is a biunivocal correspondence between tasks and subsystems.
Perhaps even a third possibility is open, viz., that there are interconnected
subsystems, and that, under certain circumstances, one can act as a vicarious
for another one when the latter cannot execute its task.
6.2 Interactions
Towards the end of the previous section, I have introduced the argument of the
interaction between holistic semantics on one side and other disciplines on the
other side. We have already seen that there may be interesting connections
between holistic theories of meaning and neurology or psychology. I think that
it is even more interesting to see the place of holistic semantics with respect
to other disciplines in the philosophical area (such as epistemology and theory
of mind), and this will be my starting point. After that I will deal again with
the connections between semantic holism and modern linguistics.
6.2.1 Philosophical Issues
For what concerns the relationship and the influence that a holistic theory of
meaning has or may have with respect to other philosophical issues, Fodor and
Lepore claim that there are reasons not only to believe that holism has not
been proved true, but also to worry about the eventuality that such a proof
should be given:
It appears that holism, taken seriously, entails incommensurability
of theories, the impossibility of linguistic diacrony, and the impos-
sibility of any generalization concerning the intentional states of
people (thus the impossibility of psychology, economics, and so
forth). According to Fodor and Lepore, these are all consequences
of holism in their sense. [. . . ] Anyway, it appears that the dreadful
16§ 5.1.
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consequences that Fodor and Lepore draw [from their definition]
could equally well be derived from holism in the traditional sense.17
All these problems roots in the same ground:
[. . . ] meaning holism would require that if any one sentence in your
theory occurs in my theory, then practically all the sentences that
occur in your theory must occur in my theory. An similarly, mu-
tatis mutandis, if “theory” is replaced with “language.” If holism
is true, then I can’t understand any of your language unless I can
understand practically all of it.18
Let us go back to § 4.1.2, and see what was the problem with Argument A,
in Fodor and Lepore’s opinion. They claim that their counterargument shows
that the same belief P can be shared by me and you, even if it is related to
different other beliefs in my mind and in yours (say, by the beliefs in the set
A for me and by the beliefs in the set B for you). But if holism claims that
to share any one belief one has to share also lots of other beliefs, then there
is a contradiction betweem holism and Fodor and Lepore’s counterargument.
I agree that there is a contradiction, but I do not see why we should decide
that it is holism that should be abandoned because of the contradiction. We
could as well decide that the hypothesis that we were able to identify a belief
independently of the context furnished by other beliefs is untenable. After all,
Fodor and Lepore have not given us an alternative method of belief individu-
ation. They were not supposed to, of course, because the aim of ther work is
not to furnish an alternative theory to holism. However, a counterargument
based on premises that are not shared from the thesis it is supposed to attack
is doomed to miss the point.
Fodor and Lepore think that their counterargument works, because they
claim to have independently opposed to the holistic doctrine that the indi-
viduation of semantic entities depends on the whole semantic system. They
think, in fact, that such a doctrine is directly responsible for untenable conse-
quences, which are summarized by Marconi in the quote above. I would like,
therefore, to discuss such consequences of holism, and its defense against the
charges moved by Fodor and Lepore, in order to clarify the connections be-
tween semantic holism on one hand and epistemology and theory of concepts
on the other.
Here is how I will procede. I will first examine the “dreadful consequences”
of holism more in detail, to see where their roots really lie, and whether holism
can deal with them. Then I will see what holism is claimed by Fodor and
Lepore to have responded to such allegations (allegedly with no success). In
17Marconi (1997), pgs. 48 f.
18Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 9.
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examining this defense strategy, we will see whether some method of holis-
tic individuation to dismantle Fodor and Lepore’s case against Argument A
appears.
Two Faces of Evil
The two consequences I intend to examine in this section are incommensura-
bility, for what concerns the connections between semantic holism and epis-
temology, and the impossibility of intentional generalization, concerning the
connections between semantic holism and conceptual theory. Of course, these
are not the only connections among these disciplines: some others have ap-
peared in the previous arguments detailing semantic holism. These were left
aside, however, and this is the reason I deal with them here.
It will appear that I have different intents in the following argument. First
of all, I will see whether Fodor and Lepore’s derivations of the dreadful con-
sequences are sound; in other words, I intend to see whether they are conse-
quences at all. Second, I will be concerned with their alleged dreadfulness:
even if semantic holism led to such consequences, are Fodor and Lepore cor-
rect in thinking that this is enough reason to doubt of the sustainability of
semantic holism? It could turn out either that there is no reason to be afraid
of these consequences as such, or that, dreadful as they are per se, semantic
holism effectively defuses their most dreadful aspects.
Incommensurability In deriving incommensurability (which is a theory
concerning philosophy of science) from semantic holism (which is a theory
concerning philosophy of language) one attempts to make a leap from lan-
guages to theories. Such a leap is not always a safe one. Let us see, then, how
Fodor and Lepore jump. First, the linguistic side of the chasm:
Consider the property R that a linguistic expression has iff it refers
to the same thing that some expression in English does. [. . . ]
Question: Is the property R holistic? Could languages that overlap
only slightly share any of their “ontological commitments?”
Here’s one reason why this question matters. Suppose that
ontological commitments are holistic, so that two languages can
share any of their ontology only if they share quite a lot of it.
It might turn out, for example, that no language could have an
expression that refers to what the English expression “the pen of
my aunt” refers to unless it also has expressions that refer to, as
it might be, Chicago, the cat’s being on the mat, the last game
of the 1927 World Series, the day after they built the Statue of
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First of all, let me state that it is not at all clear what here is intended with
“ontological commitments.” Languages, as such, have no ontological commit-
ments at all, or it is at least disputable that they do. It seems to me that it is
preferable to say that speakers can have their own favourite ontological the-
ory according to which they interpret their own language and other people’s
language. And the same language, so it seems, can be interpreted according
to different ontological theories.20 And this seems to be the reason of all the
ontological disputes across the millennia: that philosophers could not assess
the question simply by looking at the language. I will put all the matter
in a dubitative form, but I would like to note that there is some danger on
Fodor and Lepore’s leap: the pole they meant to use may be less solid than
it appears.
As a matter of fact, I do not find anything dreadful in Fodor and Lepore’s
hypothesis.21 I would indeed be puzzled if I was told that someone could refer
to a pen but not to a city, to a book (either the physical object or the story
wherein told), to a particular individual, to a time, to a state of affairs, or to
an event. I would be puzzled because I would have thought that, these things
being part of what is or could be relevant for any human being to be talking
about, any human being had means to refer to them. All this may simply boil
down to saying that my intuitions are different from Fodor and Lepore’s. It
may be that some empirical inquiry about human beings and human languages
can prove me or them right by showing whether there can exist languages
lacking the expressive means to refer to any of the above mentioned entities.
I doubt that such empirical evidence can be found, though, unless we prove
that there is a univocal way to attribute ontological commitments to other
people.
∗∗∗
This having been said, let us see the final phase of the leap:
It raises the stakes [. . . ] that the same considerations would apply
if we asked about the semantic property R*. An expression has
20Cf. Davidson (2001), pgs. 188 f.:
Suppose that in my office of Minister of Scientific Language I want the new
man to stop using words that refer, say, to emotions, feelings, thoughts, and
intentions, and to talk instead of the physiological states and happenings that
are assumed to be more or less identical with the mental riff and raff. How
do I tell whether my advice has been heeded if the new man speaks a new
language? For all I know, the shiny new phrases, though stolen from the old
language in which they refer to physiological stirrings, may in his mouth play
the role of the messy old mental concepts.
The key phrase is: for all I know. What is clear is that retention of some or
all of the old vocabulary in itself provides no basis for judging the new scheme
to be the same as, or different from, the old.
21Nor do they say they do, of course, apart from finding it “counter-intuitive.” Cf. Fodor
and Lepore (1992), pg. 11.
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R* iff it refers to something or other that currently accepted as-
tronomical theories refer to. Suppose that R* is anatomic, hence
holistic on the assumption that anatomism implies holism. Then
it might turn out that no theory could refer to (for example) stars
unless it could also refer to (as it might be) planets, nebulas, black
holes, the center of the galaxy, the speed of propagation of light,
and the location of the nearest quasar. It would follow that Greek
astronomy (hence, Greek astronomers) couldn’t ever referred to
stars. [. . . ] In fact, strictly speaking, it would follow that the
Greeks didn’t have any views about stars; we can’t, in the vocab-
ulary of contemporary astronomy, say what, if anything, Greek
astronomy was about. A fortiori, it makes no sense to speak of an
empirically motivated choice between Greek astronomy and ours;
whereof you cannot speak, thereof you must be silent.22
Again, my intuitions part company with Fodor and Lepore’s, for I do not
see any inconvenience in such a proposal. I am not alone in this, but I will
not try to prove my party right in this occasion. Fodor and Lepore say that if
we think that we can bite this bullet, we must also accept that science is not
progressive, and that, therefore, “the standard argument for Scientific Realism
goes down the drain.”23 I can be fine with all this, although I fail to see the
cogency of the inference.
On one side, in fact, note that some comparison is still permitted even if
we deal with incommensurable theories. Thomas Kuhn was certainly one of
the keenest philosophers on incommensurability. He was, indeed, one of the
first to have introduced the term in the epistemological debate. Yet he did not
think that incommensurable meant that no comparison at all was possible:
Remember briefly where the term ‘incommensurability’ came from.
The hypotenuse of an isosceles right triangle is incommensurable
with its side or the circumference of a circle with its radius in
the sense that there is no unit of length contained without residue
an integral number of times in each member of the pair. There is
thus no common measure. But lack of a common measure does not
make comparison impossible. On the contrary, incommensurable
magnitudes can be compared to any required degree of approxi-
mation. [. . . ]
Applied to the conceptual vocabulary deployed in and around
scientific theory, the term ‘incommensurability’ functions meta-
phorically. The phrase ‘no common measure’ becomes ‘no com-
mon language.’ The claim that two theories are incommensurable
is then the claim that there is no language, neutral or otherwise,
22Ibid., pgs. 11 f., emphasis in text.
23Ibid., pg. 12.
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into which both theories, conceived as sets of sentences, can be
translated without residue or loss. No more in its metaphorical
than its literal form does incommensurability imply incomparabil-
ity, and for much the same reason. Most of the terms common to
the two theories function the same way in both; their meanings,
whatever those may be, are preserved; their translation is simply
homophonic. Only for a small subgroup of (usually interdefined)
terms and for sentences containing them do problems of translata-
bility arise.24
This subgroup of technical terms can very well be considered responsible
for the better predictions that enables us to say that our theory is better
than the Greeks’. Notice how this result is achieved by means of a holistic
theory of meaning, and not against it: if we manage to put in a (homophonic)
relation terms of both theories is because they serve the same function in
both theories. Also, note that a scientific theory is never independent from
the human beings that made it up, and that it is also thanks to what we know
about Greek culture and Greek language that we can say that what they were
trying to devise was an astronomical theory.25
As for Scientific Realism, the reason it goes down the drain may not be
the fact that we cannot account for progressive science any more. Maybe the
problem is that we do not really know what to do with a concept of real world
as opposed to the scientific picture which is supposed to be its approximation.
If scientific progress really was “the argument for Scientific Realism,”26 maybe
Scientific Realism was condemned anyway: indeed, there seems to be quite
a lot of more independently well-equipped epistemological competitors that
could account for progressive science. And some other competitors would also
gladly reject the picture of a progressive science altogether.
∗∗∗
In fact, Fodor and Lepore’s leap from philosophy of language to philosophy
of science was not only dangerous and, perhaps, even ill-supported by their
mention of reference. It was also not at all necessary. Epistemological theories
about the holism of scientific theories are independent from holistic theories
about language.
Imagine we assume a rather classical atomistic point of view about mean-
ing: the meaning of a sentence is the fact that verify it. Suppose further that
24Kuhn (2000), pg. 35 f.
25Cf. Davidson (2001), pg. 168:
It isn’t that any one false belief necessarily destroys our ability to identify
further beliefs, but that the intelligibility of such identifications must depend
on a background of largely unmentioned and unquestioned true beliefs.
Note that this would be, in Fodor and Lepore’s terminology, a shift from talking of content
identity to content similarity. I will come back on this issue further on.
26Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 12, emphasis in text.
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we try to be more specific about that, and that we decide that what counts as
verifying has something to do with our perceptions. We can think that it is a
task for a scientific theory to show how all of our sentences are connected to
our perception. This was a strong positivist claim, of course, but it was not
alien to Quine, either.27 Now suppose that, as it may turn out to be the case,
whether a sentence is verified by a fact or not depends on the whole theory.
This was of course Quine’s opinion; remember, on this regard, that Fodor and
Lepore mention their doubt about Quine being a semantic holist.
All my point is to show that, as Fodor and Lepore seem to acknowledge
elsewhere, it is not at all necessary to be a holist about meaning to be a holist
about scientific theories, with all the consequences of that kind of holism.
Scientific holism can be seen as one of the natural consequences of the positivist
program facing its extreme consequences.28 On the other hand, as we have
seen, semantic holists can have some good argument to block the radical and
perhaps unwanted consequences of scientific holism.
The Impossibility of Intentional Generalization Another argument is
built by Fodor and Lepore starting with translation instead of reference. Sup-
pose that we assume that the property of being a translation of one sentence
of English or the other is holistic. It will follow that if a person’s language
cannot translate lots of present English sentences, it also cannot translate,
say, “My aunt’s pen is on the table.” The problem is, of course, that lots of
names and lots of concepts happen to have been introduced during the cen-
turies; so, e.g., Shakespeare, or Chaucer, or Lincoln could not translate “My
aunt’s pen is on the table,” because they lack a translation for, say, “Water
is XYZ” or “The proton is made of quarks.”29 This is why Marconi talked of
“impossibility of linguistic diacrony” as a consequence of holism.
This part of Fodor and Lepore’s argument seems very close to the first part
of the argument considered in the last section, and I think that the comments
I gave there still apply here. In a nutshell: I think that languages should be
thought of as permitting to acquire new vocabulary with only slight adjust-
ments to the already acquired vocabulary. The mechanism that should permit
such slight adjustments has already been the subject of previous discussion.30
The argument, however, is not finished yet. It carries on, claiming that,
if an issue can be made about Shakespeare’s language, it can be made also
about his thoughts. For, consider the property of entertaining one or the other
belief that I entertain. If this is holistic, then Shakespeare could not believe
that the Thames is a river because he could not believe that Obama won
the elections. The problem is that we assume that human actions depend on
27Cf. Quine (1953), pg. 42.
28This is why Rosaria Egidi can consider Hanson and Feyerabend, who mostly shared
Kuhn’s views, (dissident) neopositivists. Cf. Egidi (1979), p. 8.
29Fodor and Lepore (1992), pg. 13.
30See § 4.2.2 above.
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what people believe and on what they want, and if there is no way of making
generalizations about beliefs and desires, then there is no chance of having a
predictive theory about human behaviour.31
This is because thoughts can fall under generalizations only if they are
identified by means of their content. If content, in its turn, is holistically
identified, then we cannot equate content of thoughts across minds, because
every person has very different thoughts that others do not entertain.32 This,
in turn, entails the third consequence dreaded by Marconi: the impossibility
of scientific knowledge about intentionalities and, therefore, the impossibility
of psychology, sociology, economics, and so on.33
To this we could answer that holistic individuation (or, actually, quasi-
individuation) of intentional content can be achieved by a trial and error
procedure, which is behavioristic inasmuch as it takes behavioral outputs into
consideration, but which is not entirely behavioristic inasmuch as it gets a
feedback by confronting its partial results with the success of the linguistic
interaction. In other words, we can begin postulating some thought to be
present in our interlocutor’s mind, then check if we pictured the right thought
keeping trace of it in our further conversation. This seems the way that people
come to the conclusion that they have the same thoughts as their interlocutors.
I have to note two things about this line of answer. First, to answer to
Fodor and Lepore’s worries, such a procedure gives enough way to generaliza-
tions. Of course there is the possibility of committing mistakes, and taking
different thoughts as the same or vice versa. But the possibility of being mis-
taken is deeply rooted in every human activity – even in hard sciences –, so I
would not be worried about that.34 On the other hand, it could be objected
that we are giving no identification criteria, but at best a procedure to decide
whether two thoughts have more or less the same content. That is, we are no
more talking of sameness of content, but of likeness of content, and here we
could have other problems.
Content Similarity
In both the situations mentioned in the last subsection, we have seen that the
holist would appeal to some criteria of content similarity to avoid or mitigate
the consequences of being a holist. What is Fodor and Lepore’s answer to
31Fodor and Lepore (1992), pgs. 13 f.
32Ibid., pg. 14.
33Ibid., pg. 15.
34There is also another way in which so-called human science are similar to hard sciences.
Fodor and Lepore (ibid., pg. 17) seem to have problems with assumptions that allow human
science to be “not negotiable” in the face of, e.g., biology or physics. But this is not a
special status that, accepting a holistic point of view, intentional explanation would have, in
contrast with physics and biology. For one might hold, for instance, chemical explanations
to be “non negotiable” however physics turn out to be. Indeed, this is what happened in
the 18th and 19th centuries.
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that? They say that you cannot have any opinion about content similarity
unless you know how to identify beliefs in the first place – and, maybe, how
to count them. Here is an example where these problems come out:
No doubt, one does know (sort of) what it is like to more or less
believe the same things as the President does; it’s to share many of
the President’s beliefs. For example, the President believes P, Q,
R, and S, and I believe P, Q, and R; so my beliefs are similar to his.
An alternative, compatible reading is: the President believes P and
Q very strongly and I believe them equally strongly or almost as
strongly, so again my beliefs are similar to his.35
If this were the right way to construe “more or less believe the same things
as the President does,” Fodor and Lepore would be right in saying that such
a notion depends on the notion of identity. However, we can think that, once
again, they are misled by their intuitions. The naive picture that they draw
needs to be questioned more than they do, before we can say anything about
it. The question I would like to ask resembles the question that Fodor and
Lepore seem to ask, viz., How do we know that we believe more or less the
same believes that the President does?
I would read that question as asking: In what way we come to have that
knowledge? If I were asked, I would answer that I have listened to, or read
about, the President’s speeches, and this is how I know what he believes. A
theory of interpretation is involved here. Maybe also a practical theory, a
theory that takes actions into consideration.
Fodor and Lepore could object that we cannot have any such theory with-
out generalizations about intentional content, and that such generalizations
rely on content identification. Actually, we have seen before that this might
not be necessary. Someone might object that, when we showed that, we did
so by substituting content identity with content similarity; thus, if now we are
trying to support content similarity with the same move, we are begging the
question.
I do not think that it is so: previously, we have announced the possibility
of a structured scientific methodology. Here we are assuming an explanation
of our intuitions. Both scientific methodology and intuitions rely on an ex-
planation of content similarity. This, in its turn, is grounded on a theory of
interpretation, which, having the principle of rationality as one of its constitu-
tive principles, explains very well the possibility of intentional generalization.
And here there is no begging the question, for the principle of rationality is
allegedly primitive.
What I would like to ask is whether my account is more accurate than
Fodor and Lepore’s with respect to being an account of what it is like to more
or less believe the same things as the President does. Remember, though,
35Ibid., pg. 18, emphasis in text.
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that Fodor and Lepore have just a negative task, viz., to show that holistic
positions have not yet been plausibly defended. What I wanted to do, instead,
is to show that there is some plausibility in the picture I have given in the
present section – which is, of course, backed up by the theory examined in
§ 4.2. If it is so, then the counterargument proposed by Fodor and Lepore
and discussed in § 4.1.2 to what they call Argument A in favour of semantic
holism is proven definitely wrong, because it is apparent that it was based on
assumptions that holists have no reason to share.
∗∗∗
In this section, I did not want to claim that semantic holism is a key to the
solving of the several philosophical problems ranging from ontological question
to epistemological ones and to those concerning the theory of mind. I rather
think that the present discourse can show that semantic holism can give us a
peculiar perspective on these issues, placing us in a route to the solutions. At
the same time, I also acknowledge some degree of independence of these issues
from semantic ones, in the sense that our commitment to semantic holism (or
to other kinds of semantic theories) does not equally commit us to the kinds
of solutions described in the present section (or, respectively, to necessarily
different solutions).
6.2.2 Linguistics
We have seen throughout the previous chapter that semantic holism is a great
premise to the whole construction of modern linguistic theories. Therefore,
semantic holism is entailed by linguistics as it is practiced nowadays. Once
again, it is important to state clearly what the relationship between semantic
holism and modern linguistics (or between any philosophical theory and any
scientific theory, for that matter) consists in.36 When I say that the modern
practice of linguistics presupposes certain philosophical assumptions such as
semantic holism, I do not want to imply that the success of modern linguistics
in explaining the functioning of the human faculty of language, or the confir-
mations that may come to modern linguistics from experimental evidence, are
to be deemed proofs of the correctness of holistic theories of semantics.
As I said before,37 the interpretation of experimental evidence depends
strictly on the theory (therefore, on the theorists) that attempts the inter-
pretation. As for the relationship between a theory and its assumptions, it
36It is perhaps once again the case to clarify also that the distinction between what is
to be deemed a scientific theory and what is not is not so sharp as we would think. To
debate this issue here would lead me outside the boundaries of the present work, so I will
just note that there is a problem, without attempting to solve it. Anyway, the solution is
largely irrelevant to the point I want to make, because the relationship between philosophy
and science, as I want to describe it here, merely depends on what we judge to be philosophy
or science at a given time, independently on the reasons and justifications that we might




is basic logic that teaches us how the conclusion might be true even if the
premises are false. Of course, if we manage to show that the conclusion is
not derivable from other premises, then we have stepped further towards the
ascertainment of the premises; in this case, of the philosophical assumptions
which ground modern linguistics. It must be noticed, though, that we can
never be assured of the certainty of the conclusion itself (i.e., of the scientific
theory), and this for the very nature of scientific enterprise. So, at best, there
is a mutual relationship of reinforcement between semantic holism and mod-
ern linguistics, but it is not that they stand or fall together, nor that one of
the two is necessary or sufficient for the truth of the other.
This relationship and reinforcement can be best understood, in my opinion,
if we focus on the heuristic value that semantic holism may have with regards
to some scientific enteprises. Far from having the deleterious effects which
Fodor and Lepore would attribute to it, semantic holism can prove a useful tool
for some scientific disciplines – linguistics being only one of them – inasmuch
as it can show where theoretical problems are, as well as which routes are
more likely to provide a solution, given the assumptions of the discipline. My
intention in what follows is to give some example of this heuristic power of
semantic holism with respect to contemporary linguistics.
Relevance Theory
We have seen some of the fields of linguistics in which some holistic theory
is common background. Syntactic theories, for instance, rest by and large on
holistic assumptions. So does any generativistic theory: since the generativis-
tic approach originated first as a syntactic theory, we can expect that it has
retained some flavour from that.
Also pragmatics can be favoured by a holistic approach. We have seen,
in § 3.3.2, that some pragmaticists would be glad to have some theoretical
background to help them individuate what is relevant to the practical uses of
language. The problems that we have found in dealing with a molecularistic
theory, which we might have expected to ground such an individuation, can
lead the pragmaticists to look somewhere else for the background they might
need. Semantic holism, with its emphasis on what cognitivists call ‘theory of
mind’ (i.e., the attribution of mental states to other people as a crucial step
in explaining their behaviour) and on the importance of focusing on the whole
experience of oneself as a rational being, seems pretty much in agreement at
least with some of the most credited theories in pragmatics, such as Relevance
Theory.
According to this, human beings are compelled, in their uses of language,
to regard all it is said as being said by the speaker for the purpose of being
relevant for the hearer. With this axiomatic ground in mind (which clearly re-
sembles the principle of charity), one calls on everything known about oneself
and the interlocutor to make sense of the utterances that have been spoken.
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It is a trial and error procedure, and its final point is the establishing of the
amount of modification to individual knowledge that the processing and in-
terpretation of an utterance causes to the hearer. If such modification is not
worth the interpretive effort, then there is no relevance to be found in the ut-
terance. Even if this happens sometimes (for not every chunk of speech that
we happen to hear is relevant to us), the hearer cannot doubt the speaker’s
intention of being relevant, unless the doubt is casted onto the speaker’s ratio-
nality altogether. Rather, the hearer would look for some kind of mistake from
the speaker – in the felicity of the utterance as an expression of the speaker’s
intention, or in the speaker’s grasping of the interactive situation, etc.38
Sketchy as my presentation might be, it is still easy to see how this theory
appeals to the same background theory as detailed in § 4.2.7, i.e., on the at-
tribution to the speaker of the same cognitive system of the hearer as a whole.
Relevance, in fact, can be determined only against a background of shared be-
lief, and the attribution of shared belief is possible, according to the account
that I have been presenting, only within a holistic theory of interpretation. In
this case, then, a theory about pragmatics (Relevance Theory) and a theory of
philosophy of language (semantic holism) find an agreement, perhaps through
rather independent routes. Still, this agreement shows that it is possible that
one theory points problems or solutions to the other, which would perhaps
pass unseen, were the theories left alone in their respective fields.
Acquisition
We have already seen some issues about the problem of linguistic acquisition
that can be solved by appealing to some holistic theory of language.39 We
have passed under silence, though, what might seem the major obstacle posed
by the phenomenon of linguistic acquisition to holism.
Here is the objection, as it might be stated. It is easy for common sense
to imagine how, one step after the other, children expand their languages into
adult ones, adding one piece at a time to a pre-existing structure. But, if the
child’s language is part of the adult’s one, then holism must be false. The
intuitive picture is not an obstacle because it pictures any chunk of language
as independent from the others. After all, it is easy to imagine that adding
something to a structure modifies the structure itself, creating the network of
interdependencies that is needed by a holistic theory. The problem is, rather,
that we have repeated many times that, under holism, we should regard the
whole language as primitive, and the parts and elements of it as derivative;
but the intuitive picture of acquisition clearly subverts the holistic image, as
we conceived it.
It seems from independent arguments, though, that holism holds. Hence,
we might be tempted to look for an explanation according to which, against




appearances, the child’s language is not part of the adult’s, but it is a different
linguistic system. Our problem is to explain what the connection between the
two linguistic systems, the child’s and the adult’s, could be. We must find an
alternative conception of acquisition to the gradual learning process picture.
Chomsky’s idea is that in the case of language we have something anal-
ogous to what happens in the case of the immune system for what concerns
selection of antibodies by antigens.40 We might think that, in the presence
of a particular antigen, the human body reacts producing the correspondent
antibody. Actually, this is not the proper way of describing what happens.
The body already has the antibodies it might need: the antigen just selects
the correspondent one. In the same way, children are born with all grammars
they might need, and their linguistic environment selects the right one. To
put it in a better way: they are born with a universal grammar which shows
them how to fix certain parameters starting from linguistic data they come
in contact with to obtain the grammar which generates those linguistic data.
One should not talk, therefore, of partial grammar: grammar is complete from
the beginning. From the beginning a structure exists and interacts with other
structures, with the environment, and with genetic predisposition, and thus
it performs a certain function and reshapes itself into another structure, and
so on, until it reaches a stable stage – i.e., adult grammar.41
Saying that a child’s grammar is part of an adult’s grammar is as senseless
as saying that its brain is part of the adult’s. It is a preceding stage of it,
but it does not exist because of what it will turn into: in fact, it is not at all
determined which direction its development will take. This holds for brain as
much as for language, and for the whole human body.
∗∗∗
Now I turn once again to heuristics. We saw that to assume a holistic point
of view on language gives us a theory of acquisition, which can and has to
be tested against empirical evidence. Contrasting theories offer less room for
empirical test.
We already mentioned the problem of vagueness of molecularism, vague-
ness which makes all tests non-decisive and perhaps uninterpretable. There
is another problem with molecularism about acquisition: it does not explain
how molecules are acquired. In fact, if they are acquired one piece at a time,
it is, actually, a form of atomism. If they are acquired each as a whole, again I
see no remarkable difference from a holistic theory that should make us willing
to prefer a molecularistic one. Both holism and molecularism, in fact, must
explain acquisition of language in terms of acquisition of rules. A molecular-
40Chomsky (1980) pp. 136 ff.
41Cf. ibid. p. 134:
Without attempting to inquire into too many subtleties or to settle the ques-
tion, I would like to suggest that in certain fundamental respects we do not
really learn a language; rather, grammar grows in the mind.
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istic theory, moreover, should also contemplate metarules to choose among
molecules: acquisition of these metarules must be explained, and this reduces
molecularism’s appeal.
An atomistic theory of acquisition has its difficulties too: it has to dis-
mantle a sorites. We already proved that a single sentence means nothing in
isolation. We can easily maintain that the same holds for two sentences in
isolation. If acquisition were gradual, some sentence at a time, one should
explain when and how meaning comes in the picture.
These problems might not be insurmountable. With time, labour, talent
and luck someone could mend the faults. I think that, meanwhile, we should
admit that the best theory we have is, for heuristic reasons, semantic holism.
Language Evolution
Another field of linguistic research in which semantic holism proves a powerful
heuristic tool is the investigation of language evolution. If the faculty of lan-
guage is, as it is thought by most prominent contemporary linguists, an innate
characteristic of human beings, and if this translates in it being a biological
feature of human beings, it is appropriate to ask about the evolutionary origin
of such faculty.
Of course, it is not at all guaranteed that the faculty of language is biolog-
ical in the first place. What we know from the discourse of the previous two
chapters is that it is essential, for our theory of meaning and interpretation,
to assume that the faculty of language is a universal characteristic of human
beings. What this universality might consist in is completely another ques-
tion. Anyway, since the study of such faculty is dealt by linguistics, and since
modern linguistics, after Chomsky, poses itself as a branch of psychology, we
might be tempted of finding a grounding to such a universal characteristic
which is not metaphysical, but immanent and contingent in nature. Other-
wise, we are forced to establish some sort of metaphysical argument to explain
why human beings are endowed of such a faculty, while other kinds of beings
are not.
Such an argument would be, as I said, necessarily metaphysical in charac-
ter. Of course, also the claim that the faculty of language is biological, and
therefor we are entitled in searching for its evolutionary origin is a metaphys-
ical claim; at least in the sense that the only proofs (or hints) for the truth
of such claim can come from the scientific research which is prompted and
grounded from the claim itself. I do not think that this situation is particular
hard to swallow, nor that it is rare. On the contrary, I think that it happens
quite often in scientific enterprises to ground on unproved claims entire fields
of reasearch which are supposed to show the truth of the claims themselves.
As long as this methodology is accepted by the community of researchers and
it produces results which are equally accepted by them, I do not think that
we should frown at it.
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The long and the short of this discourse is that nowadays the leap from
considering some certain cognitive characteristic (viz., the faculty of language)
a universal feature of some organism and considering it a biological feature
of that organism is seen as legitimate, even if it is not warranted by what we
know about the connections between biological and cognitive features. Within
such a leap, semantic holism has an important role, being the theory which
assess the faculty of language as a universal feature in the first place.
∗∗∗
The problem of the evolutionary source of the faculty of language comes to
the attention of the scientific community from reasons that are not completely
dependent on semantic holism, and that I will not attempt to reconstruct
here. What I would like to show, though, is that also for this scientific project
semantic holism can constitute a valid heuristic theory, pointing at routes that
might seem promising to explain how the faculty of language evolved.
I will not go into any detail here: suffice it to say that the Davidsonian
theory of interpretation, according to which interpretation always entails at-
tribution of intentions, can be seen as showing a strong connection between
the faculty of language (or, at least, that part of the faculty of language that
is responsible for interpretation) and that faculty that cognitivists call ‘the-
ory of mind.’ A promising route for the evolutionary linguistics is therefore
to investigate the possiblity that the faculty of language primarily evolved
from the theory of mind. Furthermore, the suggestion that all interpretation
is possible because of the ability of producing utterances, and the proposal
that all self-interpretation comes first from recognition and interpretation of
others’ intentions also strongly point in the same direction. These two ideas,
taken together, also show that it is perhaps appropriate to think of the fac-
ulty of language as unitary, and deem the interpretive side and the productive
side merely as two interrelated tasks carried out by the same faculty. If this
is correct, then we might also have the hint that the interpretative task is
prior to the productive task, and this may originate a very particular kind of
evolutionary theory of the faculty of language.
It is interesting to note that a theory along these very lines has indeed
been proposed. In a nutshell, the faculty of language first originated from the
need of interpreting very long chunks of incoherent oral noises. The need of
interpreting them, and of projecting the interpretation on the proto-utterances
gave to them arrangements and orderings that eventually led to syntax and
morphology.42
42Cf. Aitchison (1998) and McDaniel (2005). Of course, this is too little space to outline
all the details of such a complex theory as one explaining the evolution of the faculty of
language. For a collection of seminal studies in the field, cf. at least Hurford et al. (1998)
and Tallerman (2005), where the two above-mentioned papers can be found.
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6.3 Final Remarks
In this work I proposed to analyze the notion and theory of semantic holism,
and I attempted to do it by comparison with other theories which intend to ex-
plain the same class of phenomena as semantic holism. In sketching the three
theories and trying to see what functions in them and what arguments still
need some mending, an eye was always kept on the relation between philoso-
phy of language (as instantiated respectively by semantic atomism, semantic
molecularism, and semantic holism) and other philosophical or scientific dis-
ciplines. To each of the three theories I grant some heuristic power, more or
less so depending on the discipline we are interested in drawing the connection
with.
Thus we have seen that semantic atomism seems apt for grounding formal
logic and formal semantics, and it both grounds and depends on certain onto-
logical assumptions. Semantic molecularism and semantic holism are perhaps
best understood as trying to offer more or less the same kind of answer to
the semantic problem. It is, for both cases, an answer which does not rely on
what there is, i.e., there is no need or little need for ontological assumptions.
Rather, it is quite necessary, in order to ground such theories, to question
epistemology, therefore both theories have strong interdependencies with this
discipline. As for the scientific connections, both have some suggestion to give
to and to take from psychology and perhaps neurology. Also, the strongest
connection for both disciplines is with linguistics.
While I gladly admit that, especially for the grounding of psychology and
pragmatics, semantic molecularism is the kind of theory that we might need
to devise in the long run, presently it has flaws at its foundation that can
be mended only by paying attention to the objections coming from semantic
holism, and to the kind of solution that semantic holism permits. If I was
asked to foretell what kind of theory our semantics will evolve into, therefore, I
would guess it will be some kind of holism reproducing for practical reasons the
desirable features of semantic molecularism – e.g., the possibility of restricting
in a straightforward way (which is still to be found) the field of what is relevant
for a given task of interpretation. Or, maybe, something completely different.
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